<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare Revisited: A Battle of ‘Buzzwords’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-28</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid warfare is the most common term used by commentators to describe the complexity and multifaceted character of contemporary warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to coercive methods of strategic competition that take place below the threshold of conventional military conflict and is usually applied to the blend of military and non-military methods of warfare employed by the West’s principal adversaries, Russia and China. The term hybrid warfare has evolved from an essentially military concept to one that potentially embraces all the instruments of state power. Hybrid warfare remains an ill-defined and contested term, and there are many other buzzwords, such as irregular warfare, hybrid threats, and gray zone aggression, that are used to describe the same phenomenon. This article examines the evolution of thinking on hybrid warfare and these related concepts. It highlights the challenges that scholars and practitioners have faced in trying to define and apply these terms in the policy environment in a manner that promotes common understanding and strategic coherence.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Roland Kelemen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Hybrid War on the European Union's Cybersecurity Policies and Regulations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cognitive warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2023 </style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75-90</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">While Russia transitioned from hybrid to conventional warfare in Ukraine, NATO recognized cyberspace as another domain where allied response can be invoked. The European Union also decided to enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of the organization and its member states, making social resilience a priority area. It is recognized that the security of cyberspace and related systems is not just an economic issue but one that affects the whole society, necessitating a more complex strategy and regulation. The EU has taken steps to mitigate the cyber risks associated with hybrid warfare, enhancing network and cognitive security. However, offensive cyber operations could increasingly lead to open armed conflict. During existing conflicts, some cyber operations may undermine public confidence and further escalate the situation. The EU and its Member States must pay closer attention to escalation dynamics in their legislation and practices. It is crucial to scrutinize cyber policies, set specific targets and deadlines, and regularly update them. This will require stakeholders to find the appropriate regulatory levels and align national regulations, practices, and standards.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">75</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">John M. Quinn</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lessons for NATO to Be Learned from Putin's War in Ukraine: Global Health Engagement, Interoperability, and Lethality</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">GHE</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Global Health Engagement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">health security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lethality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">medical readiness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military medicine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">103-118</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Russian invasion of Ukraine exacts a heavy death toll of preventable morbidity and mortality of warfighters and vulnerable civilian communities. Global Health Engagement (GHE) with partner forces across the entire continuum of care, from the point of injury/wounding to rehabilitation, promote interoperability, medical readiness, and lethality. Owing to Russia’s recent tactical and combat movements in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and elsewhere in Europe, GHE activities offered by NATO and unilaterally by member states must increase. Multi-domain attacks by Russia, China, and other malicious actors exacerbate global health security risks and war-related injuries and illnesses. NATO-led GHE activities for warfighting in Ukraine can support foreign policy interests with targeted application and, in return, yield maximum benefits to NATO and member states. Medical readiness, interoperability, and lethality can be achieved through a coordinated effort across all medical actors to standardize the medical evacuation chain, conduct transparent deployment of mobile medical units, and increase access to damage control resuscitation and surgery through echelons of care. Sharing lessons learned helps Ukraine, as well as NATO and its member states. These main themes of effort will reduce preventable morbidity and mortality in support of warfighting and state sovereignty.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">103</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Susan LeVine</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nonlethal Weapons and Intermediate Force: A Necessary Complement to Lethality</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">infantry</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intermediate force capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">land domain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maritime domain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobility</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-lethal weapons</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Protection of Civilians</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stability policing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stabilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">urban operations</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article updates a previous publication, “Beyond Bean Bags and Rubber Bullets: Intermediate Force Capabilities Across the Competition Continuum,” highlighting the relevance of non-lethal weapons as intermediate force capabilities to the U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy and NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Intermediate force capabilities can strengthen deterrence, providing active or defensive measures to counter aggression below the level of armed conflict, enable military operations among civilian populations in urban environments, and support establishing post-conflict safe and secure environments for transition to host nation governance.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Erik Fagergren</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia's Gambit to Redefine the Current World Order</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Crimea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Donbas</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">great power</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Security Strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">President Putin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">special military operation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">world order</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29-46</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made iterative changes to its National Security Strategy (NSS) to bolster its position in the world. The initial intent of the NSS was to provide aspirational foreign policy goals and ambitions the Kremlin could work towards. In 2021, President Putin viewed Russia to be in a position to change the Kremlin’s status in the world and decided to take action. In addition to publishing the 2021 NSS, President Putin also penned a personal history essay about Russia and Ukraine. President Putin’s article provides the Kremlin with a narrative to garner popular domestic support and superficial justification for Russia’s actions against Ukraine. The ultimate goal of the NSS is to reestablish the Cold War world order. President Putin is using Ukraine as a means to reassert Russia’s position in the world while at the same time attempting to discredit the Euro-Atlantic rules-based order.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Glen Segell</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Selective Leadership Expectations in a Multinational Force Context Examined through NATO Training</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">commissioned officer</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO School Oberammergau</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">non-commissioned officer</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">North Atlantic Treaty Organization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">training</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Military personnel with leadership roles may be expected to require some additional specialist training to be more effective in the NATO context, given its multinational environment. That includes the command of forces not necessarily from their own country. To describe and evaluate such leadership expectations, this article examines NATO training and uncovers the expectations defined by the training. The analysis of five courses offered by the NATO School Oberammergau helps determine these expectations in the specific areas for specific ranks and the value-added of the training and its content. For example, non-commissioned officers with ranks OR-4/OR-5 are expected to lead in interoperability, OR-6/OR-7 in rules of engagement, combating trafficking in human beings and tackling organized crime, and OR-8/OR-9 in international ethics and law of armed conflict. Commissioned officers with ranks OF-4/OF-9 are expected to lead in integrity-building and anti-corruption activities. Between 2015 and 2021, there have been a total of 1 555 trainees on these five courses that, given their ranks, could mean that they would be leading over 85 000 subordinates in deployment.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Giray Sadık</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aybike Yalçın İspir</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comparative Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Efforts of NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">regional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SCO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shanghai Cooperation Organization</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">48</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">115-134</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p style=&quot;margin-left:19.85pt;&quot;&gt;The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are two important regional security organizations covering interrelated areas, yet they do not cooperate in the area of counter-terrorism. The comparative analysis of their counter-terrorism efforts can bring a fresh perspective beyond that of inter-block rivalry by adding a layer of complexity while evaluating the advantages of cooperation. In this article, the counter-terrorism efforts of NATO and the SCO are compared with regard to their founding principles, legal doctrines, organizational structures and military operations. It provides analysis of how these organizations created their legal doctrines, established their organizational structures and implemented practices in combating terrorism. Based on this comparison, it was discovered that both organizations transformed and adapted to better fight terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks; however, due to the differences in their founding principles, NATO and the SCO tackled terrorism via different paths. Since terrorism is their common enemy, it can be asserted that collaboration between NATO and the SCO would benefit the counter-terrorism efforts of both organizations, as well as global efforts.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">115</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rupert A. Brandmeier</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jörn-Alexander Heye</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Clemens Woywod</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Future Development of Quantum Computing and Its Relevance to NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cryptography</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Quantum computing</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">quantum cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">quantum key distribution</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">quantum resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">quantum supremacy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89-109</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The first quantum computers are becoming a reality, and scientists working in various areas look forward to taking advantage of their enormous computational potential. At the same time, the high performance of quantum computers imposes serious risks for cybersecurity. We can expect an arms race between rival parties: a defensive side trying to ensure the privacy and dependability of stored and transmitted information and their adversaries. With this article, the authors aim to provide an overview of the status of quantum computer development, project the next steps, and investigate the impact future quantum systems may have on cybersecurity and military operations. We first discuss the basic aspects that differentiate quantum computing from classical computing and find that analogies between both domains are quite limited. The world of quantum computers is remarkably diverse already, and we elaborate that quantum simulators and universal quantum computers have “qubits” in common but still work in fundamentally different ways. Since security experts focus on upcoming trends in quantum computing, we take a look at the latest technologies and at the race for first reaching “quantum supremacy.” Finally, we provide a detailed analysis of the specific risks future quantum computers represent for established cryptosystems and conclude that asymmetric algorithms like the RSA protocol are particularly vulnerable. The dangers of quantum computing for cryptography are obvious, as is the high relevance of the safety of stored and transmitted data to the defense sector. However, we examine the capability spectrum of quantum technologies and discover that breaking asymmetric encryption algorithms is just one facet, and other features like Grover’s quantum algorithm may revolutionize the logistics of the armed forces. Satellite Quantum Key Distribution is another promising concept that may change the communication between military units. To NATO, quantum computing is a double-edged sword: the alliance needs to use the developments to benefit from the potential and be ready to counter the cyber threats. We derive ideas of what NATO should do in order to prepare for the quantum era.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilian oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EUAM</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parliamentary oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SSU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state security reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verkhovna Rada</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VR</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Though Ukraine was among the first successor states of the Soviet Union to create a legal framework for the activities of its intelligence and security community, said framework addressed inherited and unreformed structures. Subsequent reform plans have not led to the success desired by Ukraine’s international partners and, we must assume, a majority of the Ukrainian voters and taxpayers. Among the reform demands is also the credible subordination to parliamentary oversight, which, though stipulated by law, has effectively been neutralized by reference to subordination to the President in the same law. Who would want to be controlled by an ever-undecided parliament if a personalized oversight by the President and the expert committee of the National Security and Defence Council is the possible alternative? As a consequence, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains subject to much criticism – for the corruption of some of its representatives, for overlapping mandates with other security institutions, and for lack of control other than by itself and the changing presidents and their administrations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andras Hugyik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Best Practices in the Application of the Concept of Resilience: Building Hybrid Warfare and Cybersecurity Capabilities in the Hungarian Defense Forces</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hungary</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-38</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In its Global Strategy for foreign and security policy, the EU applies resilience as a comprehensive concept of internal and external security. In parallel, at the 2016 Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders decided to boost NATO's resilience to the full spectrum of threats. Each NATO member needs to be resilient to a major shock caused by a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, a hybrid, or an armed attack. Hybrid warfare, including cyberattacks, is recognized as a significant security challenge. The National Security Strategy of Hungary, adopted in 2020, confirms that the primary international framework of Hungary's security and defense policy is NATO and EU membership and highlights the need to enhance the country's resilience against hybrid attacks. This article provides an analysis of the application of the concept of resilience in the Hungarian defense sector. It introduces the development of the resilience of the Hungarian Defense Forces against hybrid threats, including their cyber component, while generating options for the decision-makers regarding the military and information instruments of national power. The author identifies potential hybrid threats against Hungary, a possible cyberattack scenario, and lines of effort to achieve a feasible level of resilience to such threats. He takes account of the political and military environment, as well as wider national issues in view of hybrid threats and main features and dilemmas of cyber warfare, thus aiming to facilitate the application of the concept of resilience in Hungary.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Concept of Resilience: Security Implications and Implementation Challenges</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">concept</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disaster risk</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">maturity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peacebuilding</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">police force</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">postconflict reconstruction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sendai Framework</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">stabilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">theory</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-12</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aiming for a more effective and efficient response to diverse and multidimensional threats, an increasing number of defense and security organizations, the United Nations, NATO, and the EU embrace the concept of resilience in their security strategies and policies. This article provides a brief overview of the concept, a sample of definitions used in policy documents, and the types of problems they seek to resolve. Then we introduce the reader to the 15 articles published in the Summer and Fall 2020 issues of Connections that present the evolution of the concept of resilience and its implementation by and within political, defense, and law enforcement organizations, as well as its anticipated contribution to cybersecurity, disaster preparedness, peacebuilding, post-conflict restoration and countering hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nadja Milanova</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institutional Resilience and Building Integrity in the Defence and Security Sector</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">BI</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building Integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">corruption</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense and security sector</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Good governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutional resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-75</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The concept of resilience in defense and security is evolving towards the inclusion of a wide-ranging and multi-dimensional set of vulnerabilities and associated mitigation strategies across the spectrum of military and non-military mechanisms of response. This article argues that while corruption and poor governance are now recognized as a security threat, as articulated in the NATO Warsaw Summit Declaration, the strengthening of defense and related security institutions in both Allied and partner countries remains to be further embedded as an integral part of the concept of resilience. Institutional resilience based on integrity, transparency and accountability is critical for ensuring the fulfilment of NATO’s resilience commitment and its baseline requirements, which include inter alia continuity of government with the ability to make decisions and provide services to the population. Corruption and poor governance undermine public trust and perpetuate instability and fragility. NATO’s Building Integrity policy contributes to the fulfilment of the Alliance’s three core tasks – collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO’s work on Projecting Stability vis-à-vis partners has recognized the role of good governance as a component of improving partners’ resilience. This needs to be further institutionalized through consistent efforts at strengthening defense institutions. The contribution of institutional resilience to NATO’s defense and deterrence task needs to be further conceptualized. The article argues for a more consistent approach to operationalizing Building Integrity as an integral part of the concept of resilience and the need for robust institutional capabilities to mitigate vulnerabilities stemming from the risk of corruption as a security threat.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rosław Jeżewski</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cross-domain Coercion as Russia’s Endeavor to Weaken the Eastern Flank of NATO: A Latvian Case Study</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">corrupt government</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-domain coercion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Flank</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic footprint</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Latvian resistance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cross-domain coercion is tangible on NATO’s Eastern flank and characterized by the use of derogatory propaganda, fake news, financial assets in the Latvian banking system, Russian-based organized crime, and various military elements. This study on cross-domain coercion, however, concentrates also on the cohesion of the Latvian population, existing gaps within society, and its susceptibility to being exploited by Russia. To acquire data for this study, the author conducted interviews with representatives of the Eastern flank countries and performed an extensive literature review. To determine the root causes of vertical division in the society, the “5 WHYs” method was used. This research has proved that the presence of a Russian minority and the Russian-based organized crime minority can be a good base to create unrest and that Russia is able to influence the internal policy of a country when the Russian economic footprint exceeds 12 % of GDP. The demographics and the cohesion (including vertical and horizontal divisions) of the society are factors determining the resistance of Latvia. The triumph of the populist parties during the October 2018 parliamentary elections reflect the trend that the nation is tired of the corrupt and ineffective government rather than that it is drifting towards Russia. In a broader scope, it is expected that cross-domain coercion will increase and Russia will test the cohesion of NATO.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velizar Shalamanov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pavel Anastasov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgi Tsvetkov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence and Defense at the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU: Readiness and Interoperability in the Context of Forward Presence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Balkans</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea region</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Flank</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">readiness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-42</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article reflects the discussions during a September 2018 conference in Sofia, sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Its focus is on the defense and deterrence posture of NATO and the European Union in Eastern Europe. Special attention is given to the development of the Bucharest Initiative (B9) and its influence on the Western Balkans and Black Sea Region. The authors propose a Program for Readiness and Interoperability, oriented to the C4ISR area. This is based on the defense posture and in the context of the developments in NATO and the European Union for improved readiness and interoperability with partners that, together with enhanced cooperation in education and training for the de¬fined B9+ region, will act as instruments to implement this cooperation and improve the deterrence and defense capability on the Eastern Flank of NATO and the EU, while at the same time strengthening resilience to hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Piotr Gawliczek</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Role in Improving Professional Military Education with a Focus on the South Caucasus Countries</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DEEP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PME</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Professional Military Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Caucasus</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer-Fall 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35-44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The presented article underlines the priority of education and considers the role of Professional Military Education (PME) in enhancing defense capabilities and preparing the military leaders who are able to make strategic decisions and solve complex problems. It emphasizes a PME as a cornerstone of the military build-up. The authors examine the main characteristics of PME and underscore its importance for increasing the interoperability between the NATO allies and the South Caucasus nations. Taking the broad meaning of interoperability into account, the authors attempted to bring to the fore the critical need for increasing the intellectual interoperability with outside expertise. Further, the authors point out the importance of the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) as a new system for improving PME and building better-integrated forces in the South Caucasus. At the same time, this article identifies factors that will lead towards the enhancement of the relations amongst the South Caucasus nations themselves. The goal is to consider how the South Caucasus countries can more effectively address the challenges in PME and to formulate suggestions and recommendations. Comparative analysis, synthesis, inductive, and deductive methods have been used to produce conclusive outcomes and recommendations for the countries in the region.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">35</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gregory Simons</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Piotr Gawliczek</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Caucasus: Stage for a ‘New Great Game’ between NATO and Russia?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">frozen conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">great power competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer-Fall 2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">18</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-34</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Caucasus is one of the most important geostrategic regions between Europe and Asia, a playground for many regional and global actors with enduring interests. These interests have been clashing through the centuries. Each actor endeavors to impose its rules and tries to capitalize on the geostrategic benefits of the region. This article analyzes the main aspects, challenges, and prospects of cooperation between the countries in the South Caucasus and Russia and NATO. The authors describe the competition for power and influence in the region, the “Old Great Game,” the regional state of affairs, and possible effects of the Russian factor on the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation. They illustrate Russia’s security interests in the South Caucasus vis-à-vis NATO’s enlargement policy, outline the reasons for the Alliance’s reluctance to engage in the region actively, and current and future prospects of South Caucasus-NATO cooperation. NATO’s presence is said to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, but how is this managed without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow and what is its contribution to resolving the so-called “frozen conflicts” in order to maintain the security and prosperity of the South Caucasus? The combination of competition and confrontation has been designated as the “New Great Game,” with clear similarities and differences vis-à-vis the “Old Great Game.” The authors question whether a “New Great Game” currently exists and apply comparative analysis, synthesis, inductive, and deductive methods to come up with conclusive answers.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nadja El Fertasi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Why Digital Ecosystems of Civil-Military Partnerships Are a Game Changer for International Security and Defence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil-military relations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence and security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital disruption</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital transformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">42</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33-47</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The defence and security sectors are grappling to keep up with the rapid changes that the digital transformation is having on societies. By 2030, people will have access to unprecedented volumes of information available through networks across the globe. Enhanced connectivity will expose both civil and military networks to threats at a pace never seen before. Threats and challenges associated with the digital change of Big Data, the Internet of Things or disruptive technologies such as Artificial Intelligence continue to make current headlines. Partnerships between civil and military institutions in the digital era will help mitigate the misuse of technology while fully harnessing its opportunities. As we move into a new era where information and hybrid warfare continue to mark the security landscape, digital ecosystems of civil-military partnerships will prove valuable for the long term. An era where a comprehensive, diverse and an inclusive lens in implementing defence and security policies is a necessity to reflect the complex and interrelated security challenges of today&amp;rsquo;s age. Building on the public-private transatlantic forum, such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group by tapping into the full potential across the Alliance, will help ensure NATO stays ahead of the technology curve. Bringing public-private partnerships into the digital era to keep pace with the challenges of digital transformation and disruption is no longer a luxury, but a necessity.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Emil Eftimov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building a Potential to Counteract Hybrid Threats through Cooperation and Regional Security</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international military cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mediterranean Dialogue</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">39</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-20</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The main goal of this article is to present and discuss the opportunities to deepen cooperation between the Alliance and partners in countering hybrid threats. The focus is put on the eastern and southern NATO flanks, where the most advanced partner formats like Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialog (MD) have been developed. The first conclusion is that NATO partnership programs and the various initiatives in the interest of the partners are aimed at achieving stability in the periphery of the Alliance by increasing partners’ resilience to various types of threats. In addition, the author argues that success in countering hybrid threats in the current security environment is impossible without parallel and coordinated action of NATO in coordination with other international organizations, especially the European Union.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mihail Naydenov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Building the Capacity of NATO’s Eastern European  Members to Fight Hybrid War</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capacity building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">subversion</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">41</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-58</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Russian Federation has been waging a hybrid war campaign against NATO and the EU for years. The Kremlin has so far skillfully managed to exploit the vulnerabilities of the West. The NATO Eastern flank members are particularly exposed to the Kremlin-orchestrated systematic subversion and this is a problem of growing significance to the Alliance as it is undermining its cohesion and is preventing the build-up of strong national security and defense systems of its Eastern European member states. In order to effectively remedy this dangerous situation, the Eastern flank NATO member states must immediately start implementing a coherent national institutional capacity building programs, supported by NATO and the EU, aimed at timely mitigation of existing vulnerabilities and building up long-lasting resilient national security structures able to tackle hybrid threats coming from any direction. To carry out this ambition, a number of capacity building steps are proposed.</style></abstract><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pierre Jolicoeur</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Education Enhancement Program in Ukraine: The Limits of NATO’s Education Program</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DEEP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Education Enhancement Program</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PME</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Professional Military Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109-119</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) is a NATO initiative dating back ten years. It aims at fostering intellectual operability and officer professional military education (PME) to render NATO Partners and potential members capable of joining forces with NATO nations if need be, and to develop the practices and methods to ensure their own security. The Ukraine portion of the program is the most significant. Administered by NATO and the Partnership for Peace Consortium, overseen by strong American and Polish interests, it is a manifestation of what the Alliance can do as a measure of assistance and reassurance to Ukraine. The DEEP is a tool to demonstrate NATO’s credibility and deterrence potential outside of Art. 5. This article speaks of the absorption challenges created by the multiplicity of events, and argues that the objective of creating self-sufficient and interoperable forces is impeded by the current conflict in the Donbas.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alexandra C. Chinchilla</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Paul Poast</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Baltic Battalion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense Institution Building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DIB</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">61-71</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defense institution building seeks to create the means and mechanisms that enable effective capability aggregation within NATO. Can external assistance with DIB help states become suitable NATO members? We discuss the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic States to understand the role of external assistance in defense institution building and how this can enable a state to gain NATO membership. We then consider whether lessons in the Baltic experience are applicable to Georgia and Ukraine.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maksym Bugriy</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform: Is Ukraine Taking Western Advice?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">complexity theory</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cynefin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2018</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72-91</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The ongoing Western support to Ukraine’s security sector reform requires the assessment of the reform success. This article considers whether Ukraine’s reform is achieving effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic governance objectives. The author uses a theoretical framework of complexity theory applied to the change management research in organizational studies. The application of this framework is appealing from the perspective of complex and chaotic organizational contexts, in which the security sector can stimulate the emergence of ‘strange attractors’ for system’s adaptability. The findings suggest that Ukraine is building a shared vision following up on chaotic-framed Security Sector Reform acceleration since 2014. The gap between increased confidence in the volunteers and the army and declining confidence in general government institutions, economic burden, and Western cohesion issues constitute the risks that Ukraine’s Europeanization faces.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">72</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Amar Causevic</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">climate change</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international relations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">59-80</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper examines NATO’s perception of climate change as a non-traditional threat multiplier. For well over a decade, European as well as Pentagon and other U.S. government studies and policy documents have noted that as the planet continues to warm, arable land continues to disappear, cyclones become more powerful, droughts increase in impact, food shortages are more frequent, and thousands of climate migrants are on the move. All of these climate change-related factors significantly increase the likelihood of conflict escalation. The threat multiplier characteristic of climate change will only exacerbate problems such as government instability, the spread of disease, conflicts over water supplies, the strengthening of terrorism, and widespread migration. This research explores NATO’s initiatives to deal with this non-traditional threat multiplier and analyzes how different schools of international relations theory define climate change and address this security concern. In addition, the article provides insights into how climate change-induced threats affect the socio-economic and political security of nation states and what that means for NATO. Finally, the research provides a review of the Alliance’s engagement, policy frameworks, operations, and units re-sponsible for tackling threats originating from climate change. It concludes with the recommendation that NATO has made significant progress on placing climate change on its threat radar, but that the Alliance will have to do more to integrate these concerns because current efforts are not sufficient to meet future security challenges stimulated by increase in the average global temperature.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velizar Shalamanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institution Building for It Governance and Management</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">change management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">good practices</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institution building</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NCIA</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">38</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-34</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institution building and change management for IT organizations is challenging even for small cases. Success rates can be improved by careful collection of verified good practices. NATO experience provides examples of good practice. Learning from one of the largest efforts in NATO Reform, launched after the 2010 Lisbon Summit, i.e. the establishment of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) is indispensable. The focus of this article is on the identification of the process and related good practices and, in some cases, recognizing mistakes to be escaped in the future. It presents an attempt to structure the experience as a methodology to support institution building and change management in similar service-based or technology-oriented organizations. The transition from five different organizations to one service-based and customer-funded agency is reviewed in the framework of the NATO Comprehensive C4ISR Approach, noted by Nations in November 2009, considered as an appropriate framework to present and understand the process of change.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Matthieu J.M. Borsboom</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Antonios Chatzidakis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barry Burton</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">General Antonio Conserva</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sigitas Dzekunskas</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tore Kvalvik</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ian Mack</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rustem Ozarmagan</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ricardo Ferreira Reis</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">David E Wright</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Alexandre Barouh</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Slawomir Paczek</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO Governance and Delivery of Commonly Funded Capabilities: Improving Support to NATO Commanders</style></title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">capability delivery</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">common funding</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%"> April 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;At the NATO Warsaw Summit, Heads of State and Government tasked the NATO Deputies Committee to provide recommendations on how to improve the governance aspects of the common funded capability delivery process. Towards that purpose, the NATO Secretary General appointed an independent Group of Senior Experts (GSE) drawn from the Alliance Members. The GSE reviewed the processes and decision-making apparatus across the dimensions of requirement setting, resource allocation, risk management, programme control and capability delivery. A guiding principle for this work was the need to protect the effective application of consensus-based governance. The GSE concluded at an early stage in its work that any recommendations would need to ensure that the controls exercised through the life of a project applied a consensus test at the right time and in the right place. Appropriate oversight and individual (National) and collective (Alliance) agreement were essential but so was the effective delegation of project management and accountability to get the job done.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The GSE undertook a wide-ranging review of the current governance and project control processes used by NATO to deliver capability programmes, recent IBAN reports, potentially useful benchmarks in the academic literature and in the practical delivery of projects in analogous organisations. Combining this analysis with the experience inside the GSE provided clarity of the problem, capacity to explore a range of areas, test potential solutions, and offer practical recommendations.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elman Nasirov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Prospects of Azerbaijan to Enhance Military Interoperability with NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">exercise</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">training</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">89-99</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">After the end of the Cold War, NATO recognized the importance of extending far beyond its traditional borders in order to maintain peace and stability throughout Europe. The incorporation of new members into the Alliance came to the fore. In the light of this approach, cooperation with partner nations became an important area for discussion. Ensuring that partner forces could work together effectively was one of the main objectives and this, in turn, highlighted the term ‘interoperability’ once again. Thus, the evolution of interoperability between NATO and partner nations after the demise of Cold War is considered in this essay, its importance is underscored, the levels of interoperability are introduced and the feasibility of Azerbaijan’s engagement in these levels is analyzed in this article. Different tools and mechanism that the Alliance has launched over the last decades are scrutinized and useful recommendations are considered for Azerbaijan to enhance its military interoperability with NATO. From this perspective of interoperability, different successful models have been outlined as examples for Azerbaijan to follow.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elman Nasirov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Khayal Iskandarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sadi Sadiyev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Caucasus: A playground between NATO and Russia?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">contribution</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">counterbalance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">frozen conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">membership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2017</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2017</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">16</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-56</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;In this article, the challenges and prospects of cooperation between the South Caucasus countries and NATO have been analyzed. The geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the region for both NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia particularly) and reciprocal expectations of further cooperation with the Alliance have been considered. The regional state of affairs in the South Caucasus has been analyzed and the possible impacts of Russian influence on forging closer relations with NATO have been examined. The security environment after the Russo-Georgian war and its repercussions for the South Caucasus-NATO cooperation have been illustrated. NATO’s vested interest in the region to contribute to a European security system for the foreseeable future was brought to the fore. The reasons for the Alliance’s reluctance to actively engage in the region are examined. The recommendations are intended to counterbalance the Russian military presence in the region, without antagonizing the incumbent government in Moscow, and to eradicate the so-called “frozen conflicts” in order to maintain security and prosperity for the South Caucasus region as a whole.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mirosław Banasik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Changing Security Paradigm. New Roles for New Actors – The Russian Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organized crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threats</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">31-43</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The success of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea attest to the fact that the hybrid warfare constitutes an effective tool for achieving political objectives. This article evaluates the nature of hybrid warfare based on theoretical publications on the art of war and doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation, and characterizes the practical dimensions of hybrid warfare. It can be concluded on that basis that hybrid warfare and organized crime constitute real threats to European safety and security. International organizations such as NATO and the European Union so far have not drawn up neither the strategy nor effective tools for countering these phenomena.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Oliver Fitton</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cyber Operations and Gray Zones: Challenges for NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ambiguity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">gray zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">109-119</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Gray Zone represents a space between peaceful state rivalries and war. Within this space actors have developed hybrid strategies to extend their influence. This concept of conflict is best illustrated by Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Gray Zone doctrine leverages ambiguity to create an environment in which adversaries are unable to make strategic decisions in a timely and confident manner. Cyber Operations, because of the attribution problem, lend themselves to this kind of conflict. This article explores the interactions between the Gray Zone and cyber operations and considers questions which NATO must address in order to adapt.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mariusz Fryc</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">From Wales to Warsaw and Beyond: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to the Russian Resurgence on Europe’s Eastern Flank</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">45-65</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strategists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Security.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Federation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">73-87</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strate-gists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West. This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Matthew P. Anderson</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">B-61</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dual Capable Aircraft</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nuclear</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tactical Nuclear Weapons</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warsaw</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2016</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-30</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR, 2012), concluded that “the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture.” In addition to the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, NATO’s “posture” notably included, then and now, some 200 B-61 “tactical” nuclear bombs stored at sites in five longtime member states. Since release of the DDPR, NATO relations with Russia have deteriorated. It would appear that the American B-61 nukes, soon to be improved through a multibillion-dollar life extension program, are destined to stay in Europe. Beneath the surface, however, linger disquieting questions about the fabled three-C’s of NATO’s deterrence – its military capability, its credibility and its communication to potential adversaries and partners alike. This paper suggests six nuclear deterrence reforms that NATO should consider following the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 in order to regain the credibility it once had during the Cold War.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tinatin Aghniashvili</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Towards More Effective Cooperation? The Role  of States in Shaping NATO-EU Interaction and Cooperation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO-EU Cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security policy</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">67-90</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Effective cooperation between the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not only desirable, but rather mandatory in this interdependent and interlinked World. The contemporary multifaceted security threats and challenges have diminished the importance of the national borders and made the members of the institutions almost equally vulnerable. Due to the inherited similarities among organizations, the perception of burden sharing seems natural. However, the existing cooperation framework leaves a big room for improvement. The article explores the factors limiting effective cooperation between the organizations and the analysis is derived from studying individual states’ (dual and non-dual members) behavior in shaping institutions’ interaction. The paper analyzes the roles of the EU and NATO during the Libyan crisis in the neighborhood of Europe and their interaction in Afghanistan – beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The findings of the analysis show that some of the non-dual members of the organization “hold institutions hostage”  ; fragmented positions of the dual members impede the elaboration of a holistic EU policy on crisis management (CSDP) and eventually, hamper formation of a joint EU-NATO strategic vision. Furthermore, lack of division of labor on the ground leads to overlapping of functions to certain extent and cooperation among institutions is better on operational rather than on the strategic level.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Key Prerequisites for Integrity in Defence - Role of Parliament</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">coordination</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence budgeting</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parliamentarian oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">April 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">29</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In a report to the session “Defence Management Reform and Integrity Building” of the 88th Rose-Roth seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Belgrade, 31 March - 2 April 2015, the author outlines three key prerequisites for integrity in defence: having a balanced, adequate, acceptable, and affordable defence policy; assessment of plans, budget proposals, and reports with a view on planned or actual results; and effective cooperation and coordination among key security stakeholders. The report further suggests roles of parliaments and parliamentarian committees on security and defence.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dabrowka Smolny</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO SeaSparrow Program: Cooperation Based on Trust</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SeaSparrow</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SeaSparrow Program</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Surface Missile System</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Fall 2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">83-93</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The author examines the background, rules and structure of the NATO SeaSparrow Program in the context of the “Smart Defense” initiative, introduced by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012 as an attempt to counteract the defense budget cuts in the Allied Countries. The main objective of the study was to identify the mechanisms of the NATO SeaSparrow Program that could serve as the basis for future programs developed within the NATO initiative.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Valeri Ratchev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO’s Partnership for Peace: Twenty Years Later (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central Asia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Eastern Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2014</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">January 2014</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On 11 January 1994, on the U.S. initiative, the heads of NATO member states approved the Partnership for Peace (PfP). A month later, Bulgaria joined PfP crossing its first Rubicon on the road towards the trans-Atlantic alliance and community. PfP proved to be one of the best ideas in the field of security and defence since the end of the Cold War. PfP applied the concept of cooperative security in real politics, and became one of the most important means of gradually breaking down mental and physical barriers inherited by the Cold War. Twenty years later, the realities are very different both in NATO and the partner countries. Military cooperation, however, continues to be an important factor for international security and regional stability. PfP is now a culture of thinking and action. Its value remains high, and member countries and partners are jointly responsible to find ways and forms for its further development and modernization. The time has come for inspirational discussions, followed by timely and effective decisions and actions.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bulgaria’s contribution in the Development of NATO and EU’s Defence Capabilities (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Common Foreign and Security Policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">smart defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">specialization</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">110</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This report to the national conference in Sofia, 8-9 April 2013, provides a review of requirements, achievements, and challenges in determining and developing defence capabilities in NATO and EU context.
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Assya Davidova</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anton Lazarov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Guidance on Developing Bulgaria’s Defence Policy (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Common Security and Defence Policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resource framework</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Minister and deputy ministers of defence in Bulgaria’s caretaker Government, 13 March – 28 May 2013 outline the key required short- and mid-term activities in the area of defence. This document was presented at the attention of the Cabinet and the succeeding team of minister Angel Naydenov, and was published on the MOD website on May 28, 2013.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Velichka Milina</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">New Trends in the Policies for Security of Critical Energy Infrastructures</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec Reports</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">critical energy infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">critical energy infrastructure protection</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyber security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberattack</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">energy security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">IT4Sec reports</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">public private partnership</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">January 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">106</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The current understanding for effective security policy of the critical energy infrastructure focuses on the ability to systematically assess vulnerabilities, predict threats and neutralize the risks of cyber attacks on the interdependent elements of the complex, intelligent energy infrastructures. There are three major new developments in the security policy concerning the functioning of the critical energy infrastructure – cyber security, public-private partnership and international cooperation in the development and implementation of the policy for security of critical energy infrastructures. Various countries and international organizations offer their own policy models, while their efficiency is yet to be proven.</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Assya Davidova</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anton Lazarov</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rossen Ivanov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Report for the activity of the Ministry of Defence in the period of Bulgaria’s Caretaker Government, 13 March – 28 May 2013 (in Bulgarian)</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">accountability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Common Security and Defence Policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">integrity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transparency</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">December 2013</style></date></pub-dates></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></number><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Centre for Security and Defence Management</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sofia</style></pub-location><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The minister, deputy ministers and Chief of Cabinet of the MOD in Bulgaria’s Caretaker Government, 13 March – 28 May 2013, account for the results and implementation of the main priorities and tasks, including the provision of stability of the defence sector and military operations, open dialogue with the organizations active on defence policy issues, and enhanced cooperation and interaction with our Allies and national security sector organizations. This document was presented publicly and published on the MOD website on May 28, 2013.
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Christopher Roscoe</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia Again in Putin’s Shadow</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Abkhazia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">energy dependence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Putin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security guarantees</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sochi Olympics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Ossetia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1-4</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thomas Labouche</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Has U.S. Leadership Been Revitalized Through Barack Obama’s Innovative Use of Force?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Afghanistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Barack Obama</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">diplomacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">doctrine</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Egypt</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Gaddafi</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iran</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iraq</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Israel</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Libya</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Responsibility To Protect</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Syria</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37-52</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kristell Arnell</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO and Sweden Joint Live Experiment on NEC</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">C2 capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Defence Support to Civilian Authorities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Network Enabled Capability</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2011</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">27</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">65-74</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The overall objective for the project was to test if a “service oriented architecture” could facilitate the vision in the NATO NEC Feasibility Study, that states “Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) involves the linking together of sensors, decision makers, and weapon systems, as well as multinational military, governmental, and non-governmental agencies in a seamless, collaborative, planning, assessment and execution environment.” The idea was to see if the utilization of NATO NEC developments together with Swedish NDB results could bring about new techniques that were more flexible and dynamic in its support of civil military co-operation and the Comprehensive Approach. The result of the live experiment was overwhelming, in about some six month the project team succeeded to federate together some 30 different types of information and C2 systems were both civil and military units could share the same operational picture and retrieve it from their own specialized systems. The federated system consisted of fully blown operational systems as the NATO AWAC to system on the experimental level. A main contributor to the success was the utilization of a Service Oriented Architecture. To verify the operational side of NEC, four different vignettes were created under the umbrella of the protection of a high level meeting in the Swedish city of Göteborg. Operating together in the scenarios was several different NATO entities, Swedish military units, the Swedish Police, the Swedish Rescue Service, Swedish SOS Alarm (911/112 functionality) and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. The federated information sharing environment was accredited by both Swedish and NATO Security Authorities.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Marco Bartolozzi</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Developing Regional Air Defence Capabilities: Role of NC3A</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">airspace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Balkan Region</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">C4I</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">C4ISR</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Civil to Military cooperation and integra­tion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">command and control</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defence planning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ISR</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Missile Defence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NC3A</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South East Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">terrorist threat.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">113-122</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The South Eastern European nations of the Balkan Region form an area of countries with similar geo-political issues. These nations need to go through a modernization process of their Air Defence capabilities, in times where financial limitations make it difficult for a single nation to acquire such capabilities on their own. The NATO C3 Agency is highly engaged with the nations of South East Europe in supporting their C4ISR transformation efforts, and possesses all skills, capabilities, and tools to design, procure and implement a regional, multi-national air defence capability, with truly joint situational awareness and integration of na­tional sensors and Missile Defence systems.
</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Katariina Simonen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Operation Allied Force: A Case of Humanitarian Intervention?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Athena Papers</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">humanitarian intervention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">international law</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kosovo</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Operation Allied Force</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2004</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes</style></publisher><pub-location><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Garmisch-Partenkirchen</style></pub-location><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">144</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The NATO Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is highly relevant to the question of the legal assessment of humanitarian intervention. Not only can the current state of law be identified through the various phases of the Operation; the campaign also provides a significant impetus for the development of future law. This study focuses on the question of the intervention threshold: what are the conditions that must exist for the right to intervene to be exercised? In this vein, the facts of the Kosovo case before the intervention are laid out, complemented by a discussion of the law on the recourse to force. Thereafter, the law is applied to the facts.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>