<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leonid Polyakov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intelligence and Security Services Reform and Oversight in Ukraine – An Interim Report</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilian oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">DCAF</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EUAM</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">parliamentary oversight</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">SSU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State Security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">state security reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Verkhovna Rada</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">VR</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51-59</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Though Ukraine was among the first successor states of the Soviet Union to create a legal framework for the activities of its intelligence and security community, said framework addressed inherited and unreformed structures. Subsequent reform plans have not led to the success desired by Ukraine’s international partners and, we must assume, a majority of the Ukrainian voters and taxpayers. Among the reform demands is also the credible subordination to parliamentary oversight, which, though stipulated by law, has effectively been neutralized by reference to subordination to the President in the same law. Who would want to be controlled by an ever-undecided parliament if a personalized oversight by the President and the expert committee of the National Security and Defence Council is the possible alternative? As a consequence, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains subject to much criticism – for the corruption of some of its representatives, for overlapping mandates with other security institutions, and for lack of control other than by itself and the changing presidents and their administrations.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">51</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Bengt Sundelius</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Brief on Embedded Societal Security</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">crisis management</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Human Safety</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intermestic Domain</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Security Risks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Solidarity Clause</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State Security</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23-37</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The traditional dichotomy of security threats and responses cannot serve as a basis for developing national and international security arrangements and institutions in the Twenty First century. This article presents the concept of societal security and the notion of intermestic domain allowing to bridge state security and human safety challenges and to build trans-boundary linkages across domestic and international levels of response. Such holistic approach, that places societal security at the core, is manifested in the Solidarity Clause of the Constitution of the European Union. The implementation of the concept would provide for efficient development of security arrangements within the European Union, between European countries and the United States. Enhanced societal security across the Atlantic could become a core mission for the future work of NATO and the wider Partnership for Peace community.  </style></abstract></record></records></xml>