<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iztok Prezelj</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive Security and Some Implemental Limits</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Asymmetric Threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Comprehensive security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Counter-terrorism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Critical Infrastructure</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cross-sectoral approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">inter-organisational cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">multidimensional security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Risk Assessment</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">threat assessment</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13-34</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The changing security environment has led to the development of com¬prehensive security approaches, strategies and policies. The ‘Holistic approach’ has become an academic and practical mantra. This paper argues, however, that comprehensive security approaches face serious obstacles to their practical implementation. The critical evaluation of several examples confirms that the implementation phase is a weakness of comprehensive approaches and that a truly comprehensive and holistic approach seems to be beyond the implemental capacities of our security systems. Multi-sectoral and multi-level comprehensive approaches become less comprehensive when implemented in practice or even cannot be implemented due to existing narrow perceptions of security or narrow and short-term interests. The trans-sectoral second-, third- and fourth-order effects of proposed security measures are hardly considered or not considered at all. There is no consensus on what exactly comprehensive means, while prioritisation of some areas in the national security policy leads to de-prioritisation of other areas and new vulnerabilities, inter-organisational and cross-sectoral cooperation faces serious limits, threat, risk and vulnerability assessments are not really comprehensive, etc. This paper finishes with recommendations on what to do about these serious limits on the implementation of comprehensive security.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lionel Ponsard</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Homeland Security and the Russian Approach</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information &amp; Security: An International Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Asymmetric Threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">homeland security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russian Transnational Organized Crime</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia’s Security Concepts.</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2005</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">50-60</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Homeland security remains a vague notion in the Russian understand¬ing, but essentially refers to the safeguard of key national interests, the struggle against global threats, with a strong focus on international terrorism, and eventually the fight against transnational organized crime. Homeland security tasks are usually performed in the Russian Federation by several security agencies distributed among three different ministries, i.e. the Interior Ministry, the MOD, and the Ministry for Civil Emergencies (EMERCOM). However, this trilateral structure is perhaps not sufficient to ensure concrete results in Russia’s attempts to fight against organized crime. Although having repeatedly stated the need to re-establish the rule of law, the current Russian government appears to deal with oligarchs in a discretionary way. It would therefore be rather utopian to expect any real improvement without a radical change of attitude from the top leadership. Russian approach towards homeland security is rather close to the European standards in terms of structural implementation, but much closer to the U.S. approach in terms of response and the preference for the use of force. The analysis of Russia’s security concepts demon-strates that security threats to the country are assessed as having clearly increased in the last ten years. A gloomier worldview combined with a reduced influence on the international scene obviously calls for more assertive security documents. In the same logic, the Russian perception advocates force as the preferred solution to deal with asymmetric threats, such as international terrorism. This became even more apparent in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the United States and the renewed strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington. The recognition of Russia’s key role in the fight against international terrorism did indeed bring Russia back into the Western security community. On the Russian side, the Russian leadership soon understood that Russia was too weak to counter these new threats on its own and would lose any prospective benefit by openly confronting the West.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>