A Comprehensive Approach to Modern Conflict: Afghanistan and Beyond

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*Editor: Mike Crawshaw*

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Welcome and Opening Remarks
*Dr John Rose*

Dr Rose began with a scene setting outlining the functions of the George C. Marshall Center and its position in today’s international scene. Since the end of the Cold War, the Center has sought to enhance partnership in the new community of nations, and to bring together people with a common interest in the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The Center operates through conferences like this, through residential courses, outreach, research and language programs.

There has been a failure to understand the dynamics of the post-Cold War world. The growth of terrorism, with the added threat of weapons of mass effect, the problems of failed states, or even a failed continent, provide challenges for which the old mechanisms do not provide solutions. Whether or not there is an actual global war on terrorism, there remains the need for preventive measures, and a need for definitions. Are we dealing with terrorists or freedom fighters? What is ‘insurgency’? What is ‘nation-building’?

Whatever the answers, there are some facts which must be faced:

- No one nation can solve all the problems.
- There is no single means of addressing the problems.
- Military solutions on their own manifestly do not work.
- How are the varied problems of different theatres to be addressed when there is no single model?

For the purpose of the Conference, Afghanistan is used as a role model. With 37 nations represented, a variety of views may be expected. The program is based on a threefold approach to encourage maximum participation on the part of all delegates:

- Keynote speeches
- Panel discussions

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* Dr John Rose is Director of the George C. Marshall European Center for European Security Studies.
• Working groups.
  Questions that must be addressed are:
• How to deliver developmental assistance in a disputed environment?
• How can the various actors coordinate their activities?
• How do the military approach the problem, and to what extent can their approach be applied by the diplomats and the humanitarians?

Keynote Address
Ambassador Martin Erdmann*

Ambassador Erdmann’s speech is reproduced as a separate item at page 81 of this issue.

Topical Remarks
Mr. Hekmat Karzai, Director, The Center for Conflict and Peace Studies, Kabul, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Mr. Karzai focused his speech on counter-insurgency warfare, opening with a brief description of the traditional and prevailing thought in the field. In a speech drawing together ideas from the writings of Galula, Trinquier, Thompson, and Kitson, Mr. Karzai used the constructs of these theorists to address the issue of the ‘80% political, 20% military’ solution to counter-insurgency planning and execution.

Mr. Karzai first addressed this framework in terms of a host nation government struggling with an insurgency. He was critical of NATO on the point that NATO has conducted COIN planning, and is executing the plan, but the plans are NATO-centric, not focused on the host nation (Afghanistan). Mr. Karzai emphasized that the external supporters and participants in a counter-insurgency campaign should focus on how to build host nation government legitimacy. He made the point that NATO’s planning must include the host nation government since it is a sovereign nation in the international system, and continued to stress that any action taken by NATO must be used to increase the legitimacy of the host nation’s central government, not to undermine that legitimacy.

Mr. Karzai then proceeded to discuss the specifically developmental aspects of a comprehensive plan, stressing that it was essential that host nation organizations and people be used wherever possible. He acknowledged that a host nation government might not have either the capacity or capability of NATO, but that NATO should focus on improving these areas, while making use of whatever capacities and capabilities exist within the host nation government in order to increase the legitimacy of that government in the eyes of its people. Mr. Karzai suggested that perhaps NATO should provide resources to the organizations within a host nation government, and that these

* Ambassador Martin Erdmann is NATO Assistant Secretary General, Political Affairs and Security Policy.
organizations should be the interface between development assistance and the indigenous population. Karzai admitted that in assessing that there are issues within many host nation governments that NATO avoids by not utilizing the host nation government. His counter-argument to this point is that the host-nation government has to be the face of development to the indigenous population. This is how NATO can enable the host nation government to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its population.

Mr. Karzai also addressed the issue of external sanctuary, continuing the Afghan government’s theme of Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctuary being provided in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He argued that until Pakistan takes action to deny sanctuary to insurgents, Afghanistan will be plagued by a Taliban-inspired or led insurgency for the foreseeable future. Mr. Karzai was adamant that NATO and the rest of the international community must pressure Pakistan to take action in the Federally Administered Tribal Area. His arguments for denying sanctuary made the issues in Pakistan almost as decisive as putting a host nation face on development programs within his own country.

Mr. Karzai also addressed support for the Jihadis/insurgents. He stated that the Jihadists are adaptive and learning organizations that have done well at utilizing 21st century information technology to disseminate their information. They use this method to increase their legitimacy in elements of the international community. This enables them to increase the level of funding they receive from external sources, especially from the Persian Gulf states, in the presenter’s view assisting the jihadists to recruit foreign fighters. This is only one of many factors underscoring the need for Afghanistan and NATO to win the war of ideology.

Mr. Karzai drew the attention of delegates to the historical record and the length of successful insurgencies and counter-insurgency campaigns, seeking to discourage expectations of early results. Successful insurgencies take eleven years to reach end-state; successful counter-insurgencies take on average fourteen years. He argued that insurgents have a built-in advantage of time, and also stated that the critical difference between successful and unsuccessful counter-insurgencies was the ability of the populations involved to maintain their political will to conduct the campaign over the length of time required achieving a positive outcome. He also pointed out that in every successful COIN campaign there is a point in which the host nation takes the lead, and the difficult part to planning and resourcing was how to determine when that point has been reached. Once again Karzai went back to his point of the need for systemic enabling of host nation institutional capabilities and capacities in preference over short-term security goals.

Mr. Karzai’s presentation opened up for examination and discussion of key issues affecting counter-insurgency planning and execution by NATO and others in Afghanistan. His major point was to place under the spotlight at the outset of the Conference the need to put an indigenous face on development and other non-lethal operations executed in COIN. This was important to establish and reinforce the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of its people. Mr. Karzai’s next most important point was the need for NATO and others to apply pressure on Pakistan in order to deny external sanctuary to the Taliban. He concluded by posing the question of how NATO should balance the longer-term benefit of enabling a systemic improvement in the host na-
tion’s government ability to provide governance, against the immediate security benefits of doing the governance and development on their own. Finally, he reminded delegates that decision-makers have to be aware that every insurgency is unique even though it might contain many familiar elements, and that globalization has quite definitely changed the system.

Topical Remarks

Lieutenant General David Richards, Former Commander, ISAF

‘ISAF: Delivering a Stable and Sustainable Future’
Theatre Command, from the Grand Strategic to the Tactical, ISAF, May 2006-February 2007

The title of the presentation is vital to the conference as it refers to the implementation of a Comprehensive Approach. General Richards stated his thesis on the Comprehensive Approach as follows:

- The Comprehensive Approach is the wholly correct approach to counter-insurgency. It involves a huge role for those in theatre rather than for national governments back home;
- There is an urgent need to ensure there is a collective body of understanding so that we do not have to re-learn each time, as in the Balkans – police were needed but not available so soldiers had to fill the gap.

Afghanistan is not yet in a post-conflict situation. NATO and Afghan soldiers on the ground are fighting for and achieving progress. The Comprehensive Approach has to reflect the high tempo and discipline of the campaign if it is to be effective; we are not yet at that stage. IGOs have to devolve responsibility to their representatives in theatre to allow for faster decision-taking and implementation. It is essential to remember that the Karzai government is in charge, and is being assisted by the international community – we need to adjust our thinking to reflect this fact.

‘Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory; tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.’ Theatre headquarters have to correlate international strategy with in-country tactics.

The amount of resources committed to Afghanistan in comparison to Iraq is small. Afghanistan, however, is still winnable, but we have to reinforce success by delivering on promises, reinforce, extend and deepen the writ of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), and use force robustly where necessary.

The NATO Operation was extended in two phases during General Richards’ tour in command. Phase 3 – the Southern provinces, then Phase 4, the eastern provinces. There would have been advantage in carrying out the extension as a single phase.

The military estimate process is very detailed and thorough in comparison to civilian equivalents. The estimate process highlighted the requirement for extra troops as early as May-June 2005 but these requests have only recently been aired. Why were
they ignored beforehand? It must be considered what might have been possible had the ISAF IX mission been properly resourced and conducted from the outset. The lesson to learn from this is to trust the results of the military estimate process, and therefore the professionalism of the military machine.

The Insurgency

The northern and western provinces had fewer incidents of suicide bomb and IED attacks in January 2007 than in January 2006 – this represents a real Afghani and Comprehensive Approach success.

The southern and eastern provinces have seen more suicide bomb and IED attacks – in particular a spike between June and July 2006 and then a marked decline in September, well before the winter set in.

Media focus is on the rising number of attacks, but the military are focused upon eliminating the attacks today, whereas politicians and the media comment and act from the events of the day. So the news generated, whilst statistically correct, does not accurately reflect current efforts to counter the attacks or the regional variation in attacks.

The worst provinces are Helmand, Kandahar, Khost and Paktir.

The Afghans and NATO cannot purely blame the Pakistanis for the increase in the number and frequency of attacks. If there was a positive correlation with a decline in attacks, then surely some credit should be awarded to Pakistani efforts?

Op SATYR MEDUSA – Panjawyi District

The Taliban in Panjawyi District actively set out to defeat NATO; they had the advantages of perfect defensive terrain, and a local population that largely supported the Taliban. There was much comment about the survival of NATO resting upon its performance in Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. NATO needed a military victory to prove its critics wrong and defeat the Taliban.

A full-scale conventional military operation was launched to remove the Taliban from the area. There was a heavy reliance upon airpower because there were not enough troops. There is a direct (inverse) correlation between the amount of airpower used and the number of troops on the ground. The fewer troops that are available, the more air-delivered firepower is required to compensate. NATO had no option but to pursue this course – collateral damage was greater as a consequence.

After culmination, it took another three months totally to remove Taliban forces from the area.

The Taliban strategy was flawed – the weakness in the NATO strategy was that Kandahar was left open. Had the Taliban taken Kandahar, then the efficacy of the NATO mission, Karzai’s presidency and the survival of the country would have been at stake.

Commander’s Modus Operandi

It is vital to integrate all lines of operation from the grand strategic to the tactical level in a timely manner, but no commander has control over all the levers of power. So:

- The Commander’s powers = LIC
The Commander’s focus = RDGP&S:
- Reconstruction
- Development
- Governance
- Pakistan
- Within an expanding cloak of Security.

**LIC** – Relationships with the President, international actors, regional actors, nongovernmental actors are all essential to get the message across, influence other players, and achieve security and stability.

*Coordination and the PAG*

Coordination in Afghanistan was particularly tough. The Policy/Presidential Action Group (PAG) is an initiative established by President Karzai. Its creation was recognition that no single man can control all the levers of power. It is effectively a war cabinet with international membership, to precipitate decision making and transmit decisions taken more effectively. It coordinates all Comprehensive Approach activities countrywide. The strategic communications pillar is improving and considered a vital part of the overall campaign. Resources at the Provincial levels are particularly sparse. We should be contributing more civilian expertise to improve the capacity and capability of the provincial governments and councils.

**RDGP & S**

*Reconstruction*

- The key weakness is delivering on results to meet expectations and promises. The military are creating the reconstruction space, but the space is not being filled fast enough because of bureaucracy, funding, availability of civilian expertise, and lack of Afghan capacity.

- *Peacetime procedures* are not applicable at the moment. We need to take the risk and implement reconstruction fast. Many NATO nations are not good at ‘short-circuiting’ peacetime procedures for wartime requirements. In some instances there is NGO hostility to the military presence. We should also assess how much effort international organizations such as the UN are really contributing to the reconstruction effort.

- UK DfID is funding £30 million over 3 years; the US Army is funding $50 million over 3 months. The European NATO member countries are not contributing enough so that there are enough immediately available funds to spend as soon as a secure area has been created.
Governance
Currently governance is low and there is widespread corruption. Negative perceptions of the GoA can increase incipient support for the Taliban. More money needs to be delivered to the PTS program – buying people off wins support; this is a traditional British imperial approach to security.

Regional Factors
Although the Pakistan government may have supported the Taliban in the past, it now recognizes that a regional Islamic militancy does not work in their favor. It will take time for the ‘supertanker’ of 30 years to turn around. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is long, with terrible terrain. This border is vital to broader security efforts, but what is the international community doing to support security in the border areas? The military to military dialogue is good and frequent. The Operational Coordination Group has been recently established as part of a series of tri-partite groups. The Joint Afghanistan-Pakistan Intelligence and Operations Center will encourage information sharing and combined information operations.

Security
The word ‘Campaigns’ more accurately represents the Comprehensive Approach aims. The Afghan Development Zones (ADZs) are all about restoring people’s confidence in the GoA. ADZs represent geographical areas to focus and sustain international and GoA led reconstruction, security and development efforts. The ADZs have only been applied sparingly because there are not enough troops on the ground, especially in the southern and eastern provinces. The ADZ concept is not wholly well received in NATO HQ as it smacks of allowing failures to occur elsewhere. However, the concept is being replicated in the northern and western provinces where security remains a lesser problem, the ADZ provides a mechanism for coordination of effort.

Other key issues
- Despite or in spite of, the 37 participating nations, NATO can and does work.
- The counter-narcotics strategy has to be re-thought. Currently we are not in a position to deal with the second and third order consequences of a full-scale CN campaign. The Afghan security forces are not capable or great enough in number to cope with the insecurity kick back.
- Breaking the Taliban needs to be done in theatre, in fact this is the only place where it can happen. Afghans understand it best, and we should take their lead – bargaining and bringing people into the tent are essential tools to securing the governance and security of Afghanistan. Arrangements such as that made at Musa Qala and bargaining deals are gray areas, but we need to take considered risks.
- The Afghan National Security Forces are currently under-resourced though this situation is changing. The army is good, but the police are taking longer to develop. The Afghan Auxiliary Force is the consequence of a PAG decision. It is hard to develop the security forces and employ them on operations at the same time – it is
asking too much of them, too soon and impacts upon their future capacity.

- **Information Operations** – national capitals, IGO centers need messages different from those to the locals in country.

- **Media** – there is a strategic-operational disconnect. The commander should be allowed to actively engage the media to gain the vital ground; otherwise you give it over to the enemy without a fight/debate.

- **National caveats** – how sustainable are they for future operations?

- **Preparation and training time**...

2007 has the ingredients for a successful year but we need to meet expectations and accelerate the process. We cannot be there forever, nor should we be. Nor do the Afghans want us there forever.

**Q&A**

**Q1:** How is the balance between the international community and the GoA going to change, when will we see the differences and how should we plan for the changes?

**A:** By 2009 US efforts to the ANSF should start to pay dividends. It is very important to look at the upward trajectory and move from hard power to soft power efforts. High-tech support, such as targeting, to the GoA should be sustained in the long term. There is an imbalance between reconstruction and military funding. We need to put Afghans in the driving seat and try to channel international assistance funds through the GoA to prevent uncoordinated international efforts undermining the GoA.

**Q2:** What would you want from NATO HQ to enable you to command better?

**A:** Listening to the commander, particularly in conflict situations where the threat is immediate, is important. Well-structured political guidance would also be supportive. There are 37 different nations and chains of command in Afghanistan. The theatre commander, be it a military or civilian representative, should take pre-eminence. The commander shouldn’t have to ask each country and NATO HQ about every decision. Commanders should be given political space, trust, resources and be listened to. NATO HQ and other contributing countries should also let the President of Afghanistan run his own country.

**Q3:** One of the key challenges in any long counter-insurgency campaign is domestic support. How should you measure progress in counter-insurgency situations so that the public understands the nature of the conflict and commitment?

**A:** Afghanistan is not just about countering an insurgency. We should look at the country as a whole. There is lots of good development work, two-thirds of the country is reasonably stable, there are functioning schools, refugees are returning. Presidential and parliamentary elections have taken place and there is an enlightened Constitution. The media tend to focus on the negative stories. The PAG is highlighting success stories and adding to them, so managing expectations, domestic and international, in the process.
Panel 1
ISAF Operations in Southern Afghanistan

Topics:

• National perspectives on current operations and lessons learned
• The interaction between security and development
• Relations with local government and local communities.

Moderator: Mrs Lesley Simm, ARAG Director Islamic World and Prism Support Group
Mr. Anthony Fitzherbert, Visiting Fellow, Defence Academy of the UK
Mr. Mark Sedra, Research Fellow, Bonn International Center for Conversion
Mr. Richard Norland, Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Kabul
Mr. Chris Cooter, Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO
Mr. Robert Gabriëlse, Director for Conflict Prevention, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands

Anthony Fitzherbert:

• The Southern Afghan economy is agriculturally based. Less than 5% of the area is cropped in the South; in the North it is the same.

• The current level of poppy cultivation is unprecedented, but this accounts for only 2.5% of the total cropped land; so what else besides is being cultivated?

• Poppy is cultivated with wheat as part of a mixed crop rotation. This rotation is essential to prevent crops being destroyed by disease. The Mercy Corps established a wheat cultivation project in 1994, but had to withdraw last year (2006) because of the deteriorating security situation. Cumin, vegetables, peanuts, sunflowers etc are all grown but the marketing of produce is difficult. The export business is also fragile.

• Much of the opium harvest is done by young Talibs on their summer breaks. Essentially they will fight for anyone that pays them.

• Sangin has been the main opium cultivation and trade center since the late 1980s. Farmers have a close relationship with the government authorities. 5% of their income from opium cultivation and production goes to government officials.

• Development in southern Afghanistan is difficult and tough. The roads are in poor condition. The Lashkagah high school still hasn’t been restored. The Kajaki dam has been repaired only slowly, and this has caused local restlessness. The main income generator in the area is the tractor emporium.

• Water is sparse and deep underground. Wells are often 180m deep; the best way to get value from the limited supply is to grow opium.

• Panjawayi district has traditionally been a hotbed of insurgency and tribal factionalism, and this continues today.
• Afghans on the street want security first and foremost.

Mark Sedra:

SSR is central to NATO’s exit strategy but there remain three daunting problems:
1. *The slide towards expediency.* The increasing insecurity and the lack of sufficient international troops in Afghanistan has increased pressure on the Afghan National Security Forces too early, stunting their development, and potentially undermining GoA principles of governance and the development of security institutions. There has been a cold war mentality of ‘train and equip’ rather than a more considered approach that fits Afghanistan’s security requirements. Much of the work already undertaken represents short-term and medium-term goals, which are not necessarily underpinned with a long-term outlook, because the requirement has been for immediate security, whatever the cost. This posture is also reflected in the development of the Afghan National Auxiliary Force. The utilization of traditional military structures to fill the security vacuum can be done but not at the expense of the formal security force. The relationship between the formal and informal security structures is at an early stage and needs to be reconciled now if a formal security structure is to have any long-term viability.

2. *The political will to reform.* This is both an Afghan and an international malaise. Corruption and the drug trade have tentacles into every level of the Afghan security establishment. Corrupt officials are known to the GoA, but the GoA is reluctant to remove them, rather there is a game of musical chairs. The DIAG program has an element dedicated to the removal of corrupt officials, and has even collated a list of known corrupt officials, but the majority have not yet been removed. The international community has adopted this accommodationalist logic but this logic detracts from the GoA ability to deliver services and engender the confidence of the Afghan people. It is these weaknesses that will make the Afghan people look elsewhere for alternative forms of governance.

3. *The justice gap.* The justice sector is woefully underfunded. By December 2005 only 3% of SSR funds had been applied. The justice sector is the ‘poor man of the SSR process.’ You cannot impose the rule of law and security without an effective justice system. Even if there is an effective and efficient police force, if this isn’t reinforced with prosecutions then all security efforts are undermined from the outset. There is a profound lack of faith in the formal justice system, and Afghans are turning to their informal tribal justice structures. Traditionally the relationship between the formal and informal justice systems has been precarious, and it remains so. There are few efforts to reconcile the two systems to produce a more coherent and effective system that maintains the Afghan peoples trust in the long term.

Robbert Gabriëlse

• The Comprehensive Approach is a 3-D mission to support the Afghan authorities.
• The Dutch government contributes 2,000 troops to the ISAF mission, has civilian representatives at ISAF HQ, and works in the Uruzgan PRT with Australian forces.
The Uruzgan PRT security provision covers at least 60% of the local population and it’s ADZ serves 40,000 local Afghans. They work closely with local Afghan officials and tribal leaders.

- Dutch troops participated in Op MEDUSA providing air support assistance as part of the integrated approach.

- In the Netherlands there is daily communication between the MFA, MOD and Development Ministry, and at the political cabinet level weekly meetings ensure that there is a coordinated interagency approach at the national level. The Embassy in Kabul communicates with the GOA, IGOs and of course with the Dutch government in The Hague.

- In January 2007 the Netherlands hosted a conference to consider more coordinated ways to deliver aid, reconstruction and security in Afghanistan. The Rotterdam Recommendations try to get people working from the same plan.

- The Dutch approach can be considered being ‘as civilian as possible and as military as necessary.’ Local Afghan ownership and initiative are essential to long term successes.

- The Dutch government encourages journalists and parliamentarians to visit the Dutch PRT in Afghanistan.

An expanded account of the Netherlands’ application of the Comprehensive Approach, also by Mr. Gabriëlse, will be found at page 67 of this issue.

Chris Cooter:
The Comprehensive Approach is demanding but we need to maintain the focus to keep the resources in balance. There are five main issues to consider.

1. *Rebalancing the civil-military equation*
   The military capacity is great but the equivalent civilian capacity is lacking at all levels – planning, policy development and in deployable personnel. In the Canadian PRT there is one civilian for every 10 soldiers. The Canadian capacity is not enough and needs to expand.
   There is also an imbalance between the military, diplomatic and development oriented cultures. The ‘can-do’ approach of the military is not replicated throughout the other government departments. There are incentives and joint meetings, but this is not enough. A fourth stream—a stability stream—ought to be added to pull together the other three steams.

2. *Rebalancing the international military effort, particularly in the South*
   NATO has too many responsibilities. It is important to get other IGOs such as the UN and the EU involved. Good working practices between international organizations, where they exist, should be institutionalized and NATO should act in support.
   Who is in charge of the civilian effort?
3. Government of Afghanistan – international community ownership imbalance

The Afghan government is in charge, not other national capitals. We should be careful not to create a dependency culture, but the GoA capacity needs supporting and developing first. Improving governance is vital, but we need to do it in a way that does not empower the Afghan government in the process. Some of the ways we could do this is to listen more to Afghan requirements, rather than giving them what we think they need.

4. Impact of NATO on the Comprehensive Approach

Other organizations’—IGOs’ and NGOs’—perceptions of NATO can damage international efforts in Afghanistan. NATO needs to rebrand itself to demonstrate more clearly that it is open to collaboration with other organizations.

5. Rebalance the focus in the short, medium and long term

Planning is improving, but training and action take their toll. We need to have a long-term view of what Afghanistan will look like. This view should be Afghan led. Involving the private sector to encourage more economic growth and development is also important.

Actually making the Comprehensive Approach work is novel, even if the ideas and some of the methods are not.

Richard Norland

- The main difference between 2002 and 2005 was that efforts had shifted from humanitarian aid to reconstruction. In July 2005 the challenge, the reconstruction challenge, was clear.

- 2006 was a bump in the road and a wake-up call. The insurgency returned with a vengeance. Why? Lack of capacity in the GoA, its inability to project power beyond Kabul, its inability to deliver services, and the lack of enough troops on the ground to ensure stability increased the number of sanctuaries available to the insurgents in Afghanistan and in the region. The insurgents also became learning organizations.

- It’s not just about reconstruction, but construction. There are few roads and little electricity coverage beyond the cities. Development and reconstruction is further hampered by the uneven commitment of donors. Whilst the Taliban are unpopular, if there is no other option their resurgence could be more widespread.

- The challenge remains the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. The police force is critical to ensure communities feel robust enough to repel the Taliban onslaught. However, the police are so corrupt that they are weakening the long-term security process. Weeding the corrupt officials out is a long-term process.

- There are not enough troops, particularly in the South. The Afghan National Auxiliary Force was the only other option to fill the security vacuum. To make them truly
effective their command and control must be national rather than tribal. For the meantime they are a good enough stop-gap.

• Counter-narcotics action is key to the South. Whoever controls the terrain controls the opium trade and the security. It is difficult and we cannot sidestep the issue. Strategic communications are also important in the south. The NCC is a form of war room, nascent in its development, which is designed to counter the Taliban ideology for the Afghan audience and measure local perceptions.

• Journalists and parliamentarians from IGO capitals should be encouraged to visit not only their national PRTs but those of others too to get a fuller picture of the international effort in Afghanistan. However, NATO does not have enough assets—air- or manpower—to transport such people around the country. Perhaps it should have some assets dedicated to such a task to ensure that the good news stories get out and domestic expectations are managed as well.

Q&A

Q1: Can you please expand upon the Netherlands government integration of its efforts towards Afghanistan?
A: There are working level communications between the ministries every day. At the operational-strategic policy level there are weekly meetings, and the cabinet ministers meet regularly. The Netherlands parliamentary system means that all cabinet members are answerable to parliament and all parliamentary members are answerable to their electorates. It is important to get as many people involved as possible to spread understanding.

Q2: What are the national markets for Afghanistan, what are the hurdles to their success and how can the international community help undercut opium cultivation and trade?
A: Afghanistan does not produce anything agriculturally unique. Its production efficiency and production levels are not high enough. Different districts cultivate different crops. The productivity of the land is determined by the availability of water. The Helmand market is too far from Kabul and is flooded by other products from the region. Afghanistan’s weakness is its exposure to the vagaries of the international economy. To trade with India, goods must pass through Pakistan, with whom relations are unstable. Opium production thrives upon instability. There is a correlation between the increased number of troops and the increased cultivation of opium.

Q3: Is ISAF still suitable for the task? Too much emphasis on counter-insurgency diverts precious resources away from the civilian-political part of the equation. We also need to consider the role of regional players – they are part of the problem and also part of the solution. Is there an SSR concept for Afghanistan that is viable?
A: Yes there is a viable SSR concept for Afghanistan, which was developed in Geneva in 2002. There is a lead nation for each pillar. However, this devolution of responsibility has compartmentalized the pillars rather than creating a synergy. ANC & ANDS have set ambitious targets but there is little strategy to achieve these aims. Yes,
a regionalized solution is necessary but as yet there are no firm bilateral or multilateral SSR or trade agreements. Building relations with Iran is a lost opportunity: they have the highest levels of drug addiction in the world and they would probably support a counter-narcotics strategy too.

Q4: There is a need to make sure that Comprehensive Approach has global applications. We need to strengthen capacity building, governance and fiscal systems, as these are global challenges in failed states where there isn’t necessarily an insurgency.

A: There is a conference in May 2007 looking at the Rule of Law in SSR & post conflict situations. Issues such as corruption need to be tackled over the long term. Perhaps in Afghanistan we should consider establishing a government department to tackle this problem. Corruption has multi level dimensions. If you remove the ‘big fish’ there is a knock on effect. We need to improve the salaries and methods of payment to civil servants to improve their loyalty and help reduce corruption. There is lots of talk about creating new strategies. There are lots of good strategies in place; it is the implementation of these that is problematic.

SECOND SESSION, AFTERNOON 26 MARCH

Topical Remarks

Ambassador Robert Loftis *

It is a great pleasure to address you on an issue of the greatest contemporary importance. This conference highlights a key point that the Euro-Atlantic community has come to understand: that we need a new understanding of the ‘3Ds.’

We all need to stop acting in organizational stovepipes. Our alliance structures and coalitions are more important than ever if we are to stop the violence and violations of human dignity in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current efforts are very much a work in progress. We see this conference as an opportunity for productive exchange with allies and non-government partners.

We need a comprehensive approach, which represents new thinking, but the nature of the challenges is not new. Afghanistan is where NATO is engaged for the first time in true ground combat operations. We must anticipate similar complexity in future operations. What is not new is the need to provide security and development assistance to new governments, and a public commitment to the success of these governments and their people. In dealing with peoples and their governments we must make as much of cultural understanding as advanced technology.

This approach must be applied to future conflicts: peacekeeping in Africa or missions in the Balkans headed by EU, as well as Afghanistan. The comprehensive ap-

* Ambassador Robert Loftis is Senior Advisor for Security Negotiations & Agreements, US Department of State. He served as Ambassador to Lesotho, as Deputy Chief of Mission in Mozambique, and in a number of other international positions.
proach applies to stability operations, peacekeeping and military operations such as counter-insurgency. If one accepts that insurgency is organized violent competition to govern, then we face the need to counter it.

There is value in applying lessons from historical campaigns to efforts in Afghanistan, and a need to capture the lessons of previous conflicts. From the US perspective, we have debated them for over four decades, and as a result are not blind to the difficulties. It was President John F. Kennedy who issued the first counter-insurgency strategy document in 1962, which was abandoned for lack of political commitment to its implementation. I do not know whether a whole of government approach would have led to a better outcome in Vietnam; the highly kinetic approach obviously did not have desired result.

The United States has learned over the last 45 years that it is difficult to coordinate across agencies in complex conflicts, like counter-insurgency and stability operations. SCRS is working hard to develop integrated planning capacities, together with an expeditionary civilian response corps to deliver functional experts abroad.

Some have asked about the difference between stability and COIN operations. Clearly they are related. Insurgency may or may not exist in every stabilization environment. It is necessary to respond to insurgency in terms of local context. Insurgencies are certain spoilers in stabilization and reconstruction efforts, which indicates that the comprehensive approach is required either way.

Key efforts at State Department include:

- Secretary Rice’s initiative on transformational diplomacy. This involves working to transform institutions and way we approach our jobs, both internally and internationally. Transformation includes both attitudes and policy. Diplomats are being shifted from stable embassies to more dangerous areas; and more are being moved moving into the field. Coupled with this, policy and assistance is being directed to encourage locals to create their own institutions.

- An executive level handbook on COIN to parallel FM-324 (COIN Field Manual) is in course of preparation. The goal is to complete and distribute it by Summer 2007.

- State is working with DoD and USAID to establish Civilian Coordination Office coordinating mechanisms for civilian and military training institutions that deal with comprehensive approach. It is hoped that the CCO (Center for Complex Operations) will also serve as an international clearinghouse. There is potential here to draw on European learning and thinking on complex conflicts.

Work in progress also includes:

- Refining manner of delivering foreign assistance. SCRS will be deputy director of foreign assistance. USAID is adapting fast. State and AID are working to ensure that diplomacy and development are closely coordinated.

- An expanded pol-ad program and state-defense exchange program, including developing a pol-ad reserve corps to advise military commanders at short notice. SCRS representatives are in place in Nepal, Haiti, and working with PRTs in Afghanistan.
Panel 2
Whole of Government and Whole of Effort Approaches to Conflict Response and Mission Requirements: Challenges and Opportunities

Topics:

• How have key nations in the current situation attempted to deliver a ‘Whole of Government’ approach?

• How are they preparing their personnel to operate in this complex environment where the desired outcomes require coordination across several key sectors?

Moderator: The Hon Donald Sinclair, Director General, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, Canada

Mr. Mark L Asquino, Deputy Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, State Department

Ms Veronica Cody, Council of the EU Secretariat

The Hon Mohammad Asaf Rahimi, Deputy Minister Programs, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan

Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations

Donald Sinclair

• You have heard a bit of the theory on the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force; let me tell you more now. The Canadian one is relatively new, bringing together 70 people. What is surprising is that we gave money to the foreign ministry to do something. There is no ‘whole of government’ anything in Canada. Bringing everyone together to deal with foreign crises has been interesting. More than just ‘the three Ds,’ but also justice, corrections, and RCMP. The current job makes me long for the simplicity of Middle East politics.

• Afghanistan is biggest recipient. Other two are Haiti and Sudan, but there are lots of other candidates. We are working well with allies, while struggling to work across government and even within the department.

• As Dr Rose said this morning, no single state can resolve these crises. Nor can any single approach. You are going to hear five different approaches.

Mohammad Asaf Rahimi

• It is both an honor and a pleasure to talk before this distinguished gathering, to share understanding in approaches to reconstructing Afghanistan. I would like to take the opportunity to thank the Marshall Center, whose determined effort has allowed us to come together.

• I am speaking specifically about the GoA whole of government approach to security and development. I must acknowledge that the security environment changed
dramatically in the last year. I am Minister for Rural Development and my remarks will have a decidedly developmental feel.

My contribution will be in two parts:

- existing programs and strategies
- challenges and solutions particularly in the South.

The challenges of rebuilding war torn societies are infinitely more complex than is usually recognized. Legacies of conflict, including physical destruction and psycho-social trauma, are compounded by lack of security. The overall development framework is the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy (IANDS). This is a coherent strategy across three independent pillars:

- Security
- Justice and human rights
- Development.

Across all sectors are cross-cutting themes like counter-narcotics, corruption, environment, gender equality.

Examples are the Minister of Education and Minister of Health, who coordinate with the Ministry of Rural Development to establish schools and hospitals, etc. But there are still enormous coordination problems. There is a dearth of human capacity at middle management level.

The GoA has survived 30 years of social upheaval and civil war by making no decisions and making no waves. The international community has expended much capital on building government institutions, but effort is too often focused on single ministries, stovepipe fashion. This does not help the whole of government approach, and encourages lack of coordination.

Each community is encouraged to developed own development council, open bank account, receive funds. This is a famous and popular program. All programs that my ministry is offering are coordinated with national strategy of Afghanistan. But given the delivery model, why are we seeing an upsurge in insurgency in the south? How will government counteract this trend?

Perhaps we, including IC, NGOs and foreign military, misjudged the defeat of the Taliban and failed to recognize that the South and East were critical to the stability of the country.

Aid was sent across all provinces in equitable manner without reference to the relative threat from the Taliban. If we had concentrated resources in the South, we might not be in the situation we are in today. As noted by General Richards, the PAG is a whole of government effort, which brings through solutions and serves as a delivery point for these solutions. One of the initial recommendations was that the South should be treated as a separate problem. I intend to focus on four key provinces in South. Want area to benefit from direct ministerial attention.
The Kandahar Model

We have to recognize that the information operations are key to success against insurgency. There is a need to advertise assistance to population. Careful assessment of situation in South and local culture led to development of the Kandahar Model, which emphasizes the specifics of local culture:

- Roads
- Water
- Irrigation
- School/health centers
- Employment.

These problems and limited government visibility at local level have made population vulnerable to insurgents. Government programs were too slow to produce results and did not meet expectations. Development funds are now being targeted in a focused manner that produces immediate benefits, demonstrating government commitment to people. The aim is to reconnect the government to the people and convince them that democratic institutions can work for them.

What makes the Kandahar Model unique is the targeting of donor money in accordance with community priorities:

- The community prioritizes local projects.
- The Provincial Governor can use directed contracts with established and previously proven contractors (no bidding process) – the risk of creating unfulfilled expectations in villagers is worse risk than that of fraud. This creates a short timeline between procurement and implementation.
- The government sends personnel to create effective regional offices. Decentralized administration and devolved authority is key to success of Kandahar Model.
- A unique aspect is the commitment of ministers and ministry to villagers. Key to reconnecting government to people.
- In turn the villagers are expected to guarantee safety of the staff. This demonstrates commitment of people to their own projects and future.

Every ministerial visit is a press conference opportunity and chance for media to visit village projects. The media create perceptions and perceptions create their own realities. It is therefore essential to fix those perceptions. The PR aspect cannot be ignored.

What has been the impact? The Model is only 3-4 months old. It is unique in history of Kandahar Province. Of 900 projects identified in January 2007, 190 are being implemented.

There is no hard evidence for success, but good anecdotal evidence: people returning home, people traveling across the province to meet with minister whenever in
town, no security incidents, none of the projects taken by this bottom-up approach have been disrupted. Building on success of NSP.

The key to success is quick implementation time, which allows us to meet the expectations of villagers. Other districts have noted the success in Kandahar and there are calls from village elders for similar programs. Success breeds success. In post-conflict society, the primary goal of any intervention must be to reconnect people with government.

The bottom-up approach that accounts for community needs also requires a security commitment and guarantee by the community. This is an example of whole of government approach that is proving successful. “No development without security, no security without development.”

Some final questions:

- In a post conflict situation should we concern ourselves with state building or institution building before taking care of the immediate needs of the population?
- Is Afghanistan a post-conflict nation state? Or is it in the midst of insurgency? If the latter, do the accepted development models apply?
- Should the international community impose a single development framework across the country? Would regional aid directors with appropriate funding and authorities be more effective?

Mark L Asquino

The turnout here is an indicator of the importance of the subject.

SCRS is new, established in June 2004. Our focus is on interagency cooperation and the whole of government approach. Under NSPD 44, the Secretary of State has been charged with leading the building of civilian capacity in dealing with post conflict situations.

Need to focus on host country population. For example, East Timor’s problems may be partially related to lack of infrastructure.

My office is part of the State Department, but draws people in from six other agencies. We are an organization that was formed in response to 9/11 realities. The US in the last decade has been involved in seventeen Stabilization and Reconstruction operations. The fact that we have been confronted with these new challenges, lead to realization that we need to change the way we approach S&R.

Failure of governance allows for introduction of extremist ideas and other dangerous activities like drugs and WME proliferation. This creates threats to our countries. We have learned that we need to bring to bear the full range of national power. These challenges are going to continue and will require an integrated and comprehensive approach.

This is no small undertaking – nothing short of revolutionary. We are proposing ways of operating that are fundamentally different from ways of working in the past. But this is necessary.
When NSPD 44 came into operation in December 2005, DoD issued their own directive. We have been called upon to harmonize State and DoD approaches to S&R issues. In working with the military, we want a comprehensive picture of needs, gaps and priorities in S&R issues. An interagency review of NSPD 44 is in hand, to see if we can devise crisis response mechanisms to allow us to work better together.

SCRS has recently aligned with the Bureau of Foreign Assistance to develop a coordinated approach. This is an alignment, not a merger. The two agencies are mutually supportive. SCRS has operational expertise and planning mandate, but lacked close alignment with the funding authorities of Foreign Assistance. SCRS retains its autonomy and continues to report directly to the Secretary of State.

Operational Involvements. We have people in Kabul working with ISAF to look at PRTs, to better coordinate those operations. We also have a presence in Kosovo, Darfur, Chad, Nepal, and a large project in Haiti. DoD has given SCRS $100m for projects in crisis response. We ran a small project in Lebanon last year after the conflict Israel/Hezbollah there. Haiti is a stabilization initiative.

The World Bank assesses that half of all countries emerging from conflict will slip back within five years. We all need to do more. We all need to work in comprehensive manner to tip that balance in opposite direction. We need to work with allies, pooling our reserves. My own office is creating a Civilian Reserve Corps, able to deploy as a reserve in fairly short notice in areas where we don’t have skills in civilian federal government.

None of this is easy, and I can commiserate with Don. But is enormously important. We must come up with strategies that are much more effective.

Veronica Cody

Civilian capabilities are a topic baffling to certain people, and perhaps a vague notion. The EU developed its military and civilian capabilities as part of the common foreign policy. View from beginning of taking comprehensive approach to crisis management. Civilian capabilities have six priorities:

- Police
- Rule of law
- Admin
- Civil protection
- Monitoring
- Reinforcement of EU special representatives (HR, media, border management).

Three years ago EU had two civilian operations: Bosnia and FYROM. Now there are ten operations worldwide, emphasizing the extended geography and diversity of missions, e.g. border crossings in Palestine Authority, including Ramallah. We have learned lessons from police missions; aid and reconstruction are not enough unless the rule of law is added. More recent missions take into account these lessons learned. 700 senior ranking Iraqi police and judiciary have been trained in the capitals of Europe.
We needed to bring them together for training because they were mutually suspicious. The only way to reinforce confidence was to train together.

**Rapid response capabilities:**

- ‘Robust police’ (gendarmes). Police are always civilian. IPU are trained together, which gives them ready deployment to go at short notice. Gendarmes can be used to establish security after military victory. They have a riot control capability and can add investigative and intelligence capacity to this. They are self sustaining and fully kitted.

- Expertise: logistic, CIS, finance, budgets, human resources. These are core functions of civilian response teams (CRT). Then add more expertise: administrative, HR, border control. The intention is to use them for very specific cases. In an unknown situation, a CRT can be used on a fact-finding mission. Or, where a mission in place has a problem, a CRT would trouble-shoot, or reinforce an existing operation. They are little bit like crack forces, with a strong sense of esprit de corps because they are trained together.

The comment on stove-piping in government departments was striking. One of the things that assists us greatly is that military, civilian, and police planners are all in the same building. We train together, work together and are now planning together. A civ-mil planning cell has been launched. We have far more planning challenges ahead.

We are shortly to launch an operation in Afghanistan, which will be Police plus judicial in its makeup. We want sustainable and effective civilian policing efforts. The position of other international actors is an important factor. The number of international actors in Afghanistan is mind-boggling. Germany and the US are engaged in policing work; the UK is doing counter-narcotics. We want to avoid previous mistakes of not coordinating with other actors.

**Gyorgy Molnar**

My particular topic is the Hungarian experience and perspective in the whole of government approach and crisis management. Hungary went through a bloodless transition from Communism in 1989-1990, and has experienced radical economic and social transformation. Hungary has been a donor state since 2003, Afghanistan is one of first recipients.

Hungarian soldiers have contributed to S&R in many ways: building bridges in Bosnia-Herzegovina, advising ISAF, training police in Baghdad. Hungary has sent police trainers to Kabul, Moldova, on a diverse variety of missions. Coordinating our participation calls for close cooperation amongst all agencies and departments. PRTs presented a new challenge.

The whole of government approach is reflected in the field as well. Ensure security but carry out civilian programs as well. Civilian coordinator of PRT reports to MFA and is not subordinate to the military commander. Emphasis is on police training. The goal is to ensure that PRT operates with local population. The best insurance for soldiers is effective development projects.
The Hungarian PRT also seeks to be an international enterprise, working with other Central European NATO countries. It will take advantage of the EU PRT program as well. The pillars of post conflict reconstruction are all indivisibly linked. It brings us to the conclusion that responses to the current security environment need to be coordinated.

An article by Mr Molnar, describing Hungary’s contribution to Stability and Reconstruction operations in greater detail, will be found at page 75 of this issue.

Adam Kobieracki
Everything has been said already, but not by everybody. My remarks have a NATO perspective, but I am speaking on my own behalf.

If you need any more reason for why the comprehensive approach is important for us, let me give you two.

- I haven’t met a single Afghani who cares which flag assistance is given under
- Our main opponent does have a comprehensive approach: bring security, rule of law, economics (poppy), and a skillful info/media campaign.

Two things which make it more difficult to implement practical interpretation of the comprehensive approach.

- Terminology. We use a number of terms to explain the same things
- Lack of clear understanding as to what is not covered by comp approach. Some of our nations assume that discussing the comprehensive approach could set a precedent for NATO to develop new capabilities. This is not true. Some of our nations focus more on precedent setting for future ops and less on what to do now in Afghanistan.

Two dimensions of the comprehensive approach are:

- The internal organization of the alliance
- Actual coordination with partners, organizations.

Negotiations so far on comprehensive approach have different proposals under the headings of strategic, planning, and in theater. From my functional perspective, the importance is planning, training, and implementation:

- ISAF must have all the military capabilities it requires
- More training of ANA is necessary
- Civil-military interaction on ground must be facilitated
- PRTs: There was an initial mistake in the making military component responsible to NATO, but the civilian element responsible to national authority. We now need to coordinate. There is a need to use PRTs better, as platforms for other organizations in theater.
There are a great many institutions and mechanisms for coordination in HQ and on the ground. We do not need additional bureaucratic bodies. We need to use what we have more effectively, thereby avoiding situations such as that where Minister Çetin was appointed NATO Senior Representative with virtually no mandate for this office and no terms of reference.

An article by Ambassador Kobieracki dealing with these and other points in greater detail will be found at page 87 of this issue.

Q&A

Q1: As far as deploying our troops to Afghanistan, I would like more info on general approach. It has been mentioned that the Taliban are able to deliver all necessary elements to local population. Understandable that these things should be delivered by allies, too. Can you tell me what is the advantage for the minds of local population?

A: The more that we can prove we are working alongside Afghan agencies the more we will be able to win hearts and minds. The Taliban may be able to provide the basics, but the downside of their methods is well understood by the population. The fundamental problem is security, which the Taliban can provide, and if GoA is unable to do so, they will.

Q2: There appears to be a lack of contact at strategic level between military and civilian agencies. Aid appears to be going to the NGOs rather than the GoA. Is this good or bad?

A: Point is well made. It is very important that the GoA is seen to be in the driving seat, not the IOs or NGOs.

Q3: A lot of money has gone into the Afghan state. There are 200,000 civil servants, and since 2002 aid has been keeping the ship afloat. There is a lack of transparency. I would particularly like to know about the links between central government and the provinces – is the money getting down to province level.

A: This is an important question, particularly the last part. The problem of corruption has been frequently mentioned already and will be again. It remains a major factor in inhibiting the application of resources where they are needed.

Address

Lieutenant General James Soligan *

Summary

NATO is in the process of transforming itself from its Cold War role to meet the challenges of the current international environment. It is, however, important that NATO

* Lieutenant General James Soligan is Deputy Chief of Staff, Transformation, NATO Allied Command Transformation.
learns to institutionalize the change. NATO’s process of change can be divided into three categories:

- Learning to adapt the comprehensive approach
- NATO plays a key role but can’t accomplish the mission alone
- Nations (both individually and collectively) have made real progress, but need to do more.

I. The Comprehensive Approach: Everything is the same and everything is different

- NATO is still in the process of transformation from a Cold War entity to one that can meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world
- The importance of meeting this challenge is NATO’s ability to ‘put it all together’; or, working economic, military, and social levers to accomplish the mission
- The military plans in isolation because of the need for secrecy. This process doesn’t maximize civilian participation
- NATO needs to utilize non-military actors and include them in the planning process
- There is a growing consensus that more international players are needed. Not just NATO, but the European Union, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization
- There is also a need for a consensus among all of the NATO nations to enhance mission accomplishment
- NATO should use the mission in Afghanistan to train and prepare for future challenges, not just treat it as a space in time
- The NATO mission in Afghanistan should also serve as an opportunity to anticipate a change in the global environment and build different templates

II. NATO’s role

- NATO plays a key role in supporting the comprehensive approach, but cannot accomplish the mission alone
- When procedures are embraced by NATO, they become the global standard
- Key roles of NATO
  - Sharing best practices: this can play big dividends when NATO nations share lessons learned about things like PRTs, IEDs, etc.
  - NATO has the ability to complement the world of other nations and organizations to develop interoperability
  - Defense Planning Process: determine what capabilities will be needed in 8-10 years
  - NATO response forces.
III. The road ahead: we’ve done a lot but we have to do more

- All NATO representatives need to bring back the recommendations from the working groups and determine how to influence and implement them
- NATO needs to work with non-members, not them working for us
- We need to develop new terminology, e.g.: supported vs. supporting roles
- NATO needs to determine a better way to describe how progress is being made

THIRD SESSION, MORNING 27 MARCH

Opening Remarks
Dr John Rose

Opening the second day’s proceedings, Dr Rose stressed that the thrust of Day 2 would differ from that of Day 1. The intention was that the deliberations of the Working Groups would take the debate to a new level, and the format of the Conference was designed to provide an immediate sharing of the outcomes of the Group discussions amongst all the delegates.

One aspect in which Dr Rose was extremely interested is the question of whether there is one Comprehensive Approach, or several. Possibly the debates might give an indication on this issue.

Dr Rose reminded the delegates that each Group had been asked to produce at least two themes – issues that require additional investigation and discussion; and two recommendations – what needs to be done, without further debate.

Finally, Dr Rose drew delegates’ attention to the presence of a continuously updated ‘Comprehensive Approach’ site on the main Marshall Center website.

Keynote Address
Ambassador Eric Edelman *

Ambassador Edelman opened his address by stressing the importance to the international community, and in particular to NATO, of getting Afghanistan right. This is not just a US, or a UK problem. The continued globalization of terrorism is illustrated by the fact that the Algerian DFDP group (8-900 strong) adopted an Al Qaeda affiliation in January of this year.

Against the background of the global threat, Afghanistan is the most vital battle-ground. We should avoid lending respectability to the Taliban by talking in conventional military terms such as ‘spring offensive.’ The Taliban are terrorists employing terrorist methods, attacking soft targets such as schools and health centers, with the aim of undermining the efforts of the international community and the GoA.

* Ambassador Eric Edelman is Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, United States Department of Defense.
The need for the Comprehensive Approach is self-evident. Authorities on the subject from Kitson onward have stressed that there is no military solution to insurgency; Galula’s 80:20 civil/military action ratio supports this view. US policy is that the military should not take the lead in reconstruction, but act in support of a civilian-led effort. The challenge is to attain unity of effort.

The United States has experience of counter-insurgency, stability and reconstruction operations dating back 200 years, but has failed to build on it. Between the World Wars, the USMC produced an excellent Small Wars manual, which somehow got lost. The CORDS program in Vietnam, with civil/military teams working alongside the civil population, was producing results but was swamped by the emphasis on kinetic effects. Nevertheless, it took the regular NVA, not the VC insurgency, finally to defeat the ARVN. CORDS is now being revisited. We must never say ‘never again.’

One common factor that surfaces in studies of a wide range of situations is the negative effect of bureaucracies in preventing unity of effort. Individual agencies will persist in being individual, to the detriment of the common purpose. Another is the tendency to transfer approaches and methods of working from one situation to another without analyzing their suitability – both the French and the US did this to the ARVN, with detrimental results. Every effort is being made to avoid this happening with the ANA.

There is a need to put in place systems to promote institutional learning. Nagl’s comparative study of the Malaya and Vietnam campaigns emphasized the need for adaptability in organizations. The US military has excellent data capture—‘lessons learned’—mechanisms in place, which permit rapid replication of successful methods. This methodology needs to be extended to include civilian lessons learned. The establishment of a counter-insurgency academy in Iraq is a further example of the need for learning being recognized.

Cultural issues are another fundamental. ‘Cultural’ means much more than just speaking the language. It means getting sufficiently inside the mind of the indigenous population to understand the motivations, the drivers. Today’s conflicts are dominated by insurgents tapping into the cultural background of the population. Unless we can understand what is going on we will be at a severe disadvantage. This may involve going beyond cultural to anthropological factors. Our educational and training centers must have the material to disseminate in order to promote a wide understanding of the people among whom we are operating.

In approaching today’s challenges, it is necessary to use caution and care in applying the lessons of the past. We are dealing with cunning and adaptive enemies. New technologies enable but complicate, and although networked forces are spectacularly successful at the high end of warfare, the insurgents, technically aware and media-savvy, have the advantage at the low. It is fair to regard the capability of our adversaries to ‘cyber-mobilize’ as a modern equivalent of the levée en masse. Our technology should enable us to gain advantage, but this cannot be guaranteed.

There is a lot of progress being made but more still to do, both within the United States and in cooperation with other partner nations and organizations. And NATO has a very large role to play.
Q&A

Q1: Are we in a state of war? Is the whole of government being mobilized?
A: The English historian, Sir Michael Howard, in an article entitled ‘The Long War’ in *Survival* magazine, suggests that the Global War on Terrorism may not be pretty either in itself or as terminology, but it is a war. Yes, there is a need for us to be mobilized.

Q2: ‘Dry up the waters.’ Do we have a grasp on the motivation of extremists? How can we get such a grasp on the ‘why’ and get them back on our side?
A: This is difficult. It is vital to avoid a degeneration into ‘Islam vs. the rest.’ We have experience of ideological conflict; the Cold War was in the end won by ideas. This is a big issue, broader than this conference can handle. There is a bearing on Afghanistan; the issues of change, of dislocation, of ‘identity up for grabs.’ And the importance of developing a bourgeois-based state.

Q3: There has been much mention of ‘setting up and strengthening the civilian side,’ of ‘giving more weight to civil matters.’ How can these civilian efforts best be coordinated with the military?
A: I do not have an ideal answer for Afghanistan; compare the scale of effort—particularly per capita—with Kosovo. There are a lot of different mechanisms available, but priority should be applied to those which reinforce indigenous structures such as the PAG.

Q4: In this long-haul operation, one center of gravity is western public opinion. What plans are in place to address this?
A: Yes, strategic communications must include the home front. Our strategic plans must incorporate a substantial element of very public diplomacy. In the United States, Afghanistan is less of a problem than is Iraq. Communications are a NATO, not a national US, or UK, problem. Bear in mind that the most radicalized Muslim youth is in Europe.

Q5: Should the military be leading Allied Command Transformation?
A: We should not be getting hung up on arguments over what is military and what is civilian.

Q6: There is a problem of managing expectations, both within Afghanistan and in the United States. How can we educate people to the long haul?
A: You will be as aware as I am of the J-curve of expectation. We must have quick-impact measures for tactical reasons, but we will be there long-term. The narcotics problem, for example, is an order of magnitude greater than Colombia. Meanwhile, we must exploit any successes to the maximum.
Working Groups
Each of the eight Working Groups (WGs) was tasked with identifying (at least) two themes and two recommendations for further examination.

WG1. Applying NATO’s strengths to the Taliban’s weaknesses

Moderators:
Dr. Thomas Mahnken, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning, U.S. Department of Defense
Dr. Michael Vickers, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Key Points
- Although the Taliban have increased their presence and influence in Afghanistan in recent months, they are not popular with the civilian populace because of their willingness to oppress and kill. This weakness can and must be exploited.
- NATO can exploit the weaknesses of the Taliban by empowering the Government of Afghanistan and placing the Afghan National Army in the lead of all operations.
- NATO must increase its presence in Afghanistan as well as providing additional trainers to the Afghan National Army.

Taliban strengths
- Taliban presence in southern Afghanistan is more significant than Afghan security forces.
- Corruption and the lack of rule of law in some provincial and district level government are beneficial for the Taliban.
- The ability to use Pakistani territory as an area for sanctuary.
- Many of the Afghan police are undertrained, underequipped, and underpaid. The level of corruption is high and the police have no interest in fighting the Taliban.
- Any collateral damage caused by coalition forces can be exploited by the Taliban.
- The Taliban are patient; time is on their side.

Taliban weaknesses
- The populace does not support the Taliban.
- The Taliban’s extremist interpretation of Islam does not resonate with the populace.
- The Taliban do not have credibility as a national liberation front.
- The Taliban is a sub-ethnic insurgency, not comprehensive.

Required NATO actions
- Provide more presence, resources, and assets.
• Build capacity.
• Increase CERP funds.
• Provide more trainers to the ANA.
• Focus on interdicting HVTS because of increased availability of ISR assets.
• Put pressure on Pakistan and other neighboring countries to interdict the Taliban.

WG2. Mobilizing & institutionalizing the “Comprehensive Approach” in national capitals

Moderators:
Mr. Philippe Gros, Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
Mr. Paul Schulte, UK Defence Academy / ARAG, Visiting Fellow (MoD)

Questions for consideration
• Do we agree on interests of different countries for comprehensive approach? Which kind of approach, e.g. counter insurgency, peace-keeping?
• What would be your national model of a comprehensive approach?
• Views on need to integrate or coordinate organizations into process. Does a common set of principles emerge?
• Obstacles and main issues against implementation. According to nations, is it agenda, restrictions, cultures, diplomats, military, etc.?
• Nature of capabilities to be engaged.
• Main triggers for initiation of change. Pressure internally/externally? Pressure from media?
• Conference Title: Afghanistan and beyond – we should consider the ‘beyond’ aspect.

Element 1
Should all countries have an interest in the comprehensive approach?
• Start with what do we mean by comprehensive approach – all feel the need for it, but what is it? What do we want from it?
• The term probably doesn’t mean the same for all of us – politics and background have impact.
• Countries have different means available – size of country and resources available, e.g. US and Macedonia. When it comes to sending what you have, Macedonia is overstretched proportionately.
• All the elements of natural power – bringing all those to the table when addressing a situation.
Although Afghanistan is in part a post-conflict situation many other situations in the world do not show the same characteristics.

Albania as example. Conceptual idea of comprehensive approach seen as inter-agency coordination, ensure synergy of efforts. Crisis management center in Ministry of Interior but not for all crisis and situations. Projects launched – national integrated surveillance component system – shared ministry budget to implement, many departments involved in implementation. Inter-agency coordination center has been established to take lead on implementation of project. As a result, it is important to conduct more exercises to streamline process.

Comprehensive approach not necessarily for long range export but also for use on your own shores.

Perhaps recommendations should include the diversity the CA can have; try to avoid misunderstanding by countries using different definitions.

Whether at national or international level, all players must share the same objectives.

French approach – long term planning, long processes. 80% of countries later revert to crisis conditions. We must concentrate on long term mechanisms to prevent this.

‘Modern’ conflict is still conflict and calls for military planning. Terms such as ‘end-state’ and ‘centers of gravity’ will rub shoulders with humanitarian and economic language etc.

Integration

• Operating in a context where many different strengths must be coordinated. Who has the lead? Who is the conductor?

• Comprehensive Approach is a civilian-led dialogue involving all stakeholders at initial stage including those from private sector.

• Objective – shared vision between stakeholders inside and outside Government and agreed at multinational level.

• Other dimension – strategy delivery piece, much work to do, facilitated plan and dialogue in theatre.

• Complemented by flexibility and agility.

• Important to set context to be applied – COIN, SSR, peacetime (prevention), national dimension e.g. civilian-military (multilateral and NGO) and civilian-civilian.

• Government, business, non-government agencies must be included.

• First phase should focus on learning, adaptability, flexibility.

• Opportunity for people to learn how to work together.

• Look at instruments in government already that are learning these methods (UN, NATO).
• Fundamental challenge: how to get different people from different organizations to communicate and understand each other

Nature of capabilities
• ‘To mobilize all national resources’ means different things in different countries.
• Why are we in Afghanistan? Fighting terrorism, drug traffic and poverty. Therefore perception is different – need is to mobilize relevant and suitable resources, not ‘all national.’
• Should recognize different approaches, try to use all appropriate resources we have.
• Kind of capabilities: e.g. US has more complete set of capabilities; France more attuned to the multilateral approach.

Obstacles
• Perhaps existing cultures are part of problem?
• Unwillingness factor, and legal problems of sending civilians into danger.
• In the US, government employees face increasing restrictions involving the ethical and legal issues when using non-governmental individuals. Oversight is more difficult due to this. Where only military are on the ground these problems are less obtrusive.
• US is now drawing on volunteer civilian professionals for Iraq (doctors, lawyers, etc.).
• German experience:
  o Set up an institute to train people for a few months – lawyers, judges, businessmen
  o Establish database of people with appropriate skills
  o Trying to establish new laws covering the issues raised by sending civilians into combat zones
  o Different law on police sent to overseas locations. German Police in Afghanistan get orders from Germany which differ from those they receive in Kabul.

Public Opinion
• Must start from scratch. If you have public support, you will have political will and therefore things will happen faster.
• Political will is crucial – must focus on positive thinking and bright side of life.
• Is the question of budgetary control (for example) too boring for the public and so needs to be dealt with purely within Government? – Yes and no. In Sweden, there is conflict between the idea of humanitarian aid and that of humanitarian aid with military aspect. If you have political will, it makes action much easier and more likely, which follows often from public support. Reports in the Swedish media
about Swedish soldiers killing Afghanis prompted calls for immediate withdrawal.
Perhaps Sweden just bringing humanitarian aid is fine i.e. everyone can bring dif-
f erent element – these things they do best or are most willing to contribute. But can
this work when some countries are carrying the burden of military operations and
some are seen to be taking the easier option?

Communication

• Information flow is very important – perhaps there is a need for a board above
Ministers which can coordinate all efforts.

• We shouldn’t just think amongst ourselves – should think about target audience.

• Lack of a communication strategy, NATO example – lack of suitable communica-
tion (marketing).

• Challenge to know what the other guy is doing. Basic information sharing across
agencies becomes a challenge (across spectrum). Simple database is part of solu-
tion.

• Traditional media should not be the only sources of information exchange – also
internet, entertainment industry.

• Dialogue should be as broad as possible – include entertainers (Bono), Angelina
Jolie (Ambassador).

Funding

• Money and funding a perennially difficult issue to overcome. Can we take from
business model to solve problems e.g. for PRT’s? Must be more flexible and adap-
tive to money.

• Ministries of Defense prepare for war but don’t pay for it.

• In addition to mechanistic obstacles, civilian expectations are not marched by re-
sources; funding will always be an issue

• Funding issues vulnerable to politicization.

‘As civilian as possible and as military as necessary’

Presentation:

Themes

• Variability of meaning – everyone is in favor of the comprehensive approach but it
has different meanings, for different states with different outlooks. Some aspects
are unrealistic for some states. The Alliance must accept that not everyone should/
can do everything – there is a need for a more realistic and tailored approach. Less
action does not mean less commitment.

• The critical importance of public opinion in government action and politics.
• The need for prompt and adequate funding and to create adequate pools of qualified and available individuals.

Recommendations
• The establishment of a common vision – all involved to have a simple & credible message, and an answer to the question ‘why are you here and what are you doing?’ This can only be achieved if the right resources are made available.
• There needs to be wider engagement and commitment of the populace of donor nations – not just government departments should be involved but business, media, NGOs and even celebrities.

WG3. Mobilizing & institutionalizing the “Comprehensive Approach” in international organizations

Moderators:
Mr. Ken Hume, EU Council Secretariat
Mr. Larry Sampler, Institute for Defense Analysis

Introduction
The EU is a young crisis management actor, and its capabilities have been developed pretty quickly. New capabilities have come online e.g. battle groups, operations center. EU’s trademark is the comprehensive approach. All our key crisis management players sit in the same building. This provides an advantage over national governments that have competing interests between competing ministries.

Have we done enough to institutionalize the Comprehensive Approach? Can we do more? What are the issues we need to consider?
• Do we need an integrated or cooperative approach?
• Is there a difference at tactical or strategic level?
• What are the key ingredients? Is it a matter of process? Structure? Culture?
• Integrated planning: is it a myth?
• Do we need an integrated planning capacity at strategic level?
• Do we need an overarching campaign plan (identified end state, CofG, objectives, linking, sequencing amongst all lines of activity)? To do that, do we have an integrated planning tool?
• If we have an integrated plan, who owns it? Who delivers in theater? Can we co-own it?
• How do we involve non-military language at an early stage? Alternatively how do we get civilians to speak the same language as the military?
• For crisis management when the EU is not the primary player, how do we institutionalize the CA for working with other international actors?
Discussion centered on the following main topics:

- The problems of coordinating the activities of IOs and national governments.
- The problems of coordinating the activities of NGOs with other national and international players.
- Planning.

Principal issues raised were as follows:

- The GoA exists as a freely and fairly elected democratic government and we should use it and its planning as the framework for all operations. ‘The only flag on any project should be the Afghan flag.’
- Coordination occurs because of the pain caused by lack of coordination.
- How do you codify coordination without imposing it, which the civilian agencies just won’t tolerate?
- There is no need to make a science out of establishing coordination in Afghanistan. The structures and mechanisms are in place. They just need to be made to work.
- IOs, nations, and other agencies need to cease regarding themselves and each other as being in competition.
- Small NGOs may be highly cost effective in delivery but need to operate within the framework of an overall plan.
- NGOs have to advertise success to their audiences, but most NGO activity in Afghanistan is donor Government funded. Unfortunately, this is not seen by NGOs as implying any degree of Government control.
- Operators on both sides of the NGO/military divide are learning toleration, at least, of the other’s way of doing things.
- Opinion was divided on the need for a High Representative.
- Many donors in a specific field lead to ‘donor congestion’ and make coordination impossible.
- A division of labor is very highly desirable, but how can it be imposed, given that even discussion of the issues involved is off the agenda, both within NATO and the EU, because of the political sensitivities involved?
- There is a need to look for success models, e.g. trust funds – unpopular with donors because of anonymity.
- The UN should be the coordinating body of first choice, but is unwilling/unable to get involved.
- Should the Comprehensive Approach become the basis of military exercises in future, including full civilian participation?
• The various IOs, NATO, EU, OSCE, etc., are so different that it is difficult to make general recommendations as to how they should engage with the Comprehensive Approach.
• Ambitions must be tempered with realism.

Caveats:
• The focus of discussion is Beyond Afghanistan.
• All IOs bring different capabilities.
• We must be realistic in our ambition.
• Comprehensive Approach within an IO compared to across IOs.

Questions/Themes
• How do we institutionalize CA at strategic level?
• Production of an integrated campaign plan?
• How do we make NGOs accountable?

Sub Issues:
• Need a mechanism to produce this plan.
• Do we need a common baseline, a planning tool?
• Who is a major player, an IO, if there is one, and if there isn’t an IO, is UN the default organization?
• All management must be brought together to plan.

Recommendations
• Establish better mechanism for harmonization. Rather than competition and suspicion, we should have more liaison offices etc.
• Instigate cross-training – must understand each others’ procedures. Multi-national experimentation.
• Settle for coordination rather than integration at the operational level.
• There must be a focal point to planning.

WG4. NATO Coordination with International Organizations and Other Entities

Moderator:
General Klaus Naumann, Former Chairman, NATO Military Committee

Discussion
The discussion within the working group revolved around three main themes:
outreach between NATO and other inter-governmental organizations
- trying to achieve unity of effort within NATO as well as with external organizations
- ascertaining what types of structures need to be reformed or created in order to better achieve unity of effort.

Finally the working group discussed some potential ‘ways ahead,’ and the need to assess success and lack thereof in outreach and organizational change that meets the need on the ground.

The theme of outreach between NATO and other international organizations prevailed through the first two-thirds of the working group’s meeting. This topic was spurred by the working group’s understanding that in the modern operating environment, NATO is often not the only inter-governmental organization on the ground. The members discussed NATO’s interaction with non-NATO sovereign nations in operations and regional IGOs. The working group really did not see these as being large friction points other than the issues of interoperability and capacity. The working group tended to focus more on NATO’s ability to work with ‘near-peer’ IGOs who might also be present in the operational area, specifically the United Nations and the European Union. The working group believed that progress was being made on the UN front, but that the issues revolved around the delineation of authority, and the role of senior civilian leaders on the ground.

The issue of cooperation between NATO and the EU was addressed, but nobody had any viable solutions. The group understood that there was continuing friction between NATO and the EU. The working group did not identify particular ‘ways ahead’ for NATO and the EU. Most agreed that it would take a senior political effort by both organizations to overcome institutional jealousy, institutional cultures, and procedural differences.

The working group discussed the issues of NATO as an organization and its bureaucracy as far as collaborating with outside organizations. The discussion revolved around should the changes to overcome institutional/bureaucratic rigidity be evolutionary or revolutionary. The evolutionary proponents discussed that there are currently work-arounds and informal agreements at the tactical level. The proponents of evolutionary change contend that NATO should capture the best tactical practices and determine a manner in which to codify them for use in the future. This was viewed as a ‘grassroots’ evolutionary change to the institutional/bureaucratic model that is currently NATO.

The revolutionary change proponents contend that a top-down driven change of organizational culture would be more responsive and adaptive to changing situations. The proponent of revolutionary change acknowledged that the political momentum for such a change is hard to build. However, the proponents of revolutionary change did point out that each situation is unique, and that if NATO were to codify what works in Afghanistan today, it might not work in the next situation. All agreed that overcoming institutional culture would be difficult, and each side had its merits, but all agreed that
developing and recommending such changes was beyond the scope of the working group.

The last one-third of the time was focused on unifying the efforts of NATO and other international organizations on the ground. This was an outgrowth of the institutional outreach and change discussion. The working group focused on how NATO achieves unity of effort with various non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations that are present in a region or country in which NATO is operating (i.e. Afghanistan). The working group agreed that there would be various IGOs and NGOs operating in the country or region, and discussed how to integrate these organizations into the plan and, more ideally, the planning.

The issue that was brought up is how do the charters of the various NGOs either allow or disallow them from planning directly with NATO. The representatives from these communities present at the working group pointed out that there are certain areas that NATO has to plan for (e.g. detention centers) that are the purview of these organizations. The representatives pointed out that they might not be involved in the planning, but that the plan should account for their organization arriving in the area and exercising the NGOs responsibilities to the greatest extent possible (International Committee of the Red Cross). The group reached a consensus that all participants at the tactical level might not agree on the strategy being executed by NATO. Furthermore, the working group believed that engagement with NGOs and IGOs should be done as early as possible, providing that NATO and these organizations did not have charter or political issues with one another.

**Recommendations**

The working group recommended two major foci. The first focus was on organizational structure and the interaction between NATO and other IOs. They recommended an examination of the organizational structure of NATO. They also said that nature of the potential changes, evolutionary or revolutionary, need to be further examined. Furthermore, the working group believed that these specific issues should be examined at the Assistant Secretary General level. This could be enabled by an external assessment to determine bureaucratic resistance. Finally they recommended that any structural change should be equally focused inward and outward.

The working group also made recommendations on the unity of effort theme. The group agreed that NATO had to be better at integrating with a sovereign nation in order to increase the legitimacy of the sovereign nation while also meeting NATO’s desired end-state. Furthermore, the working group recommended that the idea of unity of command be examined, based on General Richards’ speech. The working group agreed that it might not be exercised by one person, but possibly by a council, or even a senior civilian representative. They agreed that there had to be some type of integrated coordination council to achieve unity of effort between all the actors in a country or region. The working group recommended that NATO has to be able to assess the capacity and capability of non-NATO organizations in order to successfully plan to achieve unity of effort.
WG5. Humanitarian Development in hostile environments

Moderators:
Mr. Tom Baltazar, United States Agency for International Development
Mrs. Lesley Simm, UK Defence Academy, ARAG

Terminology
The terminology of the title is confused and confusing. You can have ‘humanitarian relief,’ ‘humanitarian assistance,’ and ‘development.’ Assistance and development can actually counter each other and create dependencies. Traditionally ‘humanitarian assistance’ for the military meant any military involvement other than war. Peacekeeping, de-mining etc all fell under this umbrella. ‘Humanitarian development’ probably means a mixture of assistance and development, considered along a continuum.

There is no common vocabulary but there are common principles from which to build. An agreed upon and shared lexicon should be part of the comprehensive approach. Our own government departments have different interpretations of the terminologies employed. There is need for understanding on all sides.

PRTs
The PRTs are the way to get the comprehensive approach into the post conflict environment. There is a north-south divide in Afghanistan and many different PRT applications. Different countries have had different approaches, restrictions and experiences. The USA has a different approach to that of NATO and other NATO member countries. However, there are clear guidelines for all PRTs centered round security and coordination of efforts from the strategic to the tactical, and between military, IGOs & NGOs. NATO has little control over the activities of the PRTs as they are nationally owned. Funding is provided by national governments, rather than through the GoA or NATO. There has been an evolution of thinking in the development community over the past four years. There is a need to share a common vision and language.

PRTs allow the provincial government to connect to the central government where there are no other means (communications & infrastructure) to do so. PRTs are good at responding to humanitarian emergencies such as avalanches and floods, as well as helping with infrastructure development. PRTs enable the provincial government to mobilize development and extend the writ of the central government to the provinces.

PRTs do have a local capacity building remit built into their principles. Civilian experts are embedded in PRTs to mentor local government officials. But when are locals going to be able to take charge of training their own? Whilst the Afghan MOI has representation in most PRTs, their representatives are not yet at the level where they can impart governance advice.

Many of the development activities undertaken by PRTs are very costly. The Afghan National Solidarity Program schools scheme was three times cheaper than anything the PRTs built. What is more, the ANSP involved the locals and coordinated with the Ministry of Education. The PRT construction program did not, and consequently they are either surplus to requirements or under resourced.
There is also much ad-hocery involved by international civilian mentoring commitments. Civilian efforts are disrupted further by the inability to get civilian experts to deploy, to extend their tenure and ensure that their rotation does not upset efforts overall.

PRTs are seen to be the next step after a conflict situation, and even where there is relative stability. Sometimes they are symbolic, other times they are necessary. Many PRTs appear to be adrift from more long term enduring NGO work, and sometimes disregard, disrupt and damage legitimate efforts already in place unnecessarily. Many PRTs are military personnel heavy. Few military personnel have development experience and expertise. A rotation of military personnel every 6-9 months can impact upon PRT relations with the local community and the implementation of development programs. The militarization of the PRTs is dangerous as the effort cannot be sustained and the military presence compromises the return of NGOs.

Aims are one thing, implementation is quite another. There are several factors to bear in mind. Firstly travel restrictions impede communication with the locals. Inviting locals to the PRT is a time consuming process. Secondly there is often competition between national strategies and local demands. Here the PRT plays piggy in the middle. Thirdly, we need to be realistic about what can be achieved with the resources available. When there are very few representatives per square mile of a province, with impeded travel and communication, and confusing messages, implementation will take longer and will not quite turn out exactly as expected.

There are circumstances in hostile situations where civilians cannot provide assistance, and the military are the only asset with the capacity and presence on the ground to deliver immediately. We should be looking to try to establish a set of ground rules for the civilian and military operators in the field. These rules should cover the principles of information sharing, communication with the host government, and how to operate on the ground in the same space. Achieving the balance between the short, medium and long-term objectives of the military and civilian effort in hostile environments will be difficult. One way to mitigate this is to ensure that all efforts have local participation and ownership from the outset, wherever possible. This would help improve local capacity and also direct resources and funding allocation more accurately to reflect local requirements.

Success stories & potential models from which to build

The lack of adequate resources and the need to innovate forced the Lithuanian PRT to address the NGO concerns more fully, involving NGOs more fully. Ensuring PRT projects have an Afghan face is considered essential if development is to have any viability with the local population. The Lithuanian model could be a useful model from which to tailor other efforts.

Other PRT examples to consider would be those of the Kandahar and the German PRT. The Kandahar model is almost entirely Afghan owned. The German PRT has established a steering committee consisting of German, Afghan and IGO representation to identify local projects worthy of funds from the Central government. This joint decision making mechanism has so far been successful.
Pre-deployment training and sharing lessons

It is important to get all three elements – defense, foreign affairs and development/interior educated from the earliest possible stage to ensure that their respective cultures do not impede working relations, and so that working relationships can be established before deployment. Their shared learning experience is also important to the training and education cycle more broadly.

There was very little commentary and few reports on PRTs before ISAF IX deployed in May 2006. Those reports produced were often so diluted that they did not contain anything useful. The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) in the US is a small effort currently based on education and training that considers lessons learned from operational experiences. However, it does need to extend, become open to more experiences (international ones particularly) and become more robust in its outlook. The NATO Defence College in Rome would consider establishing a course and open portal on PRTs if there is sufficient demand from NATO countries. Considering that PRTs are seen to be a model for the Comprehensive Approach in post conflict situations perhaps there is some value in this idea gaining traction.

Recommendations

• We need to establish working practices for the different actors in the different phases from the war fighting to reconstruction.

• Any comprehensive approach should include clear definitions of the terminology employed so there is clear framework of understanding for all international, civilian and military actors involved.

• Establish a database—a learning library—to act as a focal point for the different PRT experiences.

• If the PRT model is to be extended beyond Afghanistan, then a more objective study needs to be conducted to evaluate PRT effectiveness throughout Afghanistan.

• Develop a working strategy for working with a sovereign state where one exists.

WG6. Security Sector Reform in non-permissive environments

Moderators:
Brigadier Andrew MacKay, United Kingdom Armed Forces
LTC Denis Sevaistre, NATO School

Definition

The group framed the discussion of Security Reform within the context of Police, Justice, Intelligence collection, and the Institutions that support a system for rule of law within a society. The discussion was also based from individual experiences and lessons learned from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Issues needing additional discussion

• Under this defined construct and the listed experiences the result of security sector reform has been poor planning, poor execution and a definite absence of policy to support security sector reform in troubled countries.

• The general consensus by the group was that the appropriate mix of 80% civilian to 20% military interaction was needed but that states are not currently allocating resources at the level of 80/20 in order to appropriately meet the needs of the host nation.

• SSR conducted appropriately and successfully can be an appropriate end state. Additionally, SSR can and should be utilized as a means to prevent future conflicts from occurring.

Group recommendations

• Clausewitz wrote, ‘the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.’ BG MacKay paraphrased this as ‘you need to decide the type of war that you are fighting prior to embarking.’ This was mentioned as a means to gain domestic will which all agreed was needed to maintain support in the extended conflicts that NATO is currently facing.

• SSR operations need to be ‘mainstream’ or elevated to a higher level in order to receive the consensus and support that is needed to receive additional resources in terms of money and expertise.

• Currently gaps and frictions occur between the legal and justice systems while conducting SSR operations. Nations need to start conducting operations simultaneously as opposed to sequentially. SSR operations done in this manner will eliminate the imbalance of police on the street and judges in the courts and will better develop a complete legal system.

• Additional emphasis needs to be placed during the planning phase to ensure good coordination and unity of effort with civilian and military organizations when conducting SSR operations in the future.

Group Discussion

BG MacKay opened with a question, ‘Is security sector reform in non-permissive environments working or not?’

The group discussed that the problem with SSR is that it is not given credit or the importance that is needed. SSR needs to be identified as the main effort in order to get appropriate allocation of resources to include personnel and money to meet the agreed upon 80/20 mix.
Resourcing
There is a huge capacity gap between civilian and military. Currently the civilian sector has the technical expertise but lacks the quantity of technical experts to fulfill the needed requirements and lacks the ability to deploy those experts into theater. In filling the gap of requirement and need, the military is the only organization that has the capacity to fill the gap; the issue is that the military is unable to fill the gap with the appropriate expertise. Additionally there is a reluctance on the part of military forces to ‘get into nation building’ or for NATO nations to sign up for ‘policing tasks.’ Additionally, nations don’t want their militaries conducting these types of tasks.

The friction therefore becomes that SSR is ‘not a soldier’s job but only a soldier can do it’ – quote from a group member. This statement then leads to the question of resources and the allocation of resources to the appropriate effort.

Outsourcing
In the ideal world there would be a civilian reserve of resources especially in the justice department. A possible solution would be to have available judges and police who could be surged to a location to help with SSR where needed. In the interim another possibility that NATO could employ is the outsourcing of the mission to contractors specializing in the SSR such as Dyna Corps.

Planning
There needs to be common planning between the military and civilian organizations such as the police. What is the agency or system that closes this gap? Should the planning be left to high level contacts between the EU and NATO? Is the problem in planning the SSR mission or is it in the execution of the mission. In the interim it is easier to train military forces to complete the task; the question still comes back to manning elements such as PRTs and resourcing the cadre to conduct the required tasks.

Another question that needs to be addressed is to what scale will NATO be involved? This will help to answer the resource allocation issue. For example, is it a huge undertaking such as Afghanistan or is the scale of the SSR mission less.

Coordination
The question of how to involve civilian organizations that are not used to operating in a non-permissive environment? One solution is to train host nation police out of the country. This has been used and works. The counter argument is that it is resource intensive, especially in the realm of logistics. Secondly it can detract from host nation pride in developing their system.

The argument that Croatia was a success in that a rag-tag police force was transformed and built. This was done through unity of doctrine, unity of the training effort, and with the will of the domestic and host nation will since the effort took time. The counter argument was that it was conducted in a permissive environment.

Agreement was made on the issue for the need to have an overarching strategy to link policing to justice and the effort needs to be applied simultaneously as opposed to sequentially.
In the future we need to get away from building “ad hoc” organizations to address the issue or are we content with this approach.

Another argument was that NATO used to be specialized. The question was is it possible to have NATO nations sign up for a particular task. The counter argument is that of resources especially with smaller NATO nations and their abilities to meet expectations during the execution phase of SSR.

Group wrap up

General consensus was that the Comprehensive Approach to Modern Conflict was moving SSR closer to the needed outcomes. Secondly the concept is generally understood but the realization of needed changes within current organizations is coming. However it may be coming too slowly for nations’ expectations and needs. It was noted that the clash of national wills and national goals create frictions that impede the needed solutions from occurring in a timely manner to increase stability and reduce conflict in nations were NATO is conducting SSR.

WG7. Reflecting the Comprehensive Approach in Pre-Deployment Preparation and Training

Moderators:

Major General John Drewienkiewicz (ret), United Kingdom
Colonel John Agoglia, Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

Initial questions posed:

- How do we involve all the actors who need to work together on the ground as pre-training is designed? We need OGDs, other coalition partners, NGOs, the local people; under whose direction does the training happen?
- How do we convince other coalition partners of the virtue of best practice? Best practice is probably expensive, and beyond some partners unless subsidized.
- There is a tendency, to be guarded against, to train for the thing we know we can do, not the thing we dread most.
- Do we train entire units and deploy them all at once (Big Bang) or deploy a few at a time and replace a few at a time (trickle)?
- If turnaround of personnel is done on a continuous trickle, the problem of new, unaware formations in old incidents is avoided, but this method loses out on the identity of the group deployed.
- If we are facing a ten-year campaign, then we should be prepared to restructure significantly to provide the capabilities we need now.
- How do you quickly fund a new line of development?
- How do you make coordination attractive and convince people of the virtues of coordination?
• COIN is a golden opportunity for nations that are no longer prepared to fund forces for war-fighting, and are not equipped to do so, to make a significant contribution. [Note: this important topic was not properly discussed].

• How do we make it attractive for individuals to return time after time to a specific theatre? How does the deployed individual compete with the individual who ‘stays close to his desk and never goes to sea, and he shall be the ruler of the Queen’s Navy.’

• How do we avoid a constant stream of new faces – ‘Balkan Virgins’?

• How do we make it attractive for military staff to deploy for longer tours?

• How do we make learning the local language attractive?

• Is there a level of commitment that is so small that its output is not worth the input? How many platoon-sized contingents can the market bear?

• The military values planning and training, and is prepared to invest significant resources in both. The non-military value both, but are not always prepared to invest resources in planning and training. How do we change this mind-set?

Comments

• Coordination is very hard. No one ever got a Victoria Cross for coordination.

• Everything is personality-dependent.

• It takes time to build trust and to mutually understand one another.

• We need a common understanding of what we are trying to achieve.

• High turnover leads to institutional amnesia.

• What we are really trying to produce is the Learning Organization, not simply individuals. High turnover of personnel, coupled with organizational stovepipes leads to institutional amnesia.

• What needs to be done is the creation of corporate knowledge.

• How do you sustain that memory? How do you share it? There are probably ways of lengthening the memory. Perhaps engineering of education and training environment is the answer.

• NGOs do have corporate knowledge, because they are deployed 24 months out of 30. The military is different. Why do we have to take it as a given that you can only deploy for 6 months?

• Need to identify and empower mediating organizations e.g. Swedes running exercises that NGOs are prepared to take part in.

• Sweden’s Viking Series: the training audience in these courses is almost entirely NGO-based. There is a need for a mediating organization which provides the right, friendly, environment. Organizations that have special competencies should contribute for the benefit of other organizations. – Viking Series is the perfect example of such an achievement.
e-learning is a good medium for cultural information.

We need a civil-military common operational picture.

postprt.com as common site for all involved in PRT.

Organization needed to support getting people to volunteer for service in Afghanistan.

Need to analyze what can be achieved through distance learning.

Ad hoc units such as PRT need proper pre-deployment preparation just as much as ‘proper’ units.

There are risks that one takes in preparation and training. You cannot have all the time in the world, choosing what you don’t cover in training needs to be a conscious decision, not a default one.

Training agencies and employing agencies are not well-connected.

Need to involve all participants in design of training/preparation. It is a joint effort.

Civilians are better educated; military are better trained. The difference between education (learning how to think) and training (learning specific things).

In a long war military personnel can expect to do two or three deployments. This means that there is time to adjust.

Comprehensive approach requires training system to have a corporate memory.

Main issue is to train everyone together in a multinational environment.

How relevant is pre-deployment training?

In the military, you spend a short time on deployment and longer training at home. In government, NGOs and private sector this is reversed. These different time scales create many issues.

**Military**: one month training per month deployed.

**NGO**: one month training for every year deployed.

**PRT**: three weeks training for one year deployed.

**Private Sector**: all training comes out of the bottom line, therefore no training will be undertaken unless it benefits the organization directly.

**Civilian (US Govt)**: previous experiences are regarded as beneficial, and the individuals are more likely to be prepared linguistically than the military.

Should we structure our Armed Forces to make them more relevant?

Training requirements must be dictated by the organization itself, and situation-dictated. Civilian agencies don’t have the ‘surge capacity,’ therefore a lot of training will have to be done by individuals, as opposed to in teams. However many NGOs welcome grants from the government for training purposes, because they recognize the value this training represents for them.
The military has a very advanced training cycle for ‘surge.’ At the same time, we have to ensure that we manage perceptions. We are sometimes perceived as military Neanderthals.

What is especially needed is the training for non-permissive environments.

There needs to be a minimum level of training for all military, civilian and NGO personnel going to a conflict zone. From then onwards, this basic training can be easily complemented by further individual training.

In the post-deployment cycle, it’s critical to do the lessons-learnt exercise.

USAID does it, but the lessons-learnt information is not shared, and not fed back into the pre-deployment cycle.

In a benign environment things are different than in conflict. Before we start looking for the solution, we have to understand the context of what we are trying to achieve, which is theatre-specific.

Understanding others’ capabilities is part of developing trust.

Comprehensive Approach (hereafter CA) tries to achieve synchronization. The training should therefore focus on this synchronization, partly via mapping of higher principles.

ISAF PRT courses: from experience, governments don’t like to be told what to do by NATO. The courses are excellent for cooperation, but should not be used for guidance. NATO merely provides the framework where this coordination takes place.

What is required is a set of certain skills by civilians that will operate in a conflict zone, an understanding of how to function in a military environment, down to the obvious example of knowing what an IED is.

Civilians ought to be involved in the design of exercises. Design of training for civilians and NGO personnel must take into account the fact they are not going to be in the conflict zone all the time.

Design of exercise must also answer the question of why do civilians deploy to a conflict zone? Do they seek excitement, promotion etc?

One of the problems civilians face is that their deployment to a conflict zone does not advance their career. This is a problem of incentives, which can be easily fixed within organizations. Those that succeed inevitably end up on an accelerated learning curve and therefore will be promoted faster.

Why do we want joint training?

There are two reasons: firstly, to build trust – training therefore must be an ongoing thing. E.g., UK perspective – courses run by government departments that have civilian-military personnel mix. Secondly, we need mutual understanding of what we are doing and where do we fit in.
• Would bringing personnel from theatre and getting them to contribute in training be one viable option?

• Cultural awareness must be built early on, from initial officer training. This is very important as the military is the biggest contributor numerically. The awareness training must begin immediately. Even in cadet schools this should be reflected. The solution to modern conflict is not ‘nuking’ them, but being cooperative.

• We’ve got to militate against mission failure.

• Planning must not be done from the military side only, on the contrary, a collective plan achieves much more.

• Ambassador Edelman talked earlier today about the cultural/anthropological element. There was a discussion about US DoD hiring an anthropologist to explain the tribal issues to other personnel.

• Foreign Service Institute. Cross-cultural training breaks down in a conflict environment. There is an assumption that if the person worked in Japan or Peru, they have already adapted and acquired cultural sensitivity as part of their character. This is not the case! There is no luxury of time, and oftentimes the person on a PRT does not receive adequate training, but the time must be utilized fully.

• What kind of training can the Military provide that is relevant to diplomats?

• Instead of training other departments and organizations, the trainers should teach how to develop own training programs.

• What we have is a system that gives most to those that need it least, e.g. PRTs really need the awareness training, and they receive very little. In contrast, an infantry battalion will receive comparatively much more training. Ad hoc units such as PRTs are the units that need it most, yet they are not receiving the training.

• We can lengthen the time line if we have more people. Unless you increase the pool of personnel, you cannot increase the time, otherwise other people’s training will be compromised.

• A crucial element is the delivery of training.

• Rotation cycle of each organization will depend on their own requirements, but you cannot be prescriptive about rotation. People are susceptible to persuasions by their colleagues that they are indispensable, and are often willing to stay ‘for the greater good.’

Learning Medium

• Distance learning is very good for certain aspects, but is not always the best.

• e-learning/distance learning has limitations, but for cultural awareness it is excellent.

• What we now need is Smart Pull, not Smart Push. The presentation should be user-defined.
• Centers of excellence must be connected to help manage training institutions. E-learning is progressively improving, and we should be at the forefront of the new developments.

• Design of our preparation must include our awareness on where we are going to fail.

• People are sent into theatre without collective NATO training. All pre-deployment training is done at the national level, as opposed to the Comprehensive Approach of international.

• Sustaining contacts over time will significantly improve the learning experience.

• It’s the young soldiers that are online, not senior leaders. The young soldiers are the ones asking all the good questions, because they are aware of the current technology, and therefore, current issues. Cross-training can facilitate that – sharing outsiders’ experience.

• The title of the conference: Afghanistan and Beyond. What’s ‘beyond’? Is it a time, or is it regions? If it’s time, we can use the training experience. If it’s other conflict regions, current training won’t be as helpful.

**Individuals’ Points**

• Need to have civilian involvement in training design.

• Expand training to include NGOs and Government Departments.

• The training is valuable, necessary and it’s the real world.

• If we accept that this is a long war, we can therefore take the long-term approach to training and preparations. We have the responsibility to train political minds, not just the military.

• Must have community-wide, collective corporate memory.

• In theatre, the community is international, whereas the training is national. The PRTs must share their lessons and train together better.

• If we want to coordinate, the military and civilians must train together.

• How do you standardize best practice? How do you capture lessons learned? We must leverage technology.

• Respect; exercises must be short and sharp; we need practical solutions, e.g. courses in NATO schools, cross-training.

• Utilize international think tanks, utilize NATO, Article 5 must be read by others, not just the military.

• Must overcome cultural barriers between military and civilian, even military and civilian police are different.

• Individual versus collective training. The Military can easily overwhelm the civilians with a number of exercises. The key is to be selective. What will sustain in the future, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan?
Themes

- The underlying theme is the need for trust, which takes time to build, and is personality-dependent.
- All parties, civilian organizations, NGOs, and private sector and the military all should participate in the design of preparation and training. It must be inclusive and integrated, and allow that some may not be able to attend every element.
- Includes mutual respect.
- It isn’t just the military training that a few others are invited to take part in.
- Leverage technology and training system so as to develop and improve corporate memory.

Recommendations

- More connection between trainer and end user.
- Much training is on national lines with multinational training as a thin veneer. Ad hoc units such as PRTs need just as much, if not more training, than proper units.
- Capture and institutionalize organizational learning so that each new rotation builds on the previous hard-won experience. Avoid SFOR experience of 6 months of experience, repeated 20 times. Or 4 months of experience, repeated 30 times.

WG8. Media Relations, Public Diplomacy, and Strategic Communications

Moderators:

Commander Steve Tatham, Director (Select), Media Participation ARAG
Dr. Kiron Skinner, The Hoover Institution

Questions

- How has the globalization of communications affected modern conflict?
- How best to communicate our message to the local population?
- How do our media relations and strategic communications square with the comprehensive approach?

Discussion

There is a disconnect between addressing principles and getting the message across. In the wider field, there is scope for re-examining Cold War lessons, e.g. George Kennan’s strategy of fragmenting Communism, and the whole philosophy of flexible response, with a view to their possible application to present-day situations. The propaganda program of that era might repay study. This connects with Ambassador Edelman’s point of a grand strategic plan including public diplomacy. In the US we see an
administration that has revised elements of institutions and doctrine, but on the other hand it has failed on the public diplomacy side.

There is a lack of clarity as to definitions and aims:

• We need to have a better understanding of who ‘we’ are. What groups, nations, institutions are involved?
• What is ‘the international community’?
• What are ‘we’ trying to do?
• Who is ‘the enemy,’ and what is he trying to do?
• Are national governments sufficiently aware of what is going on to offer adequate support?

These uncertainties are vulnerabilities, fault lines which the media will exploit to the detriment of our strategy.

Perception and the Message

• In today’s world, perception is more important than reality and is itself formed by presentation.
• The message must not only incorporate ground truth but must be so presented as to achieve perception of ground truth in the audience.
• Policy must also reflect ground truth and not some erroneous approximation.

Problems

• Whether in or out of theatre, very few people have a clear idea of what is actually happening on the ground.
• NATO is seen by many Afghans as foreigners who have taken the lead in Afghanistan, when it should appear that the GoA is in control and that NATO is in support. The entire Western alliance is viewed to be totally dominated by the US – a US puppet tied to what they perceive to be US interests.
• Five years on although democracy is good, internal problems make supporting democracy difficult. Democracy, women’s rights, don’t fill bellies. The GoA lacks legitimacy because it cannot provide for its people.
• GoA is perceived as full of war criminals, and the international community is seen as supporting an unpopular modernizing minority.
• Winning ‘hearts and minds’ in-theatre is the responsibility of the GoA. The international will is the job of the international community.
• The need for tangible changes and for these changes to be broadcast – this raises another issue, how to make positive news marketable? Given the limited coverage allocated to Afghanistan in the international media, hard events (kinetic effect) will attract attention rather than soft (another health center opens and stays open).
• Afghanistan is not European, never will be, and never should. This too presents problems of perception for the West.

**Dissemination**

• Media – bottom up development is required. There is a need to use, and where necessary create, local networks (e.g. community radio) to disseminate information.

• What is needed is not an Afghan face (a veneer) but an Afghan mechanism, an Afghan institution from which messages can be generated. The international community cannot do this.

• Who are the audience?
  
  o The core fanatics.
  o Groups financing and supplying weapons to the core (target and cut their finance links and networks).
  o People who are supporting the core – these are the ones in theatre that media should be targeting.

• The audience for strategic communications also includes the home populations of donor nations. These need to be kept informed and on side if national will to maintain operations in the long term is to be sustained.

• Dissemination calls for a ‘comprehensive approach’ of its own to determine the best methods of reaching the target audiences, which will include individuals covering the whole spectrum of media technology and will include a significant proportion of illiterate.

**Themes**

• The message needs to reflect the reality on the ground much more closely.

• There is a high level of ignorance among the public about what is happening on the ground.

• The media worldwide will be able to expose lack of consistency and clarity between actors, which will improve the adversary’s position.

**Recommendations**

• Concentrate on comprehensive understanding of problems in the world. Suicide bombing is a problem, but it is also a tactic.

• Focus much more on local issues.

• Establish a truly Afghan media, building from the bottom up.
Summary of Reports from Working Groups

WG1. Applying NATO’s strengths to the Taliban’s weaknesses

Themes:
A lot of Taliban weaknesses can be exploited. The Taliban has an alien ideology, and a track record that portrays brutality, e.g. killing civilians with IEDs. The Taliban is strong because NATO is weak.
The importance of defeating the Taliban is such that we need NATO forces in the lead. But there is a need for an Afghan face.

Recommendations:
We need to counter propaganda about occupation.
We need to hunt down and kill or capture high profile Taliban targets.
We need to generate more presence in the South, both NATO and Afghan.
We need more NATO trainers to empower and enable Afghan forces.

WG2. Mobilizing and Institutionalizing the Comprehensive Approach in National Capitals

Themes:
Variability of meaning of Comprehensive Approach (CA) – different states have different perceptions and interpretations.
In order to achieve an alliance, it is not necessary for every country to do everything. Selectivity does not equal lack of commitment.
Public opinion, politics, and the need for electoral support. Overcoming inertia.
Adequacy of preparation and planning, creation of enough trainers and experts.
Prompt and adequate funding for CA activities.

Recommendations:
Common vision – we must aim for a situation where everyone would have the same message and vision. This is only achievable if there is credible belief that there is adequate funding.
Wider engagement – we must involve not only NGOs, but also business, media, even celebrities.
Micro-investment into social improvement.

WG3. Mobilizing and Institutionalizing the Comprehensive Approach in International Organizations

Caveats:
The focus of discussion is Beyond Afghanistan.
All IOs bring different capabilities.
We must be realistic in our ambition.
Comprehensive Approach within an IO compared to across IOs.

Questions/Themes:
How do we institutionalize CA at strategic level?
Production of an integrated campaign plan?
How do we make NGOs accountable?

Sub Issues:
Need a mechanism to produce this plan.
Do we need a common baseline, a planning tool?
Who is a major player, an IO, if there is one, and if there isn’t an IO, is UN the default organization?
All management must be brought together to plan.

Recommendations:
Establish better mechanism for harmonization. Rather than competition and suspicion, we should have more liaison offices etc.
Instigate cross-training – must understand each others’ procedures.
Multi-national experimentation.
Settle for coordination rather than integration at the operational level.
There must be a focal point to planning.

WG4. NATO Coordination with International Organizations and Other Entities

Identified Shortcomings:
Lack of common understanding.
Lack of unity of effort.
Different structures of different organizations.

Themes:
Who coordinates, and who should? Afghanistan is a sovereign nation, and it should coordinate. But does it have the capacity? If it does not, then building that capacity should be our first priority.

We need:
- A strategic plan that we can all subscribe to
- Some nations have to maintain their neutrality, and that is fine
- Subordination – under right situation
- Engagement of private sector in this unity of effort, especially crucial as there is no long term stability without private sector.
**Recommendations:**
Assess the ability of Afghanistan to coordinate all our efforts. If it can, allow it to co-ordinate, if it cannot, assist the nation in building that capacity as the first priority.

**Structures:**
Public would find it a disgrace if they were aware of the lack of coordination between IOs.
Lessons learned – do we use the top-down or bottom-up approach?
NATO – do you take a revolutionary approach e.g. subordinate NATO to EU in Kosovo, and/or to the UN in Afghanistan?
Must have HQ structural change.
Structural changes – do we need to restructure NATO HQ, if yes, do we need to add resources, if yes, does it change the fundamental role of the HQ?
How do you operate internally in an organization is just as important as how you operate outside the organization.

**WG5. Humanitarian Development in hostile environments**

**Background**
Need for a definition of Humanitarian Development (HD).
Efficacy of PRTs in Afghanistan.

**Themes:**
Lack of common framework of discussion, which directly affects our ability to operate effectively in a civil-military environment.
The Military is not the organization to do HD work, but increasingly it is required to, because it is the only organization that has the capacity. How do you transition out of this environment to give over to civilian organizations?
What are the ROE, at what stage does the civilian contingent come in?
Developing capacity of civilian agencies to get involved in hostile environment.

**Recommendations:**
A ‘laboratory of learning’ must be developed. NATO is developing a common portal at the moment to exchange information.
Establish a framework that allows the recipient government to get involved right from the start.

**WG6. Security Sector Reform in non-permissive environments**

**Themes:**
Security Sector Reform has been around for some time now, although frequently poorly planned and executed. SSR is the route out; we have to create institutions and conduct reform.
Take Clausewitz’s advice and decide what war you are fighting.
Role of military – far beyond what it was in Bosnia. Major commitment is training police. How do we address that gap? Civilian component would be better at doing it, but this is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Substantial organizational changes are required. If inter-agency approach is genuine – PCRU and SCRS would be resourced properly, with spending authority, not just operating costs.

**Recommendations:**
SSR must be viewed as a mainstream activity, not a Cinderella. Governments and other agencies must engage in public dialogue. PS has a pivotal role, how is it to be moderated and regulated? Inclusive, integrated, informed, aware. CA is conceptual and therefore difficult to comprehend. The soldier or policeman has to deliver on the ground. Do they understand the issues? Integrated approach – implementation. Output approach – deliverables.

**WG7. Reflecting the Comprehensive Approach in Pre-Deployment Preparation and Training**

**Themes:**
Underlying theme is the need for trust, which takes time to build, and is personality-dependent. All parties, civilian organizations, NGOs, the private sector and the military all should participate in the design of preparation and training. It must be inclusive and integrated, and allow that some may not be able to attend every element. Training includes mutual respect. It must not be viewed as military training in which a few others are invited to take part. Training systems should include mechanisms to develop and improve corporate memory.

**Recommendations:**
There should be more connection between trainer and end user. More international training is necessary – much training is on national lines with multinational training as a thin veneer. Ad hoc units such as PRTs need just as much, if not more training, than proper units. Capture and institutionalize organizational learning so that each new rotation builds on the previous hard-won experience. Avoid SFOR experience of 6 months of experience, repeated 20 times. Or 4 months of experience, repeated 30 times.
WG8. Media Relations, Public Diplomacy, and Strategic Communications

Factors:
Lack of consensus in the international community on who and what constitutes the international community.
Lack of consensus on what we are trying to do. Is it a global war on terror?
Lack of consensus on who the adversary is and what he is trying to achieve.
Lack of support from national governments.
International consensus does not equal local consensus.
Assumptions are flawed even as it applies to Afghanistan. Until there is a better understanding there can be no CA that will survive later shocks.

Themes:
The message needs to reflect the reality on the ground much more closely.
There is a high level of ignorance among the public about what is happening on the ground.
The media worldwide will be able to expose lack of consistency and clarity between actors, which will improve the adversary’s position.

Recommendations:
Concentrate on comprehensive understanding of problems in the world. Suicide bombing is a problem, but it is also a tactic.
Focus much more on local issues.
Establish a truly Afghan media, building from the bottom up.

FOURTH SESSION, AFTERNOON 27 MARCH

Topical Remarks
The Honorable Hikmet Çetin *

Towards a Comprehensive Approach at National and International Levels

I would like to start by thanking the Marshall Center and the US State and Defense Departments for inviting me to this conference, and for the warm hospitality extended to me and my delegation. I also would like to thank everyone who took part in the excellent organization of this very timely and thought provoking conference. This conference underlines the priority Afghanistan has on our common agenda.

As you may recall, I stayed in Afghanistan for almost three years during my tour of duty as NATO Senior Civilian Representative. Quite a life-time experience it was, of-

* The Honorable Hikmet Çetin is former NATO Senior representative in Afghanistan.
ffering a first hand insight on historical changes. Some experiences were saddening, frustrating and incomprehensible, but most were encouraging and promising.

On a positive note, I was impressed by the determination and perseverance of the Afghan people for building a better future. Afghanistan is the poorest country in the entire world save Sub-Saharan Africa. Its government is, in terms of the resources it could generate, the most destitute in the world. The people of Afghanistan are genuinely tired of fighting with each other. Yet they are still keen on defending their freedom against the predators of dark forces.

In short, what they are trying to achieve may seem to be impossible. But, they are not disheartened nor are deterred.

*Let me now reflect on how I see the situation today.*

Despite important political developments in the last few years, events since last spring gave us a clear signal that the overall security in Afghanistan is still fragile. I feel worried that, unless the influence of Taliban is cleared out, problems in the south may spill over to a larger area.

The opium economy is yet another source of concern for Afghanistan and the international community. This is the long-time exposed belly of Afghanistan. It has an adverse effect on every single aspect of Afghan life. It prevents the development of a legitimate economy. It corrupts institutions and people. And most worrisome, there now seems to be a greater connection between drug trafficking and the insurgency as well as criminality across the country. Needless to say, the provision of alternative livelihoods for the local people is the very key to break this vicious cycle of opium economy.

*Ladies and gentlemen,*

Until recently, the insurgents waging war around the world held the promise of a ‘heaven on earth’ to the people in order to enlarge their support base. The insurgents of our modern era are not bothered to offer a better future any more. They simply aim to dysfunction the central governments, for this goal is much easier to achieve. Afghanistan offers a typical example of this case.

It follows that the insurgent war is more of a political nature, rather than a military one. This is not a ‘modern’ feature, for it has always been the case. Insurgents’ fundamental teaching supposes that ‘superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.’ Their main goal is exhaustion of the enemy’s political will rather than destruction of its superior military power. They remain hopeful for winning the war even when the opposing military force wins all the battles and remains all powerful. In other words, they focus on winning the war, not the battles. Modern insurgency, therefore, seeks to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. This is exactly what we witness today in Afghanistan.

Yet I do not see any indication of second thoughts on the part of the ISAF participating governments. This is good news. But can we assume the same for our parliaments and public opinion makers? I doubt that.
We all know that insurgencies can last longer than we hope, remaining viable before the eyes of a wider population. Insurgencies are measured in decades, not in months or years. If citizens turn sour when faced with the long time-frame and mounting costs of counterinsurgency, the insurgent wins.

In this perspective, we should ask ourselves whether the general public in the ISAF participating countries is ready for protracted low-intensity warfare in Afghanistan. However disturbing this prospect may be, we must prepare them for this eventuality. Otherwise, the theory and past practice suggest that the likelihood of us losing this endeavor is quite high.

In the case of Afghanistan, the insurgents argue that they are defending the faith and their country against ‘foreign occupation.’ Their message to uncommitted or pro-coalition countrymen is to stand clear of the fight between the insurgents and the ‘invaders,’ who will eventually be forced to leave. From this tune sheet, a subtle message is relayed to the ISAF participant countries and the coalition: withdraw or else prepare to engage in an endless, costly fight.

As of today, notwithstanding the speculation about an imminent spring offensive in Afghanistan, the Taliban could return to power only by filling a power void rather than by re-conquering the country.

Its thinking is simple: to outlast NATO-ISAF.

Thus, the Taliban leadership will be content to slowly build on the gains made in 2006 rather than making 2007 a decisive year. They will not take us on in a conventional war that maximizes our strengths; they will fight the insurgent war that challenges our weaknesses. This strategy frees them to focus on offensive warfare to make gains in a shorter time frame.

This takes me to offer an important observation:
In strategic terms, the Taliban is capable of sustaining prolonged insurgency. They have capitalized on the 2006 campaign to attract finance, material and recruits. Morale and confidence seem to remain sufficiently high. Last year, despite suffering many casualties, they were able to recruit with relatively little difficulty. In this war of attrition, they remain convinced that time is on their side, unless the local population suddenly turns against them.

Against this backdrop, the question is: “what should the Afghan government do?”

Let me share my thoughts on this.
The central element in any strategy must be the people. Effective governance is the first condition to win the loyalty of people by providing security. And this does not simply culminate to killing insurgents and terrorists.

Luckily for us, the Afghan Government does not have a legitimacy problem. It came to power after fair and transparent elections that reflected the free will of the Afghan people. It is eager and motivated to stand up to the challenge. This is a great asset, and it must be used till the end.

The government, however, must adapt to effective governance. This is exactly what the Taliban aim to undermine. Should the Taliban succeed in proving this point, then, the government will be doomed. Therefore, the foremost aim of the government must
be to display its ability to rule effectively and fair-handedly. Culturally speaking, justice and fairness in ruling, in this part of the world, may sometimes supersede even basic liberties.

The Taliban have only one marketable past performance. Their rule was brief and brutal, but marked with secure streets free from fratricidal fighting. That is an exceptional feature in Afghanistan’s recent history. The Afghan people should not be allowed to develop a longing for this period. I should make a point on this issue: We must not forget that time can play to the hands of the insurgents.

At this juncture, establishing a strong national army and an efficient police force are crucial for Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces should be better equipped, and better trained in order to take the lead in the struggle for the future of their country. They should get hold of the monopoly of using legitimate coercive force in their own country; and, sooner the better.

As you all know, the people of Afghanistan are proud to be known as great warriors. Needless to say, they have accumulated sufficient experience for the last 25 years. Sometimes, they say that they feel offended as we are fighting for them. They really do not wish to become a political burden on the other governments to convince their parliaments for sending troops. I know for a fact that the Afghan Government prefers to have modern military equipment and logistic facilities for its own army rather than an increase of foreign troops in Afghanistan. This preference is not vocally expressed yet for some reasons, but there is such a feeling among the Afghans.

At this point, another question is ‘what should NATO do?’

Before answering this question, we all have to agree that Afghanistan has become a test-case for NATO’s credibility. NATO has no other choice than being successful in Afghanistan. Thus, failure is not an option.

Should NATO fail in Afghanistan, its role and mission, and its very reason of existence in the new world order will fall under question. It will be the first defeat of NATO in its history. This will inevitably play to the hands of the insurgents in other hot spots of the world. Thus, the theatre in Afghanistan has now turned into a test-case for the insurgents, too.

The Taliban aims to erode our political resolve, and our superior economic and military power. We cannot allow that happen. It is a recognized fact that we should pass our messages to the Afghan people more effectively. But that is hardly enough. We should dig trenches of information in our home countries, too.

It is my firm belief, yet, that success in Afghanistan is achievable. However, this goes beyond military means alone. This was confirmed during the Riga Summit as well. Despite resurgent activities, IEDs, and attacks, Afghanistan’s destiny is one that will be resolved by civilian efforts parallel to the military.

There are many global and regional actors in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that all of them are working hard and sincerely for a noble cause. Yet coordination and the cohesion among those are lacking, and the problem continues to get worse. I think with its high motivation, NATO is definitely more capable and focused than any other or-
ganization in Afghanistan. Therefore, NATO should take a more visible role in civilian efforts, too.

I am convinced that if NATO takes such a lead, that will tremendously increase the visibility and the credibility of NATO in Afghanistan in a positive way, and of course, that will lay the ground for the Alliance to design a healthy and a timely exit-strategy.

Therefore, what we should do is to implement civilian programs with comprehensive economic, social and humanitarian dimensions. When you visit Afghanistan, you hear as much about unemployment, transport, energy, basic health, and other fundamental services from average Afghans as you hear about the Taliban.

As long as we continue to talk about Afghanistan in purely military terms, without the subsistence levels and employment, then we will have a longer problem. Well, there are vital infrastructure projects going on in the country. I have no doubt that these are result-oriented projects. But, those results would be seen in the medium to long run. When and if the man on the street survives the winter without heating and electricity, then an ongoing multi-billion dollar networking project does not mean much to him. Similarly, as we are building a state-of-the-art ring road connecting cities, if the residents of parts of central Kabul are still walking in knee-high mud, our efforts will not mean much to the average person on the streets of Afghanistan. Therefore, in addition to these costly works, we have to offer them something concrete and visible in order to bring a positive change in their daily lives, in a shorter term.

Starting to ‘create sustainable jobs’ and ‘increase employment’ are the key words here. Thus, I welcome the establishment of the Afghan Development Zones, where improvements in security and governance are delivered through an integrated approach by all relevant actors. ADZs will definitely create the necessary conditions for development. Yet again, time is ticking.

Utilizing the services of more Afghan companies, and employing more Afghan personnel in our construction projects, and other quick impact projects focusing on agro-industry are other tangible contributions we can make. These are relatively inexpensive in budget, quick and effective in nature.

Earlier, I argued that we should not talk about Afghanistan only in military terms. Well, there are times that you have to speak with a language that Taliban only understands. Even when we must be doing this, we should always keep in mind that the most important battle in Afghanistan is the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The real contest for the hearts and minds of the local population for 2007 may well hinge on the competing sides’ ‘collateral damage’ statistics.

According to some experts, even the Taliban suicide bombers, in their own sinister way, claim trying to avoid civilian casualties. They say, when compared to Iraq, Afghan suicide bombers seem to be aiming at the hard targets (government, police, military). If this is correct, we might then conclude that the Taliban are trying to avoid losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people by needlessly killing civilians.

In this regard, NATO and Coalition Forces must definitely do whatever is necessary to avoid civilian casualties. The worst development in Afghanistan would be the
consolidation of the image of our troops as an occupation force in the eyes of the Afghan people.

*Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,*

To reach our common goals in Afghanistan, we should steadfastly continue our close cooperation. This cooperation will enable us to see a more stable and developed Afghanistan in all fields.

Though ironical it may sound, let alone the positive ones, the negative points in the whole picture lead us to a conclusion that the Government of Afghanistan still needs our determination to honor our pledges.

I believe that what the international community does over the next two or three years will largely determine our long-term success.

I have to emphasize one vital point here. The international community is there to assist the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. Any impression on the part of the Afghan people that we are there to conduct decision making for them, in their own affairs, would be detrimental, because this would feed the Taliban propaganda that they are fighting against a foreign occupation. So, more and more Afghan ownership and more visible Afghan leadership are the key concepts here.

I believe that as long as we continue to offer our valuable support to the people of Afghanistan, this country will take its rightful place in the world. Undoubtedly, it takes time and patience.

I am very positive that if NATO takes a more prominent role in future deliveries of the international community with a comprehensive approach, our common history will record another success story for the future generations. As emphasized earlier, we cannot opt for failure in so doing.

In conclusion, I feel compelled to emphasize yet another point: that Afghanistan cannot be dealt with in isolation from the regional dynamics. Therefore, we should develop a broader thinking that would ensure the regional cooperation of the neighboring countries, foremost that of Pakistan, within the wider context of the global war on international terrorism.

Thank you for your attention, and allow me to thank, once again, the Marshall Center for their kind invitation that gave me the opportunity to be a part of such an august gathering.

I would be pleased to answer if you have any questions.

Thank you.

**Q&A**

**Q1:** Exit strategy/end-state – the goal is to create a safe environment for economic development, etc, but no indication of a time frame. Given the risk of developing dependency, should this remain vague or be set more specifically?

**A:** Why are we there? This is the first time NATO has operated out of area. The political side is going very well – successful Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Security is still a problem – although only negative matters tend to be reported e.g.
two-thirds of the country, approximately 20 provinces, is safe. NATO cannot leave US and Afghanis to deal with neighbors alone. We should concentrate more on police – 50% are illiterate. Afghan security forces must be able to take over before withdrawal. Economic development must be more focused on – a good way to show locals that their life is improving/can improve.

Q2: *Pakistan is a key to success. Bilateral cooperation must be developed. Is the relationship between Musharraf and Karzai improving and how can we help?*

A: We must establish more confidence in leaders of both countries. Help is required on both sides of border – can only support them. These are two very important leaders in the Region. They should not criticize each other publicly. Pakistanis are especially sensitive to this – they have their problems too.

Q3: *Problems with lack of resources – demand always ahead of supply. What is the cause and solution?*

A: Need for between 4/5 billion dollars in aid per year for next 15 yrs (perhaps). Money should go to Treasury to be spent by GoA – ‘you elected me and now I will do this for you.’ If others are seen to be doing the job, this undermines leadership. At end 2001, Afghanistan started below zero (unlike Iraq), but looking at current state you can see improvement. Now almost 2m girls in schools; previously they could not leave the house without a male chaperone. No change for so many after successive elections. Narcotics issue only touched on – 2006 highest production ever.
Panel 3

Institutional Changes to Deliver a Comprehensive Approach

Topics:

- Long-term reform both at the IO level (NATO and EU) and at the national level within inter-agency processes
- Lessons learned within national capitals for bringing more civil-military planning, training, and education prior to crisis and war
- National efforts to transform militaries to conduct non-traditional operations.

Moderator: Lieutenant General David Barno (Ret.), Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Brigadier General Joseph McMenamin (Ret.), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acting), Stability Operations Capabilities

Mr. Richard Teuten, Head, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, DfID

Brigadier General Antonello Vitale, Allied Command Transformation

Mr. Alastair McKechnie, Country Director for Afghanistan, The World Bank

LTG David Barno

- NATO ISAF is still a relatively new organization.
- ISAF rotations are 6-9 months and staffed on an individual basis.
- The operational center of gravity in Afghanistan is the populace.
- Robust information operations are critical.

BG Joseph McMenamin

- Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the need for a comprehensive approach.
- American forces have adapted to meet the threat.
- A key question is, ‘How do we institutionalize these changes?’
  - Stability operations
  - NSPD 44 give the American Department of State the lead.
- There are two key differences between the military and civilian agencies:
  - The military has a robust planning process that can overwhelm civilian agencies
  - Civilian agencies are not designed to surge during a mission like the military.
- Planning sessions must consider the 3 ‘Cs’:
  - Capability: What do you want the units/agencies to do?
  - Capacity: How much of a unit/agency do you want?
Compatibility: Interoperability with NATO allies and interagency must be considered.

- Differences in NATO and interagency systems:
  - Planning
  - Resourcing: budgets
  - Intelligence
  - Information sharing
  - Doctrine, training, and education
  - The private sector: what are contractors going to do and should they follow military rules.

The key goal for stability operations is that the lessons learned outlast Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Mr. Richard Teuten**

- The UK strategy for operations in the Helmand province in Afghanistan was a cross-agency one.
- The cross-agency approach should allocate responsibilities and develop common goals.
- Commanders at all levels need to understand the implications of their decisions and maximize flexibility of systems.
- We should approach the mission in Afghanistan in a manner as civilian as possible, but military as necessary.
- The military role needs to be clearly defined by the national political commitment.

**BG Antonello Vitale**

- One error to the comprehensive approach is planning, but not knowing what you’re planning for.
- Key elements of success:
  - Governance
  - Development
  - Justice.
- Defining success is important.
- Four ways to enhance civil/military interaction:
  - Promoting *awareness* of other players
  - Fostering *de-confliction* between players
  - *Cooperation*
  - Achieving *cohesiveness*.
- Lastly, NATO needs to consider transnational threats.
Mr. Alastair McKechnie

- Defining the problem of modern conflict is about state building and development of durable institutions.
- The World Bank distributes funds twice as fast in Afghanistan than other countries.
- The manner is which aid is distributed is as important as its volume:
  - Aid distributed outside the national budget disempowers the Government
  - Inefficiently delivered aid damages the credibility both of the donor and of the Government
  - Community-based approach is effective in areas of weak governance.
- Foreign aid is becoming more fragmented:
  - Bilateral donors have increased from 5 or 6 in the 1940s to at least 56 countries today
  - There are more aid agencies than recipient countries
  - Multiple channels strain the recipient and increase costs
  - There are implications for coordinating a comprehensive approach that defines results
  - Focus on projects that are attributed to the state, not the donor country
  - Donor executed projects are the norm, but have major disadvantages.
- Coordinating the joint effort:
  - Partnerships should be multilateral and coordinated
  - Every agency should stick to its expertise.
- Agencies should pool resources for greater effectiveness.
- The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was established to aid development.
- Building institutions – items for partner countries to consider:
  - Create internal cohesion within donor countries
  - Be inclusive – don’t exclude small countries
  - Find, define and build country knowledge
  - Devolve decision making.

Q&A

Q1: Should the military do what civilian agencies are unable to carry out for lack of resources?
A: Yes. There are simply not enough civilians on the ground to do the jobs which ought to be done by civilians. The military will have to pick up the responsibility for some of these activities.

Q2: How does the rule of law apply to contractors?
A: Contractors are subject to local law and to international and their own national law as applicable in theatre.
Q3: *From the World Bank’s viewpoint, what are the major lessons from Afghanistan?*

A: Try these bullet points:

- Forced lessons don’t stick
- The importance of institutions
- The need to develop business
- Persistence, dialogue, and respect.

**Summary and Conclusion**

*Dr John Rose*

In his brief concluding remarks, Dr Rose emphasized that the achievement of the Conference was to bring together representatives of over 30 nations and reach broad agreement, not only on what needs to be done to deal with the problems of modern conflict, but on the methodology required to achieve this.

After thanks to the main presenters, panel members, working group moderators, and the organizing staff, the Conference closed.

**Rapporteurs:**

Ms. Sarah Auchinleck – ARAG
Maj. Paul Larson – US Army
Maj. David Benton – US Army
Maj. Jim McDermott – US Army
Mr. Mike Crawshaw – ARAG
Mr. Jhilwan Qazzaz – ARAG
Ms. Irene Klymchuk – ARAG
Mr. Mark Scharma – ARAG

Ms. Erin Simpson – Department of State