

BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF NATO'S EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS TO FIGHT HYBRID WAR

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Abstract: The Russian Federation has been waging a hybrid war campaign against NATO and the EU for years. The Kremlin has so far skillfully managed to exploit the vulnerabilities of the West. The NATO Eastern flank members are particularly exposed to the Kremlin-orchestrated systematic subversion and this is a problem of growing significance to the Alliance as it is undermining its cohesion and is preventing the build-up of strong national security and defense systems of its Eastern European member states. In order to effectively remedy this dangerous situation, the Eastern flank NATO member states must immediately start implementing a coherent national institutional capacity building programs, supported by NATO and the EU, aimed at timely mitigation of existing vulnerabilities and building up long-lasting resilient national security structures able to tackle hybrid threats coming from any direction. To carry out this ambition, a number of capacity building steps are proposed.

Keywords: Hybrid war, NATO, Russia, subversion, security, institutions, capacity building.

Introduction

*Hybrid war is not declared. Instead, it is being fought.*¹

This experience-based reality provides an enormous advantage to aggressive actors in their orchestrated hybrid wars against nations that are not able, first of all, to timely and correctly assess what is really happening on the ground and therefore to effectively organize their defenses. As stated in a recent article by the author, hybrid warfare is “first and foremost about perceptions and understanding of the real situation. If leaders and society of any given country under hybrid attack are unable to comprehend they are under such a threat, then defeat is only a matter of time.”²

The Russian Federation has been waging a hybrid war campaign against NATO and the EU for years. Its strategy is aimed at dividing and eventually making both organizations collapse. The Kremlin has so far skillfully managed to exploit the vulnerabilities of the West and thus to attain significant results at low cost.

The NATO Eastern flank members are particularly exposed to the Kremlin-organized systematic subversion and this is a problem of growing significance to the Alliance as it is undermining its cohesion and is preventing the build-up of strong national security and defense systems of its Eastern European members.

In order to effectively remedy this dangerous situation, the Eastern European NATO member states must immediately start implementing a coherent institutional capacity building programs that will make them prepared to effectively fight hybrid threats coming from all directions and particularly from the Russian Federation. They should be supported by NATO and the EU in this endeavor. In order to be able to swiftly fill the existing vulnerability gaps and start building long-lasting resilient national security and defense structures, capable to tackle hybrid threats, the NATO Eastern European member states should implement a number of state and institutional capacity building steps.

The Subversion Strategy of the Russian Federation

Under Vladimir Putin's rule the Russian Federation has been pursuing a revanchist agenda aimed at restoring the spheres of influence of the former Soviet Union. In quest of this ambition Moscow has long been trying to undermine the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries that it considers being in the sphere of its privileged interests. This is particularly true regarding the Black Sea and Western Balkan countries that have not yet become part of NATO and the EU.

Since the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow has intensified these efforts, including through attempts to subvert and when possible to overthrow legitimately elected governments, in order to prevent them achieving NATO membership. The failed coup attempt in Montenegro in October 2016 sponsored by the Kremlin was aimed at precluding the country from joining the Alliance next year. The Russian Federation is also actively interfering in the internal political process of the Republic of Macedonia and is trying to subvert the pro-NATO and EU ruling coalition in Skopje.

In other places Moscow is nowadays investing in widening and deepening its already established positions. In Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina Moscow is increasingly using local pro-Russian political actors, and chiefly president Milorad Dodik, so as to derail the Federation's Euro-Atlantic integration as well as to increase the Russian influence in the country and to project influence in the region. There the Kremlin is supporting pro-Russia paramilitary Bosnian Serb groups. In the observation of local authors, "[t]he most pronounced Russian intervention in Bosnia is in the Republika Srpska security sector. With Russian support, RS police and security forces receive training and equipment similar to that of an army."³

With regard to Serbia, the strengthening of the Russian position is progressing as Belgrade is expanding its military ties with Moscow and is procuring Russian-made equipment, including MiG-29 fighter aircraft, while the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš that was established in 2012 is in fact not humanitarian.⁴

In the case of Ukraine from 2014 up until now, as well as in the case of Georgia in 2008, Moscow aims at destabilizing these states by way of military intervention with the aim of blocking their Euro-Atlantic integration. Furthermore, by invading Georgia and Ukraine, the Kremlin also wants to “send a message to other governments in the region that pursuing Western-backed democratic reform will bring dire consequences”.⁵

Regarding the NATO and EU Eastern European member states, the Kremlin’s subversive strategy is implemented through indirect means, as military intervention or intimidation to use force is not feasible. Here the full spectrum of hybrid subversion options is available. A broad toolkit of political, diplomatic, economic, trade, energy, information, cyber, media and other non-military instruments are being used, depending on the strengths and vulnerabilities of the target states. Corruption and organized crime are of great importance in hybrid wars as they subvert rule of law and thus weaken the countries under attack. The use of a well-established network of local agents is *conditio sine qua non* for the implementation of the Kremlin’s subversion in the NATO Eastern flank members.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow could not stop the Eastern European former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO and the EU. It did not have the resources to prevent the enlargement of both organizations. What it however managed to achieve was to preserve various degrees of residual influence in all of these new NATO and EU states, in order to influence their domestic and external policies. The ultimate goal of Moscow’s strategy is to turn these countries into a club of friends, ready to promote pro-Russian positions within both organizations. So far Moscow has achieved mixed results, but what is alarming is that there are now established elements in state structures of some former Warsaw Pact countries that overtly, or not so directly, defend pro-Russian positions, especially on Crimea and the sanctions regimes.

The lack of unanimous reaction of solidarity (in late March 2018) with the UK of all the NATO countries on the need to expel Russian intelligence officers from their capitals, following the poisoning of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia with a nerve agent on British soil, represents an evident signal of how far the Kremlin has until now managed to penetrate the internal decision-making processes of some NATO allies, including Bulgaria. Sofia in this case refused to ex-

pel Russian intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover and this is a telling example of how pervasive is the Russian influence in Bulgaria nowadays.

In the case of Bulgaria, the Russian strategy is aimed at establishing a sufficient level of control over the political processes. The essence of its strategy is “Bulgaria: Trojan horse” in NATO and in the EU.⁶ It is named after the cynical remarks of the Russia Permanent Representative to the EU Vladimir Chizhov in 2006, who called Bulgaria the Russian “Trojan Horse in the EU.” Under this logic, Sofia could join both organizations, but the Kremlin would maintain sufficient influence on Bulgaria’s policy decisions.

Obviously, nowadays the NATO and EU Eastern European members have significant internal weaknesses that have been skillfully exploited by the Kremlin in its hybrid war against them. Hybrid war is first and foremost about exploiting the weaknesses of the attacked state. Russia is seeking to subvert these countries with the intention of creating a new ‘grey zone’ of instability in Central and Eastern Europe, sandwiched between Russia and the West, and thus making them a mounting burden for NATO and EU.

The Russian advantage of waging hybrid war at present comes from both the readiness gaps of NATO and the EU to face this evolving challenge, especially in its Eastern member states and candidates, and from the Russian aptitude to mobilize all its available resources and tools under centralized control as well as to use them in an unscrupulous and unimpeded by law and moral norms manner. This allows the Kremlin to carry out a constant peacetime subversion of the Eastern European new democracies. This subversion is possible to a great extent because of the inhibited capacity of these countries to recognize the challenge and therefore to quickly identify the aggressor and take actions to defend themselves.

Plausible deniability is the weapon that the Russian Federation has so deftly exploited since 2014. The aim is to conceal the Russian involvement in hybrid activities against NATO and EU member states, including Bulgaria, as well as against other countries in Eastern Europe, in particular Ukraine, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Peter Dickinson put it,

Whether it is masked men in eastern Ukraine, a chemical weapons attack in the English countryside, or an attempted coup in the Balkans, the process is more or less the same—faced by a fresh round of accusations, the Kremlin denies everything and declares, “You can’t prove it was us.”⁷

This is how Putin’s Russia wages war, by attacking in a myriad of different directions while carefully maintaining a semblance of plausible deniability that leaves its victims partially paralyzed and unable to respond effectively to an enemy they cannot

conclusively unmask. Few doubt that Russia is behind each new act of aggression, but it is often difficult to differentiate between Putin's many proxies and the hand of the Kremlin itself.⁸

The only way to stop this hybrid war is to win it.⁹

This is what matters now the most. In order to stop this aggression against their member states, NATO and EU must win the hybrid war. This could be accomplished provided that these two organizations and their member countries are ready to fight it.

Being ready at this juncture means being prepared. To be prepared means to have, first, a robust state-level capacity to tackle hybrid threats and, second, to build up solid capability to counter hybrid threats at the NATO and EU level. This two-tracked approach (both national and Alliance preparedness) is the key to make the EU and NATO robust and resilient enough to deal with hybrid threats and to effectively protect all of their member states. Only a one-level preparedness will certainly not be enough. If, for example, the NATO nations or some of them are not ready to face hybrid threats, then the Alliance would not be able to effectively and fully assist them too, regardless of the progress made at the level of the NATO structures. What is more, NATO and EU cannot and should not be considered as having the duty to substitute for national efforts. Neither should they be tasked to fill national capability gaps, if members states are not investing enough therein. Preparing to effectively defend against hybrid threats, as is the case with any other threats, is above all a responsibility and a duty of any member state.

The opposite is also true. If NATO and the EU at their institutional levels are not investing enough in countering hybrid threats, the efforts of their member states, however significant they might be, would not be sufficient too. This is the reason why implementing the two-track approach in dealing with hybrid threats is a *conditio sine qua non*.

The first part of the equation, i.e. the NATO and EU institutional efforts, at present is delivering good results. An active groundwork preparation to counter hybrid threats in NATO was initiated in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. For strengthening the collective deterrence and defense potential as well as for effective protection of the member states, essential decisions were made at the Alliance Summits in Wales (2014) and in Warsaw (2016). The Alliance's approach in tackling hybrid threats is based on the understanding of the necessity to focus the efforts in three main directions – “prepare, deter and defend.”¹⁰ At the end of 2015 NATO adopted its own strategy¹¹ for countering hybrid threats.

The EU is also investing efforts in this direction and its understanding on hybrid threats is pronounced in the “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response,” dated April 6, 2016.¹²

A European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)¹³ was established in October 2017 in Helsinki by Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. The Hybrid CoE will be the focal point of the best expertise in countering hybrid threats and it is intended to support the efforts of NATO, EU and the member states. It is open to other member countries.

The EU and NATO have been developing their collaboration in this field and the concrete areas of joint activity were defined in the Joint Declaration¹⁴ they adopted in Warsaw in 2016.

With regard to the member states, in order to have NATO and EU capable to effectively support them in case of a hybrid attack, they need to prepare themselves first. The member countries must first of all do their homework.

Steps to Build Up State Institutional Capacity to Deal with Hybrid Threats

In order to be sufficiently prepared to deal with hybrid threats coming from any direction, and based on the identified most common problems, the NATO Eastern flank members should focus their efforts on a number of areas identified as critical. The key areas are political consent, rule of law, civil society, creating and implementing a strategy, building institutional capacity, providing for effective interagency cooperation, strengthening resilience, effective strategic communication, or STRATCOM, modernizing command and control, and providing robust military capabilities. Each of these areas is examined briefly below.

Political Consent

First of all, a robust and unquestionable general political consent on the Euro-Atlantic choice made more than two decades ago should be maintained and constantly strengthened. The first target of the Kremlin's subversion is the political strategic level of decision-making of any country under hybrid attack. Sowing divisions amongst political parties, within parties and finally within governments is the corner stone of the Kremlin's subversive strategy. The ‘Scripal’ case provides a fresh illustrative example of how well this strategy works and the extent to which the subversion efforts invested so far in some NATO countries are rewarding for Moscow. This is, quite alarmingly, particularly valid concerning Bulgaria at present.

Political consent on the pro-Atlantic identity of any NATO member country is the key for maintaining allied solidarity, as solidarity is proven with actions, not just words. Striking the capacity to act at the governmental level is where Russia has been systematically investing its efforts and resources in its hybrid war.

If an ally fails to stand together with the rest of the member states in a critical moment in peacetime, such as the ‘Scripal’ case, then it is quite logical to ask whether it would be capable of shouldering its burden together with its allies in times of crisis and war. For what one country cannot do in peacetime it will for sure fail to do in war. If in peacetime there is a deficit in consent whether to act and how to act to support an ally, the same will for sure be the case in times of crisis and war. If some countries are looking for enough corroborating evidence about the Russian involvement in the poisoning of Skripal and his daughter, then it would not take great effort to imagine the behavior of such allies in case of an attack on a NATO member on the Eastern flank with the same kind of ‘little green men’ that occupied Crimea in 2014.

This is the reason why in any NATO member state, especially those situated on the Eastern flank of the Alliance, that were part of the former Warsaw Pact, the efforts to strengthen the pro-NATO and pro-EU consent should be permanent and the achievements therein should never be taken for granted, as the Russian efforts are also focused on this critical juncture. What is more, there Moscow still can count upon a network of connections inherited from the times before 1989 and cultivated and expanded afterwards.

Quite unfortunately, there are many politicians in NATO Eastern member states that are still not able to evaluate hybrid threats in an adequate manner and that are blind to any Russian involvement in hybrid activity on the territories of their home countries. That is the reason why at the strategic level of government a sufficient level of common understanding on hybrid threats, and especially their sources, must be constantly maintained and solidified. Otherwise, all other national level efforts would be useless. In order to have all the other steps succeed, the first line of battle is strengthening the strategic political pro-Atlantic and pro-European consent.

Rule of Law

The Moscow’s subversion strategy needs a good breeding ground within any country under attack in order to bear fruit. Such a favorable breeding ground is provided by deficits in the rule of law. The more rule of law is deficient in a given country, the better for the Kremlin’s subversion.

Organized crime and corruption are subversion tools that could very well serve the purposes of a hybrid war campaign against any country. The Kremlin is capable to employ these tools abroad in promoting its goals. In addition, Russian business enti-

ties and oligarchs connected to the Kremlin are also instruments to exert influence in a given country.

Therefore, the stronger the rule of law, the less chances Moscow has to effectively use corruption and organized crime in its hybrid war campaigns. This is especially true regarding the long-time Russian modus operandi in making local politicians dependent and servants of Russian interests against their own countries. That is why the Eastern NATO members should focus their efforts in building resilient rule of law. This means strong state institutions, effective and independent Judiciary, strong internal security and counterintelligence services that are capable of timely and resolutely intercepting and disrupting hybrid threats and especially any subversive activities, mostly but not solely espionage as well as any active measures carried out by the Russian Federation on their soil.

Civil Society

Civil society is a critical element of any democratic nation that is a part of or is aspiring to join NATO and the EU. It is the guardian of the strategic choice to be a part of the Euro-Atlantic family of free democratic nations. Civil society watches and, if needed, pressures political parties and leaders that are compromising by whatever actions this strategic choice of the nation. The stronger and better organized civil society is, the more robust the political pro-NATO and pro-EU consent within any country is. Therefore, strong civil society means also stronger NATO allies.

Strategy to Counter Hybrid Threats

To begin with, all the NATO and EU nations, especially these on the Eastern flank, should adopt as soon as possible their own national strategies for countering hybrid threats, harmonized with the NATO and EU related documents. Their national security strategies must be reviewed and preferably new ones should be adopted. They should clearly identify and point out hybrid threats as main challenges to national and allied security. Their strategic conceptual basis should be periodically updated so that the evolving challenges are taken into account accordingly.

The challenge of adopting national strategies to counter hybrid threats in some Eastern NATO members, nonetheless, should not be underestimated in light of the degree of Russian meddling in their internal processes and the influence Moscow is exercising today on some East European politicians. This would be a critical test today that would help NATO understand the real scale and depth of the Kremlin's penetration within a number of its members in Eastern Europe.

Institutional Capacity

In order to effectively counter hybrid threats, the Eastern European NATO allies should have a sufficient level of institutional capacity. This is, to various degrees,

problematic, given the Communist legacy and the active Russian hybrid subversion therein. Building sufficient capacity to deal with hybrid threats should be carried out by every institution related to national security, i.e. Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministries, counter intelligence and intelligence services etc. Within all of these institutions there should be a separate designated structure, charged with dealing with hybrid threats and provided with enough human, financial, material and information resources.

A full and timely awareness is critical to be able to resist and counter an attack. A particular focus should be put on early warning and early identification of hybrid activities. This is a key element of the institutional capacity to effectively defend any nation, as the strength of actors using hybrid threats depends on the initial inability of victims to comprehend what is happening until it might be too late.

Interagency Cooperation

The state-level capacity to counter hybrid threats could not be developed without a strong and well-established interagency coordination processes allowing adequate, rapid and well-coordinated reactions in crises. That is the reason why it is compulsory for the NATO and EU Eastern European countries to build up an effective mechanism for interagency cooperation and coordination amongst all the relevant institutions involved in this field.

In order to have this, first of all, there should be a designated strategic level coordinating structure, charged with leading all the related activities, receiving and processing information, and regularly reporting to the top executive and to the legislative branches of power. This structure should support with expertise the decision-making process of the executive. Most logically, the role of such a body should be assumed by a well-established and resourced structure at the Council of Ministers. For example, this could be named a Security Council that is subordinated directly to the head of the executive branch, i.e. the Prime Minister. Such a body should be supported by a robust and specially established by law national crisis management system with clearly defined functions and responsibilities. Nowadays this could turn out to be problematic to carry out in some Eastern European NATO allies, given the residual Communist legacy in a local environment, where there is still an underdeveloped modern administrative culture, compatible to that of Western allies. The situation is further complicated by the aggressive Russian hybrid influence therein.

Resilience

In the context of hybrid war, protecting the civilian sector is the key to the ability to withstand the shock of an attack and to mobilize the country's resources to win the war and rapidly recover. It is necessary to work resolutely to strengthen the resilience

of the Eastern European NATO countries in times of crises, particularly by covering the civilian aspects of resilience.

Building up resilience is first and foremost a national duty. All the NATO and EU members must be sufficiently resilient to withstand various shock events, be they armed invasions, terrorist attacks with mass casualties, massive disruptive cyber-attacks, large-scale critical infrastructure failures or natural or man-made disasters.

In brief, resilience means that a country is capable to effectively resist a shock event and subsequently quickly and easily recover and return to normal. More resilient the member states are, a more resilient and stronger will be the Alliance, and better prepared to fulfill its core mission of collective defense.

Resilience is increasingly seen as the corollary of deterrence and reassurance measures in the classical military sphere as part of a comprehensive security strategy for the Alliance. The seven baseline requirements to be assessed are ¹⁵:

- assured continuity of government and critical government services;
- resilient energy supplies;
- ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people;
- resilient food and water resources;
- ability to deal with mass casualties;
- resilient communications systems; and, finally,
- resilient transportation systems.

These seven areas apply to the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners.¹⁶

STRATCOM

The hybrid war is first of all an information war and it is of utmost significance to develop institutional capacity to perform the crucial function of delivering adequate strategic communications, aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences. This is obligatory not only with a view of countering foreign subversive propaganda and fake news, but most of all in order to convey convincing positive messages at home in support of policies aimed at making the NATO Eastern flank member states stronger, more effective and more reliable allies. The reason why pro-Russian propaganda is so much successful is due to a significant extent to the still underdeveloped STRATCOM capacity in a number of these countries.

Modern and Effective Command & Control System

To put into effect all recommendations listed above, each Eastern European NATO member should have a modern system of crisis management, based on a detailed leg-

isolation. It is essential here to adopt a modern concept of escalation, in conformity with the Western best-established practices. This means to clearly write down in law and define the powers and responsibilities of all the state institutions as well as the interaction amongst them. This should be made in the context of four possible states – peacetime, tension, crisis and war.

This would necessitate in many countries not only legislative, but also constitutional amendments. To take Bulgaria as example, under its Constitution there are now only the states of peace, war, martial law and “any other state of emergency.” This status quo is no longer answering the real security needs of Bulgaria as a member of NATO and EU in a fundamentally changed strategic environment.

There is also another aspect of this issue across Eastern European NATO members, which is problematic. This is the issue of the national level of command and control in crisis and war and whether in the new strategic environment it is fit for the purpose of delivering maximum security in an allied format. Over-centralization of defense decision making is a Communist legacy remnant that is impeding quick and effective decision making. It is depriving commanders—especially at the operational and tactical levels—of initiative that could be critical in a rapidly and constantly changing hybrid war environment. This is why there should be more delegation of authority to lower-level military leaders.

Moreover, defense chains of command across many Eastern European NATO members are burdened by the inclusion therein of presidents as commanders in chief of armed forces, although the presidential institution may not be a part of the executive power. Instead of being assigned to prime ministers as heads of the executive branch, the function of supreme commander of the armed forces is constitutionally given to presidents, who have neither the needed institutional capacity nor enough expertise to perform effectively this essential function. The problem is complicated even further with the double subordination of chiefs of defense/chiefs of General Staffs both to ministers of defense and presidents. As Thomas-Durell Young points out,

...designating presidents as commanders in chief whilst not defining clearly which authorities that office possess (and by extension, what is the role of the head of government and the minister of defense) opens these governments to potential conflicts in periods where the president and the government are from opposing parties, i.e., cohabitation. Without attention paid to the details of precisely which elected official commands what, and under which circumstances, suggests that these arrangements are unlikely to function effectively in periods of escalation (i.e., peace, tension, crisis), as well as in war.¹⁷

In view of the above, it is important that these countries undertake legislative and, if needed, constitutional reforms with the purpose of streamlining their national chains

of command and to make sure that in crises and wars there is an unambiguous unity of command of their armed forces. This command should be vested in the heads of the executive power, i.e. prime ministers in parliamentary republics, but not in the presidents, which have only representative and ceremonial functions as heads of state.

The capacity to take informed and well-timed decisions, including on using military force, would be critical in the context of hybrid threats, where the security situation could deteriorate swiftly and unexpectedly. This is why the national chains of command should adapt accordingly and the heads of the executive power must be the supreme commanders of the Armed forces in peace, tension, crisis and war.

Military

Last but not least, to withstand hybrid attacks involving military force and win wars together with their allies, the NATO Eastern European members need strong national defenses. This is above all their responsibility. How to better prepare their defense systems to fight hybrid wars is a subject of a separate study. However, some basic requirements to be attained can be outlined for the purposes of the current analysis. To build up strong defense organizations, the following basic requirements should be met:

- Adopt and apply the NATO understanding on what a defense capability is, with its eight mandatory elements, known under the acronym DOTMLPFI – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and interoperability;
- Investing in people serving in defense in order to recruit and retain well prepared and dedicated personnel;
- Decisive rearmament with NATO interoperable weapons and military equipment;
- Early decommissioning of remaining Soviet legacy equipment and thus cutting residual dependencies on the Russian Federation for repairing and maintaining old Soviet platforms;
- Increasing participation in joint capability building projects with NATO allies and EU members in order to achieve cost efficiency with the use of the potential of the NATO and EU agencies;
- Hosting joint NATO and EU military formations on their territories, combined with participation in such formations in other member states;
- Developing the potential of military mobility, with the intention of being able to move speedily troops and equipment across the territories of all the

European member states, with the intention of establishing the so called ‘military Schengen area’;

- Building up cyber defense capabilities.

Conclusion

Faced with the challenges of the worst security environment since the end of the Cold War and a revanchist and unscrupulous regime in the Kremlin, led by Vladimir Putin, the NATO Eastern flank members have no choice but to build up their capacity to fight the wars of today and tomorrow, which would be of a hybrid nature. The Alliance, in close cooperation with the evolving Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU, should support their efforts, but the primary responsibility to reinforce and upgrade the defense systems is national. The capacity to resist hybrid attacks is a fundamental part of this task. The sooner these countries start to prepare to fight hybrid wars, the sooner will they become stronger and more reliable NATO allies that are security providers within a stronger Alliance.

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The views expressed herein cannot be attributed to any organization with which the author is, or has been, associated.

Notes

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