

IT 4 Sec Reports

Framework for Analysis of Potential EU Roles in the Comprehensive Approach

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*Потенциални роли на ЕС във всеобхватния подход:
Рамка за анализ*

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***Framework for Analysis of Potential
EU Roles in the Comprehensive
Approach***

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IT4Sec Reports 88 presents the CSDM input to Focus working package 3.1. It identifies principal dimensions for describing EU roles in the comprehensive approach: (1) Actors; (2) Instruments; (3) Goals and Objectives in supporting non-EU member states; (4) Strategies; and (5) Mission Roles. Secondly, it provides an overview of recent advances in the EU understanding and development of the comprehensive approach. Third, it presents analysis of the structural conditions for EU decision-making and respective strategies. The final section of the report outlines the main drivers for the further development and implementation of the comprehensive approach. Abstracts of recent specialised publications are included in an Annex to this report.

IT4Sec Reports 88 представя изследователските резултати на ЦМСО по работен пакет 3.1 на проект FOCUS. В доклада са идентифицирани основни измерения за описание на ролите на Европейския съюз в прилагането на всеобхватния подход: (1) Действащи лица; (2) Инструменти; (3) Цели в подпомагането на страни извън ЕС; (4) Стратегии; и (5) Роли в мисии, систематизирани са развитията на разбирането за всеобхватния подход в ЕС, анализирани са структурните условия за взимане на съответни решения и са представени основните драйвери на бъдещото развитие и прилагане на всеобхватния подход от ЕС. В анекс са включени резюмета на последни специализирани публикации по темата.

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union is a unique complex power. Its strength and weaknesses stem from the fact that the Union is more than an intergovernmental organization and, at the same time, a cluster of nation states. None of the other global players possesses this quality. Therefore, the institutional place of the EU in global relations is a primary ingredient of the strategic challenges that the Union has to face.

EU has a responsibility and must play a crucial role for the security and stability in the area of its direct security interests. This role requires:

- full recognition of the realities in a variety of countries and regions,
- permanent screening of risk factors with technical and analytical/intelligence tools,
- clear decision making mechanism at various stages of the escalation of threats and risks, especially accounting for foresight and prevention strategies,
- diverse capacities for prevention and early action against threats,
- close communication with supporting players in the specific situation, with relevant international organizations and NGOs,
- an operational strategy based on the principle of approaching the crisis “as soon as possible, as far from the Union’s borders as possible, as supportive/communal as possible, as peacefully as possible.”

In future comprehensive approaches to addressing variety of security threats and challenges, both internal and external, EU roles may vary. These roles are not limited strictly to using available capabilities and assets. The EU may trigger action and development of relevant strategies that facilitate the involvement of various players. While particular choices and decisions will be debated and reflected in specific policies and official documents, this analysis is intended to support the exploration along several *principal dimensions*:

- *Actors* both within and outside the Union that should be seen as perspective partners in a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and crisis management;
- *Operational instruments* that the actors should be able to provide and EU should be able to manage;
- *Achievable goals and objectives* in supporting non-EU member states;
- *Crisis Management Strategies*;
- *Mission roles*.

The particular choices on future EU roles will be shaped by:

- Structural conditions for EU decision-making;
- Trends and factors that do and will drive the respective decisions.

Therefore, this section of the report presents a study on dimensions, structural conditions, and drivers. It summarises the advances in the implementation of the comprehensive approach and outlines constraints impacting the definition of EU roles in this respect.

DIMENSIONS OF THE EXPLORATORY SPACE FOR FUTURE EU ROLES

D1. Actors

Actors in EU comprehensive approach to security are those official international, European, national and local authorities, international and national non-profit organisations and individuals, media and businesses, with which the EU would be able to establish partnership relations or cooperation in operations to reduce risks, prevent conflicts and manage crises.

Partnership is the relations between two or more actors based on formal agreement. These actors would share common goals within a comprehensive approach to risk reduction, conflict prevention, crisis management or stability and reconstruction activities and will conduct operations in a coordinated manner. *Coordination* is a form of synchronization of political or operational activities in terms of objectives, space, time, resources and rules of engagement; it could be formal or informal.

Typical actors ¹

International actors are global or regional intergovernmental organisation with which EU may establish partnership or cooperation relations and act in coordinated manner in applying comprehensive approach to security such as UN, NATO, OSCE, Arab League, African Union, Organization Islamic Conference, Gulf Cooperation Council, etc.

Governmental actors are governments and governmental agencies of member and not-member states, as well as provincial, local, and community authorities that could be partners in solving particular security cases.

Humanitarian actors are non-profit civilian organisations, whether national or international, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and have essential capabilities to perform humanitarian or development activities.

Military actors are those national or coalition official military that are provided to comprehensive approach operations by their governments or an intergovernmental political body.

Security actors are any lawful security actors other than the military, including both public entities, such as national and boarder police and other national and international security agencies, as well as private entities, such as commercial security contractors and guards.

D2. Instruments

Instruments are those political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, security, judicial and non-governmental capabilities and resources, which EU may generate, mobilize, collect, or provide trough partnership and cooperation in order to apply the comprehensive approach to any particular security case.

¹ Adopted from Guidelines for the interaction and coordination of Humanitarian actors and military actors in Afghanistan, version 1.0 (20 May 2008), www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Temabilder/Tema%20sikkerhetspolitikk/Afghanistan/Guidelines_Afghanistan%5B1%5D.pdf and DCAF Backgrounders 2009, www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id=99979.

Typical instruments

Political instruments are the related EU policies, consultations, summits, declarations, high-level visits and meetings, and other forms of political activities aimed to build political consensus on EU policy, to establish partnership relations, to intervene in international organisations or to contact the political or opposition authorities engaged in a conflict situation.

Diplomatic instruments are EU and member states representation, different forms of public and confidential demarches aimed to create a positive environment for a crisis resolution.

Economic instruments are those EU and member states policies that are focussed, from one side, to provide resources to achieve EU aims, and, from other, to limit the resources available to the opponent(s).

Intelligence instruments are national official sources of sharable information related to the issue, which could be supportive to the political and operational decision making.

Military, para-military, law enforcement, civil protection and other security instruments should be subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental; they should be deployable to the area of concrete operation, trained under politically determined rules of engagement and (at least) minimal interoperability standards, accordingly equipped, and sustainable for the time of operation.

Judicial instruments could be different international and national justice institutions as courts, criminal investigation and prosecution services, customary and traditional justice systems and other legal institutions that work to ensure respect to constitutional arrangements, support to the rule of law supported and safeguarding human rights.

Non-profit organization, media and businesses also can provide powerful instruments, such as development, informational, etc., in partnering with EU as its member countries have the most vibrant civil society and host competitive businesses.

D3. Goals and Objectives in supporting non-EU member states

Goals and Objectives in supporting non-EU member states are those EU policies, programmes and measures that are aimed to improve the security, political, economic, social, humanitarian and administrative situation in particular country/ies or region(s), thus helping local people to alleviate a crisis and achieve sustainable self-development, while respecting human rights and political freedoms.

Typical objectives

In addition to the provision of basic security, EU may pursue other objectives such as support to economic development and the establishment of good governance.

Development policy of EU - Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid) is responsible for putting into motion the European Commission's worldwide concern for development, by bringing together policy design and policy implementation covering all development countries.²

² From the website of *Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid* at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/index_en.htm.

Good Governance is a concept of addressing the way power is exercised in the management of a country's affairs which core elements are public sector management, accountability, a legal framework for development, transparency, information, anti-corruption and the principle of participation.

Specifically, security sector governance (SSG) refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation. Security Sector Reform (SSR) aims to enhance SSG through the effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control.³

As one example, the *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe* can be examined as a model comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity, that could be applied to other regions in need.⁴

D4. Strategies

The EU may choose to pursue different strategies, or combination thereof, focusing on respectively on prevention, building resilience, pre-emption, deterrence, protection, defence, de-escalation, and consequence management.

Typical strategies

Prevention is a strategy based on the understanding that a crisis is inevitable, but not imminent, and there is time and opportunities to apply measures and take operation in order to de-escalate tensions.

Resilience reflects the capacity of states and societies to recover for crises from any type using mainly internal sources like political consensus, public confidence and support for reforms, national unity and creative behaviour.

Pre-emption is strategy of acting on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy terrorist, military, pirates attack or mass migration wave is imminent.

Deterrence is an element of conflict prevention strategy based on building sense within the opponent that any kind of attack will be more costly for him than eventual win.

Protection is a universal norm addressed to both national governments and international community and organisation as requirement to provide security and vital human rights for the ordinary people. Responsibility to protect for EU is also a valued and moral code of conduct in the face of massive violence against civilians.

Defence today is a comprehensive formula of guarding allied or national sovereignty using mainly military but also political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other non-coercive instruments.

De-escalation is a strategy after the crisis has reached its peak. The main aims are first, to avoid the return to coercive operations and, secondly, to build supportive environment for stability and reconstruction.

³ DCAF Backgrounders 2009 at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id=99979>.

⁴ From <http://www.stabilitypact.org/>

Consequence management constitutes actions taken in the aftermath of effects of an attack from nuclear, chemical, biological weapons of mass destruction, a natural disaster with massive consequences or an industrial catastrophe. From EU point view, it should also include more general definitions such as threat to life by destructive events.

D5. Mission roles

The potential roles of the EU in the comprehensive approach may be explored also along the possible roles it could play in a particular mission. In such cases the EU may decide to act alone, to take a lead role, to share the leadership, to provide support, to take responsibility for a particular operational area or a type of capability. Finally, at the extreme, the EU may decide not to get involved in a particular mission.

Advances

The principal advances of EU are in its collective values, socio-economic achievements, and sense of belonging to the most liberal and successful political alliance in history.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) emphasises that “No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own.”⁵ It examines conflicts abroad in their relation to development, as well as impact on European vulnerabilities. Conflict resolution and provision of security are examined in their links to confidence building and arms control regimes, spreading good governance, trade and development policies. The strategy calls for increased responsibility of the EU in preventive engagements, development of a wide spectrum of capabilities, and a strategic partnership with NATO in crisis management. Multilateral cooperation in international organisations and partnerships with key actors are seen as indispensable in the pursuit of EU objectives. Thus, although ESS does not explicitly use the term “comprehensive approach,” the ideal of comprehensiveness in terms of actors, instruments, and phases of conflict is certainly reflected in the document.

The EU has agreed with NATO on a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, known as *Berlin Plus*. It provides for crisis consultations and, *iter alia*, provides access to NATO assets in EU-led crisis management operations.⁶

In addition to its more traditional military missions and efforts at developing defence capabilities, expressed most visibly through the 2010 Headline Goal and the concept of the EU Battle Groups, the Union invests in the civilian aspect of crisis management, focusing on four priority areas as defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.⁷

In addition, the Council of the European Union prescribes roles of the EU and member states in using both civilian and military capabilities in emergency and crisis response.⁸

⁵ *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 12 December 2003), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, quote on p. 2.

⁶ See “Background EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus,” [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11 Berlin Plus press note BL.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf).

⁷ See “Civilian Crisis Management” and the respective reference documents at www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/civilian-crisis-management/reference-documents.aspx?lang=en.

⁸ “Reinforcing the European Union's emergency and crisis response capacities,” 10551/06, JAI 313 (Brussels, 15 June 2006), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st10551en06.pdf.

The term “comprehensive approach” is getting traction also with the European Parliament in discussions on future defence developments. A study by Mölling and Brune, published on behalf of EP’s Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, calls for “a more comprehensive approach to the defence sector” in order to overcome “the current piecemeal approach to the various problems” and “concentrate on the shape of an effective EU defence sector strategy during a period of austerity.” The authors of the report conclude that

[t]he character of crisis management is also drifting away from purely military tasks. Future engagements are likely to be more civilian and more geared towards managing the complex interaction of several actors to achieve an integrated or comprehensive approach. This poses also challenges to the development of capabilities, i.e. to link planning assumptions and deduce integrated or civil – military interoperable capabilities such as communication, maintenance or transport.⁹

Recently, the concept of the “comprehensive approach” has been applied in shaping EU policy for internal security. The draft Internal Security Strategy (ISS), approved by the Council of the European Union in February 2010, calls for understanding the concept of internal security comprehensively.¹⁰ In addition, in its ‘Strategic Guidelines for Action’ the Council mandates the application of a “wide and comprehensive approach to internal security.”¹¹ In this comprehensive approach is to encompass “a wide range of measures with both horizontal and vertical dimensions”, as follows:

“horizontal dimension: to reach an adequate level of internal security in a complex global environment requires the involvement of law-enforcement and border-management authorities, with the support of judicial cooperation, civil protection agencies and also of the political, economic, financial, social and private sectors, including non-governmental organisations,” as well as “vertical dimension of security at various levels: international cooperation, EU-level security policies and initiatives, regional cooperation between Member States and Member States’ own national, regional and local policies.”¹²

In its November 2010 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council,¹³ the European Commission shied away from using the term “comprehensive approach.” Nevertheless, it referred to the cross-border and cross-sectoral nature of current security threats and challenges and the inability of individual member states to respond effectively on their own. Further, reflecting a broad understanding on security players, it came up with a shared agenda for member states, EU bodies, local authorities and civil society, supported by a solid EU security industry. The Agenda emphasises the need to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal and external aspects of EU security and integration or security measures in “relevant strategic partnerships.” Finally, in the elaboration of the strategic objectives, the Commission examines the spectrum of preventive, protective and consequence management actions.

⁹ Mölling and Brune, *The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence*, quote on p. 18.

¹⁰ Council of the European Union, *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union “Towards A European Security Model,”* 5842/2/10, Rev. 2, JAI 90 (Brussels, 23 February 2010), <<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842-re02.en10.pdf>>.

¹¹ Ibid., 10.

¹² Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹³ *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*, COM(2010) 673 final (Brussels: European Commission, 22 November 2010), <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/archive/internal_security_strategy_in_action_en.pdf>.

To summarize, in a very short time, the EU has built a solid crisis management capability and accumulated multiple practical experience, both civilian and military. Some suggest that the success of the mission is because of the small size and limited military risk. However, experience confirms that in case of spillover of a crisis situation neither pure military nor pure civilian mission may be effective.

If this is mutually recognised, the EU capacity to perform integrated missions both inside and outside Europe should be completely established. EU engagements should surmount the fact that the Union's potential for integrated missions is hindered by internal EU politics. EU should establish policy of investing time and money in developing balanced, flexible, and effective civilian-military capabilities, adequate to foreseen requirements for crisis management, peacebuilding, reconstruction and stabilization missions.

As a preliminary conclusion, it can be stated that there is growing understanding and acceptance of the comprehensive approach in addressing various security threats and challenges, with account of the interplay between those with external origin and the ones originating within the EU. It is safe to predict that in the future the comprehensive approach will be applied in addressing additional challenges to the European security, and new ways will be explored that seek to make this application more effective and efficient. However, it less clear—and maybe impossible to predict—exactly what roles the European Union will undertake in terms of partnerships, mission roles, capabilities, and phases.

Therefore, the FOCUS project will explore alternatives of these roles of the European Union, that will be shaped by the structural conditions for EU decision-making and a number factors and trends, described in the following sections.

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR EU DECISION-MAKING AND STRATEGIES

There are several principal structural conditions for effective EU decision-making on crisis management.

The first is rooted into the principle of consensus-based decisions. As it is seen by the reality of recent crisis situations, achieving consensus is complicated, especially in cases of rapidly escalating crises. The principal issue here is the shared threat perception between the member states and the differing views on applicable strategies.

The other structural issue is the delimitation of competencies between EEAS and the European Commission. It is conditionally solved through compatibility with the positions of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice President of the European Commission in one and same person. However, the issue continues to be partially opened in areas as financing of external actions, crisis management (EEAS) and crisis response (EC). Since its foundation, the European Community is involved in all phases of the crisis cycle: from preventive strategies to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction. It manages substantial resources devoted to countries in political crisis through its country programmes and specific instruments such as the Instrument for stability. The Commission attaches great importance to a coherent EU approach to crisis situations, assuring that EC instruments and ESDP actions are complementary. Both local delegations and local partners are closely involved. The portfolio of the Commissioner for international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response covers functions for response to crises, which is different from the classical understanding of crisis management.

Third structural issue is subsidiarity. For EU, this is a guiding principle of federalism stipulating that decisions should be taken at the lowest level consistent with effective action within a political system. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the European Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless this is more effective than the action potentially taken at national, regional or local level.¹⁴

In addition to solving structural decision-making issues, the implementation of comprehensive approach requires wide spectrum of strategies in order EU to be effective in any case and at any phase of escalation of risk factors or in the case of a natural disaster, pandemia or industrial catastrophe.

As generally crises have more or less common phases of escalation and de-escalation, any decision on EU roles would be based on specific strategic approaches to each of them. Crisis management strategies are based on the continuum of conflict and should be applied in the right time, with right instruments, while maintaining focus of the limited use of coercion, avoidance of collateral damages of any type and the necessary consequence management.

¹⁴ Gilles Bertrand (coord.), Anna Michalski and Lucio R. Pench, *Scenarios Europe 2010* (EU Commission, 1999).

DRIVERS

Drivers are those factors and developments that will affect the life of all European citizens, and in this way will shape the decisions on what roles EU will undertake in providing comprehensive security for the Europeans.

Drivers could be identified in practically every area of security. Since the EU is a unique complex institution for both member states and people, multiple drivers should be analyzed. The main argument comes from the trends of complexity, interdependence, and global nature of almost all aspects of security. The multiple drivers in turn create complicated decision-making environment, especially in the case of a rapidly escalating situation. The decomposition of drivers could make the analysis easier, but this will not serve our fundamental aim – to be maximum supportive to the security decision making in EU.

Drivers are basic instruments for building scenarios. Presenting them in a form of matrix format gives opportunity to explain scenarios through drivers and, what is very useful, to appreciate the similarities and the dissimilarities across the scenarios on a number of important points.

Multiple drivers ¹⁵

Growth

Economic growth is one of the key advantages of the EU. The focus here is not on annual size of the growth only, but on its range, quality and capacity for innovation. Growth, considered in this way, determines the degree of freedom EU has to take or not decisions to engage in security case, to apply costly but effective comprehensive approach to security issues of different types or to engage with a supporting, minimal or symbolic role. The characteristics of economic development also will affect decisions on generating capabilities, selecting partnership actors and designing the strategy of engagement. It will also shape respect by friends and adversaries and will continue to feed the image of the EU as the most successful political alliance in history and will make EU attractive moderator in any conflict situation.

But maintaining economic growth is also one of the key challenges for EU. The current financial crisis shows a vital need of structural reforms and different political economy. Efforts and difficult decision are still to be taken and their scope will unavoidably influence the scope and intensity of any EU future security role.¹⁶

Symmetrically, the quality of the economic growth, and especially the absence of growth or exploration of resources only based growth, will effect strongly also the behaviour of the countries within the area of immediate security interest of EU.

¹⁵ This approach to drivers has been applied by the Strategic Foresight Group, www.strategicforesight.com.

¹⁶ For the impact of the modalities of capability development see Christian Mölling and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, *The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence* (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, April 2011), www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/PE433830_1_PARTIE_I_II_STUDY_ANNEX_drei.pdf.

Governance

Principal characteristic of governance in EU, member states and outside is the connection between political powers and citizens. The level of maturity of governance in EU and any country is characterised by the factual engagement and influence of people on executive policy. If any executive power performs its business through participation and legitimacy, vision and strategy, effectiveness and efficiency, transparency, accountability and rule of law, we will witness a shift of policy-making towards effective governance. If not, the trend will be towards authoritarianism and dictatorship. Good governance principles certainly make the life of policy-makers more difficult but one of the outcomes is the increasing public support.

Governance at the global level is about the so-called world order – a division of labour, rights and obligations between countries with global reach. In the march of globalization, ambitions for taking global responsibilities flag down.

EU is a champion of democratic governance at both union and national levels. Maintaining this unique quality, EU would be able to take a lead role in security affairs beyond the area of immediate security interests based on stable qualitative growth, strong and wide public support.

The level of governance strongly impacts the *cohesion* of the European Union.

Ideology

Ideology in terms of moral code, political principals and global vision based on well rooted values makes the difference in terms of human rights and prosperity. Ideology of national dominance and ignorance of political and individual values may set up a construction of “winners” and “losers.” Each “victory” and each “defeat” in this context would be a source for new conflicts within a spiral of violence.

Religion and religious issues are provocation to political ideology and especially to the liberal democracy. Strategically, it challenges most of all the European open societies and their ability to cope with aggressive penetration without wounding painfully achieved freedoms and rights.

Political and religious ideologies are representing probably the most complex and complicated challenge to EU decision-making on security policy. These are not perspectives but recent reality and their influence will grow at all three levels – internal, neighbourhood, and global.

Geopolitics

Geopolitics is about control. Control over space, not only borders. The modern states' geopolitics is equipped with variety of sophisticated instruments within the range from total information, transnational banks, intercontinental pipelines and control of maritime traffic, through terrorist networks and hybrid armies to missile technologies and nuclear weapons. Geopolitics is deeply rooted in ideology, economic growth and history (Europe has been politically established around five geopolitical centres). It closes the circle of multiple security drivers and completes the spectrum of considerations that affect decisions on EU security issues.

The geopolitics of EU is not a issue often discussed, but in reality it does exist. It relates the union with neighbours (Neighbourhood policy) and with strategic allies (transatlantic relations). Even the relations between EU and NATO fall into this category.

ANNEX: RELEVANT SPECIALISED PUBLICATIONS

David M. Law, "Canada in Afghanistan: Concepts, Policies, Actors, and Prospects," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 8:3 (Summer 2009): 25-51.

Dr. Law examines conceptual defence innovations in Canadian defence, such as the 3-D approach, the "whole of government" approach and security sector reform (SSR), seen as conceptual evolution of the "comprehensive approach". The author looks at the factors that have shaped change in Canadian thinking about security, development and governance in developing countries, including the strategic shift that occurred with 11 September 2001. The author further addresses the main features of Canada's SSR role in Afghanistan: What it has been doing in this theatre; how its approach compares with that of other countries; and how Canada's efforts have been conditioned by those of the international community in Afghanistan.

Ray Murphy, "The European Union and Developments in Crisis Management Operations and Peacekeeping," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 8:1 (Winter 2008): 58-91. www.pfpconsortium.org/file/the-european-union-and-developments-in-crisis-management-operations-and-peacekeeping-by-ray-murphy

This article addresses the developments involved in the creation of a framework for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The author examines the tools available under the Second Pillar of the EU, including the publication of a European Security Strategy supported by an attendant institutional infrastructure, to the deployment of Rapid Reaction Forces for large-scale military operations, and the introduction of battle groups that can be moved to respond to crisis situations at very short notice. He emphasises that, in order to meet contemporary security challenges, the EU must apply the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at its disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade, and development activities in a more comprehensive approach based on the principles of preventive strategy that goes significantly beyond the traditional "military threat assessment."

Michiel de Weger, "The Rise of the Gendarmes? What Really Happened in Holland," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 8:1 (Winter 2008): 92-114. www.pfpconsortium.org/file/the-rise-of-the-gendarmes-what-really-happend-in-holland-by-michiel-de-weger

This article discusses the phenomenon of gendarme forces as intermediaries between regular, civilian police forces and the military and, thus, a contributor to the comprehensive approach. The author examines the role and function of these forces; how they relate to military and civilian authorities and cooperative partners; their (dis)similarities with the police and the military; their history and current challenges; and their role in domestic security and peacekeeping operations abroad.

Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ed., *Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments*, Forum Paper no. 9 (Rome: NDC, June 2009), www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79

See in particular the chapter "Comprehensive approaches: Theories, Strategies, Plans, and Practice," contributed by Alexander Alderon (pp. 14-34), setting the CA in a historical context and reflecting the experience of the United Kingdom. Even though the term itself has not been in use, the Cabinet of Winston Churchill followed the principles of "a proactive cross-government approach, shared understanding between departments, outcome-

based thinking and collaborative working.” Discussing the Briggs plan in Malaya in 1950, Frank Kitson defines requirements for “*vertical and horizontal integration* to prevent separate ministries cascading information in isolation.”¹⁷

Allen Burch, Bradford R. Higgins, Christopher A. Jennings, Kirk A. Johnson, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Nadia Schadow, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of Strategy*, Forum Paper no. 15 (Rome: NDC, April 2011), www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=272

Whether the preferred term is “interagency” (most common in American parlance), “whole-of-government” (frequently used by the British), or “comprehensive approach” (a term typically used within the UN, EU and NATO), it is widely recognized that effective integration of military and civilian capabilities is necessary for success in contemporary missions. However, international organizations and state have generally done poorly in their attempts at putting this concept into practice. One reason is that there is a difference of doctrinal methods between civilian and military organizations, as well as between alliances and member states. There is no single ‘best’ way to address complex security problems in the contemporary operational environment. Nevertheless, it is necessary to agree on a common, or at least compatible, concepts of strategy.

J. Edward Fox, Florence Gaub, David E. Johnson, Andrew Monaghan, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Jan Techau, and Rick Waddell, *Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Strategic and Operational Challenges*, Forum Paper no. 18 (Rome: NDC, May 2011), www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=290

This report examines in detail a selection of specific cases that illuminate the challenges of integrating civilian and military challenges.

Information & Security: An International Journal vol. 27 (under print), <http://infosec.procon.bg>

This special issue under the title “*C4ISR Support to the Comprehensive Approach*” examines the technological underpinnings of the comprehensive approach. See in particular the article by Amleto Gabellone entitled “NATO-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management: Required C4ISR Capabilities.”

Claudia Major and Elisabeth Schöndorf, *Crisis Management: Comprehensive Approaches*, *SWP Comments* 2011/C 23 (September 2011), www.swp-berlin.org/en/products/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/crisis_management_comprehensive_approaches.html

Players involved in today’s crisis management are becoming more numerous, duties and responsibilities are becoming more diverse and commitments more drawn-out. To achieve successful outcomes, governments and other actors involved need to coordinate their aims, activities and instruments at the earliest possible stage and ensure these are tailored to need. This is what comprehensive approaches are all about. New concepts and structures should be introduced to guarantee the coordination and cooperation of those involved at national and international levels. In practice, however, such efforts often come to grief in identifying the various different problems and approaches to resolving them, as well as in resistance to reform and inadequate funding.

¹⁷ Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber & Faber, 1977). – Emphasis added.