The recommendations contained in this report are the outcome of an online virtual transatlantic security brainstorming event designed to look at securing the future post COVID-19, flag issues and develop recommendations for policymakers. Leading think tanks and defense educational institutions hosted the discussions on six main topics, featuring 2,750 registered representatives from government, international organizations, academia, and the private sector. This number included over 160 VIP’s, many at the ministerial and ambassadorial level.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a swift and severe impact on our societies. In the midst of this pandemic, many of us are facing new challenges and are asking what comes next. This report is designed to highlight outcomes of an online Transatlantic Security Jam event that focused on how to secure the post-COVID future.

Despite the lack of a clear picture of what will eventually happen with COVID-19, the Jam provided a unique opportunity to start learning, thinking and discussing how to prepare better not only for future disease outbreaks, but also for various threats that may have global source and coverage. Nations can emerge stronger and more secure if they learn from the COVID-19 experience that genuine safety and security are not possible without international cooperation and coordination.

In the words of Jam participant United States Assistant Secretary of Defense, Kathryn Wheelbarger:

“Given the nature of our adversaries’ actions, success going forward will require whole-of-government and whole-of-society solutions, which highlights the need for greater integration between the efforts of NATO and the European Union, a more comprehensive approach to operations and activities, and a transatlantic investment strategy that rewards innovation, relevance, and the rapid fielding of cost-effective solutions.”

The 11 theme summaries that follow were extracted by the authors from the proceedings of the event. Highlights of the themes are positioned in a roadmap (Figure 1). Each theme summary has been formatted into three components: (1) findings, (2) policy challenges and (3) response options. The findings, challenges and response options contained in this report summary are the outcome of Jam discussions and are not necessarily endorsed by all Jam participants.
1. International Order: Will the COVID-19 pandemic turn into a systemic shock?

“This pandemic will alter aspects of world order and its full consequences remain to be seen.”

- General Tod Wolters, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The pandemic did not create new global power conflicts; however, neither did it result in enhanced cooperation and solidarity needed to limit human and economic losses. Its spread along the China–Russia–Europe–United States axis exacerbated the processes already threatening the international order, compromising rules-based trade and interdependence, neglecting multilateral cooperation and coordination, and eroding democracy with disruptive populism. The pandemic’s scale, speed and consequences sharpened mutual suspicion, inflammatory rhetoric and general concerns for the future of the world. If the pandemic turns into a global economic recession with concomitant de-globalization and rise in nationalism, it may severely challenge the international order. China, Russia, and other adversaries already regard it as a constraint on their power and as a factor promoting and institutionalizing transatlantic leadership to their disadvantage.

The systemic effect of the pandemic is still unclear; it could drive national attitudes and international actions towards either reinforcing or weakening the international order. If the latter dominates, the geopolitics of control may broaden and deepen fragmentation. Those who see in the pandemic an opportunity for improving the global arrangements must unite along the principles of freedom, prosperity and democracy.

Courses of action for policy makers:

The transatlantic community needs an in-depth leadership discussion (using G7, NATO and US-EU formats) on:

- Modernizing and strengthening the historically established strategic advantages;
- A common approach to prevent an authoritarian turn worldwide;
- Pragmatic principles of constructive multilateralism.

Key recommendations:

- The transatlantic community should initiate an in-depth leadership discussion (using G7, NATO and US-EU formats) on leveraging and strengthening historically established strategic advantages.
- Achieving “strategic complementarity” between NATO and the European Union is a strategically desirable goal. Both NATO and the EU should initiate comprehensive reviews of the US-Europe strategic dialogue on all topics from trade to security with the goal of reaffirming and enhancing transatlantic solidarity.
- NATO and the EU should establish task forces to examine balancing allocation of resources devoted to traditional external threats with those devoted to emerging global threats.
- NATO and the EU should establish and formalize mechanisms to examine and develop comprehensive response strategies to Chinese global efforts to expand influence. Beijing’s European policy during the pandemic provides strong evidence that the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation should be seriously overhauled. It is important scrutinize Chinese geo-economics through a security prism, with resulting guidance to the EU Members and aspirants on a unified strategy for their relations with China. A similar approach guiding relations with Russia is also warranted.
- The timing of catastrophic events is often not predictable – but effective responses to such events have much in common. NATO and the EU should formalize mechanisms to develop and robustly coordinate all hazards response capabilities to catastrophic events with the pandemic experience as a driving force. Important here is to ensure supply chain continuity. Resilient, dependable and diverse supply chains, involving trusted allies and partners, are essential for effective national and regional responses to pandemic-like threats.
- The EU should create a Strategic Communications Task Force dedicated to countering hostile competitor campaigns designed to undermine EU public opinion; e.g. Chinese, Russian, Iranian, Islamist, and others.
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) has much to offer in enhancing readiness and response to pandemic-type events, but often not without potentially far reaching implications for individual freedoms and civil liberty. Creating EU or NATO task forces or advisory/study groups charged with enhancing compatibility of legal and ethical frameworks with the use of AI in military applications is an option worth considering.

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- Modernizing and strengthening the historically established strategic advantages;
- A common approach to prevent an authoritarian turn worldwide;
- Pragmatic principles of constructive multilateralism.
2. Allied Militaries during the Pandemic: Supporting civilian authorities, maintaining readiness

“Now more than ever we must be vigilant, we must maintain our readiness to act and to react, and we must demonstrate our solidarity, our resolve, and our commitment to protect and defend our populations, our economies, and our political systems.”

- Mike Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, USA

Allied militaries play a crucial role in national responses to COVID-19, supporting civilian authorities with logistics and planning, field hospitals, transport of patients and supplies, disinfection of public areas, border control, or by establishing checkpoints and patrolling streets under lockdown. Military hospitals and laboratories are part of the first line of response, and military medics share their unique know-how of working in a bio-hazardous environment. On the other hand, COVID-19 demonstrated the fragility of present armed forces and alliance capabilities, and the challenges of maintaining cohesion and operations in a pandemic.

In the spirit of solidarity and cooperation, the squadron of C-17 Globemasters of the Strategic Airlift Capability, operated by seven NATO allies and EU partners Sweden and Finland, as well as SALIS An-124s, delivered critically needed diagnostic kits, medical supplies and equipment, while the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) managed the support on the request of the United Nations, allies, and partners from four continents. Since military personnel are not immune to infections, armed forces had to scale back operations and exercises following the COVID-19 outbreak. Some units and ship crews required quarantine. This impacted readiness, particularly for troops deployed in operations or as a forward presence.

During a pandemic, the safe and rapid movement of military personnel and equipment is crucial to support civil exigencies, while maintaining deterrence and defense capabilities:

“Military mobility … in the European theatre is essential … for collective defense purposes or for crisis management. It calls for improving NATO’s logistical capabilities by adjusting legislation and procedures to facilitate border crossing; upgrading infrastructure (e.g., roads and bridges with the right parameters for heavy military equipment) … Many of those elements are to some extent within the scope of the EU regulation and funding.”

Amb. Tomasz Szatkowski, Permanent Representative of, Poland to the North Atlantic Council
Courses of action for policy makers:

- Enhance allied capabilities to support civilian authorities in a pandemic, e.g. by introducing a pandemic scenario in the NATO defense planning process, conducting exercises in simulated biohazardous environment, developing online training courses, etc.;

- Develop a robust all-hazards response capability with the pandemic experience as a driving force;

- Better equip and train the military for action in bio-hazardous environments;

- Improve the resilience of Allied forces by promoting common health standards, assessing critical material dependencies, and pooling stocks of medications and vaccines for troops;

- Speed up the flagship initiative of NATO-EU cooperation for establishing a “Military Schengen Zone” by adapting legislation and procedures and upgrading dual-use transport infrastructure to facilitate military mobility in Europe;

- Improve resilience of supply chains and stockpile availability of vital equipment and supplies;

- Exercise innovative ways to enhance deterrence and demonstrate solidarity during a pandemic (e.g. B-1s flying over the Black Sea).

3. The Future of US-Europe Strategic Alliance - An invaluable pragmatic partnership for rule-based international order

“The basic argument for NATO is so obvious it is often ignored. Western security depends on cohesion and solidarity of like-minded states to use collective power for the common good.”
- Harlan Ullman, Atlantic Council, U.S.A.

The US–Europe alliance established rule-based international order, turned democracy into a global trend, and created the most attractive socio-economic space in the world. Failing to sustain this historic achievement would be a recipe for a historic defeat. However, both sides currently oppose significant internal and strategic challenges, leading to disagreements and emerging rifts between Allies. To oversimplify the roots of friction would be a mistake. The tragedy of COVID-19, along with increasing confrontation with China and Russia, is challenging the resilience of the Transatlantic Alliance. But this will also help the Alliance focus on foundational principles and values.

Nearly 80 % of the polled participants disagree with the statement that COVID-19 may result in the termination of transatlantic security relations (see Figure 2).

Consolidated and effective transatlantic leadership is both desirable and indispensable for preserving the prosperity, freedom and democratic perspectives of the world. More rigorous cooperation is necessary to maintain global influence beyond COVID-19 and to cope with multiple threats – nuclear, kinetic, pandemic, cyber, hybrid, and space.

Courses of action for policy makers:

US-Europe strategic dialogue on all topics from trade to security is indispensable; it must be re-invigorated on leadership, bureaucratic, military and intellectual levels to reaffirm and enhance transatlantic solidarity.

- This dialogue must support the aspirations of both NATO (political/military) and the EU (political/economic);

- Promising areas for NATO-EU cooperation include counter disinformation, crisis management, cyber security, hybrid threats, contingency planning, and cooperative, comprehensive resilience;

- Possible defense budget cuts may provide an incentive for cooperation and collaborative projects in bilateral and multilateral formats.
4. Nuclear Deterrence: Unyielding commitment to non-proliferation and arms control

“The role of nuclear deterrence in the security of Europe has not changed because of COVID-19. The fact that a lot of domestic attention is turned elsewhere does not change its relevance.”

- Marjolijn van Deelen, Ambassador for the Non-Proliferation Treaty

During the expanding pandemic, most nuclear armed governments declared the situation would not affect the combat readiness of their nuclear forces. However, President Putin exploited the world’s diverted attention and announced new political guidelines for Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy, which already includes several new missile systems. Moreover, China is rapidly fielding a nuclear triad for the first time. Unilateral disarmament initiatives do not appear to be trending positively. Transatlantic nuclear capabilities remain critical for global stability, the security of the NATO area, and the defense of Allied nations.

In the civil nuclear sector, China and Russia dominate the export of nuclear power to both developing and developed countries. This gives them substantial influence through control of energy-related supply chains and leverage over the use of nuclear technology dissemination for military purposes.

The ongoing negotiations on nuclear arms control are necessary and promising, especially if China joins. However, until achieving a mutually binding agreement, measures should be undertaken by the US and NATO Allies not to hand the initiative and advantage to Russia or China.

In the civil sector, allowing foreign government companies to build and operate a dangerous piece of energy infrastructure in Europe carries serious risks.

Courses of action for policy makers:

Allied nations should coordinate a three-layered approach to tackle the nuclear issue:

- The progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament should continue to be highly prioritized;
- Allied nations may support intensive diplomatic efforts to reduce risks at regional levels;
- In the civil nuclear sector, the US and EU should continue working to enforce safety regulations at the production lines and with purchasing states to reinforce their security.
5. China’s Role in Europe: The end of illusions

“In Central and Eastern European member states and Eastern partner countries, the EU could do a much better job…. The EU’s support of these states still far outweighs that of China, but public and political leaders in these countries sometimes don’t realize this.”

- Andrew Cotter, University College Cork, Ireland

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a communist dictatorship with giant production capabilities based on European and American technologies. The regime is oppressive at home and economically aggressive abroad. PRC leadership sees a global Pax Sinica based on production, demography, superior military, and “Wolf Warrior” foreign policy. This strategy has already impacted Europe, raising concerns about the use of direct investments, trade and aid as a platform for interference in the political, economic and security decision-making in Europe. During the pandemic, Europe has depended on China for medical supplies and this gave Beijing another opportunity to get a foot in the door of many European capitals. At the same time, in Europe, there is an increasing distrust of China.

PRC activities are targeted to undermine cohesion and promote fragmentation between NATO and EU member states. China’s economic largesse ruins democratic ideological scruples in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and other financially fragile nations. Beijing has initiated the “17+1” initiative with the East European countries as “supplement” to China’s relationship with the EU that actually led to growing trade deficits and Chinese Communist Party “dialogue” with selected political parties. While there is shared concern over PRC’s overall strategy and immediate actions during the pandemic, there is less agreement on strategies for confronting China, despite its designation as “systemic rival.” It is time to discuss whether Europe wants to continue to see its cutting-edge technologies and critical infrastructure sold off with the consequent political, social, and security repercussions.

Courses of action for policy makers:

Beijing policy in Europe during the pandemic provides strong evidence that the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation should be seriously revised to scrutinize Chinese geo-economics through the security prism and provide clear guidance to the members and aspirants for their relations with China (as well as with Russia).

• The EU needs to secure and expand its investment and trade interest in China – a comprehensive investment agreement should precede a possible free trade agreement;

• China’s supply lines, international commerce research and development, and financial markets contain vulnerabilities that joint EU-US pressure might encourage Beijing to follow the international norms more closely;

• The transatlantic community should more closely control and monitor third parties’ investments in critical sectors and assets.
6. EU Security and Defense Goals: Strategic autonomy or stronger transatlantic partnership?

“Nobody seriously believes that the crisis should produce less Europe rather than more Europe. The crisis has shaken multilateralism while demonstrating that multilateralism is our only viable exit strategy.”

- Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow, Friends of Europe

The EU Global Strategy announced the goal to achieve strategic autonomy through Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. The strategy was followed by introduction of capability planning and review mechanisms, launching PESCO projects and the multi-billion European Defense Fund, as well as other practical steps.

Strictly national responses prevailed in the first days of the pandemic, showing how fragile European solidarity actually might be. However, the European Commission and member states, with NATO’s important participation, fairly quickly introduced measures to reinforce national healthcare systems, contain the spread of the virus while assuring cross-border mobility, and a plan to support an economic recovery from the crisis.

Future developments will depend on the hitherto unclear impact of the recession and recovery funding on defense expenditures. Most Jam participants expect that defense budgets will come under strain and warn that slashing defense expenditures would be a “cardinal mistake.”

Still, 60% of the participants think that the COVID-19 crisis will not infringe on the EU’s strategic autonomy aspirations.

In the opinion of Jiří Šedivý, Chief Executive of the European Defense Agency, COVID-19 may turn to be the wake-up call that will unleash Europe’s extraordinary potential, by engaging member states in “real, deep and sincere cooperation, at all levels, including on defense policies and capability development.”

Some see the drive to strategic autonomy, and in particular technological and industrial autonomy, as long-term insurance in a turbulent world. Others, including Raimundas Karoblis, Minister of National Defense of Lithuania, state that strategic autonomy can be pursued as a transatlantic endeavor by NATO and the EU, and not just by the EU.

Courses of action for policy makers:

- A number of participants underlined that, at least in the foreseeable future, the European Union would not be able—and should not aim—to deploy the full spectrum of required security and defense capabilities autonomous from NATO;
- Not surprisingly, in response to a poll, 51% of the Jam participants stated that EU security policy should be defined in cooperation with NATO, 45% called for EU-wide coordination, and the remaining 4% consider security policy a national responsibility;
- The current lack of definition of the purpose of strategic autonomy (see Figure 3) and its scope (e.g. in terms of geographic areas, domains of conflict, capability types, technologies and industrial capacity) hinders the transatlantic debate. Better specificity and exchange of information concerning shared goals would facilitate the identification of most relevant and mutually accepted solutions;
- Ralf Roloff, Deputy Dean for Academics of the George C. Marshall Center, wraps up this debate well stating that instead of “strategic autonomy” we should rather aim at “strategic complementarity” of NATO and the European Union.
7. The pandemic information battleground

“There’s definitely a deliberate element of using this pandemic to destabilize our democracies by means of information operations, but we’re also seeing many homegrown conspiracy theorists emboldened to spread disinformation. They are creating a sort of co-production of disinformation pieces that recycle and transform Chinese and Russian propaganda.”

- Nathalie Van Raemdonck, EU Institute for Security Studies, Belgium

The tensions between Russia and NATO, and the US and China, created another front during the COVID-19 pandemic, continuing a long-running information war. China and Russia sought to take advantage of the early lack of solidarity in the EU through disinformation campaigns, efforts to showcase their modest contributions, and attempts to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on the EU and member states.

Russia generated propaganda in a traditional KGB manner – Sputnik News launched the false information that the virus was produced by a US laboratory and followed with a comprehensive campaign aimed at increasing the psychological impact of the pandemic, creating panic and sowing doubts. Meanwhile, China engaged in a classic propaganda campaign by sending messages of false solidarity, criticizing the EU crisis management, promoting China’s own success, and suppressing dissident voices at home.

Massive disinformation and false attributions targeted against the West and coupled with the opportunistic delivery of aid during a global human tragedy demonstrates Russian and Chinese exploitation of the crisis. The propaganda campaigns aim to create an impression of the overwhelming importance of China as a primary actor in the post-COVID-19 response, with Russia a close second. Nevertheless, these countries were not able to increase their prestige and respect in the eyes of Europeans; instead, excessive propaganda amplified current fractures and may complicate future relations.

Courses of action for policy makers:

• The EU should create a Strategic Communications Task Force dedicated to countering hostile competitor campaigns designed to undermine EU public opinion; e.g. Chinese, Russian, Iranian, Islamist, and others:
• It is mandatory to initiate positive public diplomacy to promote the EU story and build solidarity among member states;
• EUvsDisinfo and the US Global Engagement Center should enhance their cooperation and prevent the creation of a Russian-Chinese “ecosystem” and further boom of disinformation.
8. Artificial Intelligence: Cooperation opportunities or the “new battleground”?

“AI is ranked with fire and electricity in its power to transform the world.”
- AFCEA Technology Committee

Seeking to optimize enterprise operations and supply chains, the private sector rapidly adopts Artificial Intelligence (AI). In the military domain, AI applications can improve intelligence analysis, decision-making, logistics, the operation of autonomous vehicles and swarms, and weapon systems. Most participants in the Jam believe that in no more than five years AI will be widely used in military operations (Figure 4).

Of particular interest is the concept of “Mission Command 2.0” establishing decision-making faster than that of adversaries. A new AI will enable leaders to oversee complex operations, while allowing decentralized execution by human-machine teams.

This concept is applicable also to COVID-19 and other emergencies, where AI will equip lowest tiers of decentralized institutions to manage safety net programs, community health, logistic supplies, and funding.

AI offers much faster and potentially more accurate assessment of enemy actions. For example, AI-based predictive analytics hold the promise of anticipating cyberattacks and the best counter actions.

The competitive advantages of AI are understood by leading powers. China pursues global technological supremacy, aiming to become the global leader in the development of AI theory and technology by 2030.

The use of AI in mission critical tasks faces considerable challenges. AI can be hacked, might be biased, could make dangerous mistakes, and is hard to understand and control.

The integration of AI into mission command, e.g., in the use of armed drones, may be politically controversial, even among allies, due to differing legal and ethical frameworks. Furthermore, Dr. William Wieneringer from the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies stated: “We don’t fully understand how AI processes information, and it is very possible that in a crisis AI could misinterpret the data – believing an attack was imminent – and thus starting a war that nobody wants.”

Courses of action for policy makers:

Closer collaboration between industry, government and academia, as well as between NATO and the EU, is essential to maintain a technological and industrial edge.

Allies must determine how to incorporate AI into defense readiness and response systems. It is important to clarify:

• The mission critical tasks that preserve the indispensable human role in decision-making;

• The best platforms to exchange data, validate, and certify mission critical AI applications; how to make legal and ethical frameworks on the use of AI in military applications compatible;

• How to select AI systems and evaluate their efficacy;

• How to engage with China to avoid—or win—a new arms race in the field of AI.
9. Accelerating innovation

“The solid basis of transatlantic cooperation in the field of innovations lies in complementarity and synergy of our economies.... We have the same competitors, we need our markets and we need our investments.”
- Krzysztof Szczerski, Chief of Staff to the President of the Republic of Poland

Allies need to innovate continuously to preserve a technological edge and maintain the ability to get the latest technology to the warfighter faster than anyone else.

Multi-year capability development projects, driven by requirements defined by military planners, will increasingly be seen as an exception, rather than the norm. Much of the expertise in today’s new technologies rests in the civilian sector.

Further, the private sector is more willing to introduce innovative solutions, even if they are not fully configured and tested, and then make necessary adjustments along the way. China uses a similar approach to speed up AI-based innovation.

Through the Allied Command Transformation Innovation Hub and the NATO Innovation Network. Allies already leverage open innovation by providing mutual support, sharing best practices, and identifying issues to solve and proposed solutions.

Courses of action for policy makers:

To enhance agility, maintain a technological edge and field superior capabilities rapidly, NATO Allies, partners, and the EU should consider the following:

• Provide a robust platform for exchange of information and ideas between the requirements-definition community and solution providers;

• Increase flexibility of the defense acquisition processes, allowing contractors and non-defense companies to contribute knowledge and expertise to requirements definition and experimentation;

• Expand the opportunities for exchange of personnel between the military and industry;

• Increase funding for innovative government research laboratories and projects;

• Create an International Security Innovation Network to amass a knowledge base and identify promising technologies, while promoting a new culture innovation.

10. Over the Horizon... Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity

“The whole point of NATO’s breadth and (I hope) flexibility will be its capacity to adjust to new threats and new ways of thinking.”
- Cameron Munter, Consultant, New York/ Czech Republic

The shape of international conflict is evolving in cyberspace, failed societies, human health, climate change, space, transportations system, technological competition, financial systems, and in other areas. Each threat may have amplifying effects on some other non-conventional security threat, creating a chain of mutually reinforcing risks. As much as Allied nations are experiencing greater vulnerabilities across various domains, the number of threat actors is also on the increase. COVID-19 provides a real-life sense of what bioterrorism could look like. It is a grim illustration how complex and poorly understood the contemporary security landscape is, and how unprepared we are for threats.

The main point of NATO’s breadth and flexibility will be its capacity to adjust to new ways of thinking and to find its place in the broad resilience debate. The dilemma is whether the Alliance should broaden its mandate to embrace a spectrum of new security threats or to focus on its traditional core defense mandate; it may be difficult to do both. The former may mean an enhanced civilian role, or for NATO to develop standing defense plans for response to various non-military threats, and therefore may come at the expense of NATO’s cutting edge military capacity; while the focus on the core defense mandate runs the risk of being inadequate for a large portion of conceivable threats.

Courses of action for policy makers:

• The lessons of COVID-19 should be used to establish a process of analysis and response to new threats’ ecology, to allow NATO to augment its capabilities and response options;

• The allied strategic thinking should find a way to balance the resources devoted to traditional external threats versus emerging global threats.
11. The Increasing Importance of Resilience

The particular experience of COVID-19 demonstrates a number of general vulnerabilities to a pandemic. Health services lack adequate protective clothing and specialized equipment. Of particular note, institutions are functionally more vulnerable in delivering their objective when facing aggregate stressors, as demonstrated in the case of the Brno University Hospital, Czech Republic, which underwent simultaneous cyberattacks. Under stress, our societies are more vulnerable to the spread of fake news, disinformation, and propaganda campaigns. Western nations are currently exposed to international supply chains for critical materials (e.g. protective clothing, medical supplies, food, raw materials, chemicals, minerals, semiconductor chips, etc.).

Many participants in the Jam focused on resilience as the most important response to these security risks.

NATO considers resilience as an essential basis for credible deterrence and defense, as well as for the effective fulfillment of the Alliance’s core tasks, such as cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, and civil preparedness. Increasing resilience against a broad and evolving spectrum of threats requires the capacity to anticipate and continually improve preparedness through better requirements analysis, contingency planning, foresight, and a whole-of-society approach. 91% of participants in the Jam support the idea of increasing NATO’s ability to foresee unfamiliar threats.

Courses of action for policy makers:

- Expand the understanding of resilience and defense to also include health systems, public trust, and cohesion;
- NATO and Allies, in close cooperation with the EU and Enhanced Opportunities Partners, should continue to invest in resilience against a full spectrum of threats, including asymmetric, hybrid, and low probability/high consequence threats;
- Study and build on the experience of Israel and Nordic-style civil preparedness, for example the organization of civilians in the Cyber Defense League of Estonia;
- Prepare for the long-term effects of COVID-19;
- Decrease reliance on China for supply chains of critical items; shift from “faster, cheaper” strategies to more resilient and diverse supply chains that involve trusted allies and partners;
- Determine optimal equipment stockpile levels and locations; formulate management strategies for pooled resources;
- Reduce response times through periodic drills;
- Enhance NATO-EU collaborative efforts for forecasting and early detection of future threats and potential crisis.

COVID-19 affects the political habits and atmosphere in individual countries differently, and the Jam reflected diverse cultural specifics and professional experience. Yet, the open and professional discussions during the Jam highlighted security issues of the highest concern for the transatlantic community, while also outlining response options for policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Strategic insights:

- The pandemic’s scale, speed, and consequences sharpened our understanding of the challenges of global interdependencies and the requirement for transatlantic cooperation.

- COVID-19 has brought home to us that each threat may have amplifying effects on other non-conventional security threats, creating a chain of mutually reinforcing risks; hence a holistic (big picture) approach to pandemics is indispensable.

- An important positive outcome of the tragedy of COVID-19 is a heightened awareness that the Transatlantic Alliance needs to focus on foundational principles and values and to enhance its resilience to Chinese and Russian influence.

- The pandemic once again underscores that cross-border military mobility in Europe must be accorded a top priority in NATO-EU cooperation not only for defense purposes, but to confront and mitigate pandemic-like events effectively.