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“And here comes in the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved.”
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
When analyzing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it is crucial to differentiate between the regions. The genesis, routes and history of their conflicts with Georgia and their relations with Russia are dissimilar. The regions cannot be viewed and evaluated symmetrically, nor can they be treated as one domain. There is a fundamental diversity between these two semi-recognized territories that has to be considered as a cornerstone to any study or approach.[17]
Georgian political expert, Ivlian Khaindrava, emphasizes a substantial difference between the South Ossetian and the Abkhazian national projects. The South Ossetian project can be characterized as an “irredentical”; it is designed to “join and reunite with North Ossetia and resolve the problem of divided peoples.” The first “brick of aspiration” was cemented on 26 October 2013 with a signed agreement between the governments of South Ossetia and the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania of the Russian Federation on socio-economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation. In contrast, there is no desire in Abkhazia to join any part of the Russian Federation. The Abkhazian national project rests on the idea of the creation of an Abkhazian independent state for Abkhaz people.[18]
South Ossetia
Political and economic experts in South Ossetia highlight certain domestic issues affecting the region. Among them are a degraded economy, poor social and political development, ruined and inefficient infrastructure, corruption and youth unemployment.[19] More specifically, Yuri Vazagov, a journalist from South Ossetia, notes the lack of potential competitiveness and the economic unattractiveness of the republic. The “political-military context (the region’s division into political-military blocs) and the threat of systematic destabilization in the Caucasus considerably narrow the corridor for prospective economic projects.” [20]
Despite the recognition of South Ossetia’s independence by Russia and four other UN Member States, the deplorable lack of socio-economic development is unchanged. Moreover, extensive financing was received for the development of these programs, yet they were neither developed nor implemented.[21]
South Ossetia’s determination to integrate with North Ossetia and Russia, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania being a federal subject of Russia (a republic), is widely expressed among the governmental officials of the region. Today, a proposed treaty on “alliance and integration” between South Ossetia and Russia is on the negotiation table. Anatoly Bibilov, President of the Parliament of South Ossetia, illustrating the leading goal of bilateral relations, explains that for the leading United Ossetia party, “joining the Russian Federation is the ideal.” [22]
The South Ossetian government’s encouragement of a national sentiment for the reunion of the Ossetian peoples also fosters a hope for the inclusion of South Ossetia into a Russia-led economic integration project, a project supported by the republic. Dmitry Medoev, Ambassador of South Ossetia to the Russian Federation, underlined that “together with the EEU project, a fundamental policy of achieving a new level of integration and security in the post-Soviet space was proclaimed, as well as the creation of an auspicious environment for profound development for each member-state.” [23]
Interestingly, the idea that “in order to avoid a conflict of interests, the great “geopolitical unions” seek to resolve their aggravated contradictions at the expense of “coercive decomposition of the post-Soviet space,” while the subsequent division of the “post-Soviet-Russian” is still intact among South Ossetia’s echelons and echoes the Russian attitude of all classes.[24] Moreover, South Ossetia’s self-perception of being Russia’s “strategic vulnerable point, which if triggered, may initiate the process of decomposition” was articulated in the Ambassador’s report and reflected the national rhetoric of both peoples.[25]
Furthermore, a status of “exclusivity” is attributed to the Russian-South Ossetian relationship that provides an assurance that the republic will receive economic, political and moral support.[26] Thus, Russia undertook the mission of being a security guarantor and protector of South Ossetia from any external military intervention in the region.
While the friendly sentiment of the reunion of the Ossetian peoples and joining the Russian Federation persists inside the breakaway region, the Russian perception of South Ossetia’s foreign policy direction slightly differs. According to a 2014 poll conducted by the Russian Levada Center, a majority of the Russian population insists that South Ossetia has to be an independent state (51 %) rather than a part of Russia (24 %) or a part of Georgia (8 %). Describing South Ossetia, the majority of respondents named it as an independent state (55 %), fewer regarded it as a part of Russia (22 %) and even fewer associated it with being a part of Georgia (11 %).[27] However, some experts expressed the opinion that the independence of South Ossetia is not taken seriously, not only in Moscow, but also not earnestly even in Tskhinvali.[28] The tables below reflect the results of the surveys conducted for the present research.
South Ossetia has already declared its readiness to join the established Customs Union and the newer Eurasian Economic Union, yet there is no clear understanding of how Minsk and Astana could vote in favor of Tskhinvali’s accession, taking into consideration the disputed status of the territory.[29] The future development of South Ossetia’s integration trajectory hangs enigmatically in the air.
What do you think, should South Ossetia be a part of Georgia, a part of Russia
or an independent state? (*) [30]
or an independent state? (*) [30]
| July 2004 | Apr 2006 | July 2009 | June 2011 | July 2012 | July 2013 | July 2014 |
Should be a part of Georgia | 12 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 8 |
Should be a part of Russia | 34 | 40 | 35 | 23 | 35 | 29 | 24 |
Should be an independent state | 30 | 26 | 40 | 53 | 43 | 43 | 51 |
It is difficult to answer | 24 | 22 | 19 | 18 | 15 | 20 | 17 |
South Ossetia is…(*)
| Sep 2004 | Feb 2006 | Aug 2009 | Aug 2010 | June 2011 | Mar 2012 | July 2013 | July 2014 |
Part of Georgia | 17 | 18 | 8 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 11 |
Part of Russia | 46 | 36 | 29 | 29 | 27 | 30 | 27 | 22 |
Independent state | 17 | 22 | 51 | 43 | 47 | 43 | 45 | 55 |
It is difficult to answer | 21 | 25 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 12 |
What do you think, should Abkhazia be a part of Georgia, a part of Russia, or
an independent state? (*)
| July 2004 | Apr 2006 | July 2009 | June 2011 | July 2012 | July 2013 | July 2014 |
Should be a part of Georgia | 14 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
Should be a part of Russia | 32 | 41 | 35 | 25 | 34 | 30 | 25 |
Should be an independent state | 29 | 27 | 41 | 53 | 41 | 42 | 52 |
It is difficult to say | 26 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 16 | 19 | 15 |
Abkhazia is …
| Sep 2004 | Feb 2006 | Aug 2009 | Aug 2010 | June 2011 | Mar 2012 | July 2013 | July 2014 |
Part of Georgia | 27 | 22 | 9 | 14 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 9 |
Part of Russia | 32 | 31 | 26 | 27 | 25 | 28 | 28 | 22 |
Independent state | 17 | 21 | 52 | 44 | 49 | 45 | 48 | 58 |
It is difficult to answer | 24 | 26 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 14 | 10 |
Do you think that Russia is doing right by providing financial aid to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia?
| Sep 2013 | July 2014 |
Definitely yes | 14 | 8 |
Mostly yes | 44 | 43 |
Mostly not | 18 | 23 |
Definitely not | 8 | 9 |
It is difficult to answer | 17 | 17 |
Although Abkhazia has expressed strong interest in joining the CU and its successor, the EEU, as reflected in the recent report on bilateral relations by Minister of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Chirikba,[38] Russian experts doubt this scenario will become a reality.[39]
Although there is active discussion in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian breakaway regions in favor of joining the CU and the EEU, there is neither a corresponding ambition nor a clear understanding among the founding member states of these unions of how to accomplish such scenarios in the foreseeable future.
Russia’s enthusiasm to actively promote Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence in the world community has slightly waned. While the status of semi-recognized republics grants the Kremlin an “exclusive” position in the regions, this luxury has a hefty price tag.[40] Physically, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian territories play crucial roles in Russia’s strategic geopolitical interests. Both republics are used as outposts for Russian forces to maintain the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Georgia’s persistent rhetoric on its Euro-Atlantic aspirations only fortifies Russia’s roles in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Therefore, the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian “frozen conflicts” are unlikely to be resolved in the near future without Russia’s direct interest.
The South Caucasus has become a stage for geopolitical and economic battles between Eurasian Moscow-led and Western Brussels-led blocs. Moreover, Russia’s strategic “near abroad” is also facing challenges (e.g. Ukraine and Moldova). The ongoing Ukrainian crisis, which developed from domestic Ukrainian disagreements over Kiev’s decision to adopt a full-scale “competition” strategy toward geopolitical influence, demonstrated Russia’s firm resolve to defend its strategic geopolitical interests in its periphery. Feodor Voitolovsky, a Russian political scientist, emphasized that today’s crisis between Russia and the West is acute and deep. Neither the attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 nor the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 instigated such coldness in relations between Moscow and Washington as we observe today.[41]
Therefore, taking the changed geopolitical context into consideration, the strategic importance of the EEU to Russia has increased significantly. In order to have an accurate assessment of the EEU’s efficiency and its future developments, it is vital to monitor the motives of its member states and prospective members with regard to compatibility, economic development and political stability. The cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia demonstrate the difficulties of joining the EEU. Although both republics have strong security ties and a shared border with their major benefactor, Russia, neither Russia nor other EEU member states have shown a willingness to assist the republics in their accession processes. However, if the balance of power shifts away from Russia in the South Caucasus, Moscow would strongly encourage South Ossetia and Abkhazia to proceed with the Russian-led integration projects.