Modern digitized societies and economies are globally interconnected and increasingly interdependent as a result of global digital connectivity and dependency on digital infrastructure, communications, and systems. The analysis of these interdependencies and emerging complex vulnerabilities and threats requires a holistic approach, which goes well beyond the personal, the enterprise, or the sectoral cybersecurity measures. The enhancement of cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructures require coordinated efforts at national, regional, and international levels. In addition, due to the multi-layered “cyber terrain” (a term introduced by the US Department of Defense, DoD, and further detailed by Shawn Riley ) and complex systems interdependencies, the new risks and threats become “unknown unknowns” and require upgrading of the established since centuries resilience principles of the society to the entirely new maturity level of “cyber resilience.”
Achieving cybersecurity and resilience at the national level is a shared responsibility of all stakeholders – government, private sector, and civil society. Coordinated actions and a multi-stakeholder approach are required to develop and execute national cybersecurity strategies and plans. Various methodologies, guidelines, and templates for defining well-structured and comprehensive national or sectoral cybersecurity strategies are provided by world organizations like ITU, OECD, EU’s ENISA, OSCE, standardization bodies, and academic research. Most of them have already postulated “cyber resiliency” as a new main goal to upgrade ‘cybersecurity.’ Strategies are also reflected in roadmaps outlining the steps and goals to achieve at different phases of the improvement plans. The challenge is how to evaluate the level of achievements, the efficiency, and effectiveness of the measures, and more generally, how to assess the overall level of readiness, capacity and objectively evaluate security and resilience capabilities at the sectoral and national level. There is also a need for a unified methodology to monitor the progress and to compare the achieved status among organizations, sectors, countries, and societies.
For decades, the approach based on maturity models has been widely used in IT companies and technology sectors, as well as by public procurement, starting with defense, to assess the organizations’ readiness and capability to deliver high-quality products and services within the required scope, time and budget. On the other hand, organizations, communities, and nations must live and comply with a constantly increasing number of regulations, standards, and requirements, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework  and related NIST standards and EU Regulations, e.g., the “Cybersecurity Act”  with the expected Cybersecurity Certification Scheme, the “NIS Directive,”  and others. To cope with all that and yet meet the organization’s specific business goals, the maturity models and assessment methods turned out to be the most efficient and effective way for larger and smaller organizations.
In this survey, we cover several most popular representatives of the huge diversity of cybersecurity maturity models and give a brief analysis of their suitability for application at a higher level for the purposes of community, sectoral or national cybersecurity maturity evaluation, and furnish national cybersecurity strategies with well-structured improvement programs, like “roadmap to maturity.”
The concept of maturity models for software/ICT industry was initially sponsored by the US military who wanted to develop a method to objectively evaluate software/ICT subcontractors’ process capability and maturity. Due to various emerging technologies, standards, different sizes and capacities of the suppliers, there was a need to objectively assess in a unified manner the level of reliability, trust, and associated risks of software/ICT service quality. Maturity models provide a measurable transition as well between different levels (or steps, stages). They allow to compare organizations by their “maturity levels” and provide a structured and prioritized approach for improvement plans.
The maturity models can be grouped into three types:
ad-hoc → managed → defined → quantitatively managed → optimized
Maturity models, regardless of their type, have a similar structure that ensures a harmonized linkage between objectives, best practices, and assessments, and also facilitates the definition of improvement roadmaps between current capabilities and target ones within the context of business goals, standards, and domain-specific characteristics. A typical structure includes:
The introduction and the early use of maturity models were in software/IT industry. After the first use of a staged maturity model by Richard L. Nolan in 1973, and the following work of Watts Humphrey, initially at IBM and after 1986 at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), the US Department of Defense requested a formalized process maturity framework from SEI by to be able to evaluate software contractors. In the early 1990s, SEI introduced the formal Capability Maturity Model (CMM) with five maturity levels. Subsequently, in 2002, a much more comprehensive and integrated model, Capability Maturity Models Integration (CMMI) was published, with the most popular version 1.3 of 2010. It applies to software engineering, systems engineering, software and systems acquisition, and service delivery as different constellations with a common core. The CMMI was further administered by the CMMI Institute (a spin-off of CMU), which was acquired in 2016 by ISACA. A new version 2.0 was released in 2018. The five maturity levels defined by CMMI to reflect the maturity of the established and institutionalized processes are:
Initial -> Managed -> Defined -> Quantitatively managed -> Optimizing
Since then, capability maturity models have been introduced widely in domains such as ICT infrastructure, all kinds of software engineering, service management, business process management, manufacturing, civil engineering, and cybersecurity. The CMMI Institute published in 2018 the “CMMI Cyber maturity Platform” to address the cyber resilience assessments.
During the past decade, multiple cybersecurity and resilience frameworks have been proposed. A recent study  identified more than 25 research activities in 36 different industries attempting to achieve increased clarity about the scope, characteristics, synergies, and gaps that would facilitate scientific research advancement in this area. A 2017 technical mapping comparing maturity models used in various sectors, including education and awareness, provided another source for our survey. The study classifies frameworks as either strategic or operational, by the hierarchy of their decision influence, by the attacks addressed, through the methods used and implementation area. As an exercise to determine the popularity of the terms, we conducted a simple search in Google Scholar, which brought more than 10,000 results for “cybersecurity maturity model,” and around 12,000 hits for “cyber resilience maturity assessment.” For our survey, we selected a few of the frameworks identified in previous research and added more recent work, as we aim at identifying the applicability at higher than organizational level (like sectors, community, nations), the similarity of assessment results, and possibilities for interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral and cross-border application. In the sub-sections below, we comment on some popular cybersecurity indexes.
CERT-RMM became the reference model for cyber resilience developed by the CERT Division of SEI, Carnegie Mellon University. It had a strong influence on most of the contemporary cybersecurity maturity assessment methods and frameworks. Although not explicitly stated in the title, the model is dedicated to achieving an operational resilience of organizations in a digitized society and economy, i.e., what we currently mean by cyber resilience. A stable version 1.1 of the model was published in 2011, with an update to the last published version 1.2 in 2016. The model is based on the “Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation” (OCTAVE) method for information security risk management and the experience of application in the financial and other sectors. The cyber risk management aspects have been combined with the process-oriented approach and common CMMI-related taxonomy, with terms like “process areas” and generic goals and practices, introduced along with mapping to the engineering and service delivery and continuity process areas from CMMI for services and development.
The model defines the following 26 process areas grouped in 4 categories:
The “resilience strategy” is based on achieving resilience of the four basic assets: people, information, technology, and facilities. Thus, ‘resilience’ is ‘translated’ to protect and sustain measures for the assets. The structure of the model follows the classical CMMI architecture. For each of the 26 process areas, a set of specific goals (total of 94) are defined and must be fulfilled by implementing specific practices (251, typically with several sub-practices). The model prescribes the use of three generic goals and 13 generic practices to measure the level of maturity. To facilitate assessments, some more granulated Maturity Indicator Levels (MIL) were subsequently introduced. The mapping of capabilities levels to maturity indicator levels is shown below:
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2)  was introduced in 2014 by the Department of Energy (US DOE) as an upgrade of an earlier version of C2M2 for the Electricity Subsector (ES-C2M2) by removing sector-specific references and making it applicable more widely to Critical Infrastructures. It was supported by the White House initiative led by the DOE, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and SEI, CMU. C2M2 is structured in 10 domains (listed in Table 1) and a set of practices per domain, which represent the capability in the domain. The practices are grouped by objectives and ordered by four maturity indicator levels (MIL0 to MIL3).
The ‘objectives’ are of two types – approach objectives (one or more per domain, unique for domains), supported by a progression of specific practices, and management objectives (one per domain), supported by a progression of ‘generic’ practices that describe institutionalized activities. The progression is measured by a set of practices characterizing maturity indicators levels, applied to approach progression and institutionalization progression. Like in CMMI and CERT-RMM models, the MILs are ‘cumulative.’ The model is mapped to most of the known models and frameworks in information security and cybersecurity, like ISO/IEC 27001/2, NIST frameworks on cybersecurity, critical infrastructures, supply chains. Remarkably, all 10 domains with objectives and practices meet a subset of the CERT-RMM. A new version 2.0 is currently under consultation.
To face the problem that most government agencies, industry partners, critical infrastructure operators, school systems, nonprofit and other organizations exist and operate at the local level and are not equally prepared to defend against cyber threats that could affect the entire community, the Center
Table 1. The Domains in C2M2, New Version 2.0 (under Consultation).
Establish, operate, and maintain an enterprise cybersecurity risk management program to identify, analyze, and mitigate cybersecurity risk
Asset, Change, and Configuration Management
Manage the organization’s IT and OT assets, including both hardware and software, commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives
Identity and Access Management
Create and manage identities for entities that may be granted logical or physical access to the organization’s assets. Control access to the organization’s assets
Threat and Vulnerability Management
Establish and maintain plans, procedures, and technologies to detect, identify, analyze, manage, and respond to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities
Establish and maintain activities and technologies to collect, analyze, alarm, present, and use operational and cybersecurity information, status and summary information from other domains, to establish situational awareness for operational state and cybersecurity state
Event and Incident Response
Establish and maintain plans, procedures, and technologies to detect, analyze, mitigate, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity events and incidents
Supply Chain and External Dependencies Management
Establish and maintain controls to manage the cybersecurity risks associated with services and assets that are dependent on external entities, commensurate with the risk to critical infrastructure and organizational objectives
Establish and maintain plans, procedures, technologies, and controls to create a culture of cybersecurity and to ensure the ongoing suitability and competence of personnel
Establish and maintain the structure and behavior of the organization’s cybersecurity controls, processes, and other elements
Cybersecurity Program Management
Establish and maintain an enterprise cybersecurity program that provides governance, strategic planning, and sponsorship for the organization’s cybersecurity activities in a manner that aligns cybersecurity objectives with the organization’s strategic objectives and the risk to critical infrastructure
for Infrastructure Assurance and Security (CIAS) at The University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) created the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (CCSMM). A program was developed to help communities (and states) implement the model and piloted in seven states helping them begin the development of their own programs, as the community cybersecurity is arguably the weak link in the nation’s cybersecurity chain. The ‘levels’ in CCSMM are less formal and defined as ‘levels of improvement’:
These levels of improvement are focused on four areas called dimensions, shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Dimensions in the Community Cybersecurity Maturity Model (CCSMM).
Most people understand that cyber threats exist. However, not as many understand the extent of the threat, the current attack trends, how a cyber incident can impact a community, which vulnerabilities should be addressed, what the cascading effects may be if a community was under a cyberattack
Addresses what to do with information on a cyber incident and where the information should be reported. In addition, how one sector can share information with another, allowing the second sector to potentially prevent the incident from occurring
Addresses the need to integrate cyber elements into the policies or guiding principles and includes all guiding regulations, laws, rules, and documents that govern the community's daily operation. Policies should be evaluated to ensure cybersecurity principles are reflected in everything we do and will establish expectations and limitations
Communities have established plans to address many different hazards and this dimension ensures cybersecurity elements are included in those plans enabling the community to address cyber incidents that could impact the operations of the community
This model’s distinguishing point is that it is 3-dimensional, with ‘geography’ added as a third coordinate, with three values: organization, community, and state. This 3-D Community Cybersecurity Model can serve to define a roadmap for individuals, organizations, communities, states, and the nation, and as:
It is declared to be compliant with other known frameworks, like the NIST Cyber Security Framework, the DoD’s CMMC, and to support the Cybersecurity Workforce Framework from the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE).
CMM-GCSCC  is a methodical framework designed to review the maturity of a country’s cybersecurity capacity. It was developed by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) through a global collaborative exercise launched in 2014. For each of its five dimensions (shown in Table 3), the model provides factors (24 in total for this version), which define criteria to demonstrate the respective cybersecurity capacity. Most factors are examined from several viewpoints, and composed of a series of indicators within the five stages of maturity for each dimension, named as follows: start-up; formative; established; strategic; dynamic.
CMM-GCSCC is among the most popular assessment tools applicable to countries and regions, used by international organizations like ITU, Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, Oceania Cyber Security Centre, Cybersecurity Capacity Centre for Southern Africa, RAND Corporation, etc. It has been deployed to over 80 nations with more than 110 assessments and two regional studies by OAS. Many country profiles are publicly available and levels achieved could be reviewed, along with recommended improvements. A new version is planned for publication in the second half of 2020. It should be noted that ‘capacity’ is not equivalent to ‘capability,’ and the model is less formal than maturity assessments, although dimensions and factors may match.
Table 3. Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CMM of GCSCC).
Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy
National Cybersecurity Strategy; Incident Response; Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection; Crisis Management; Cyber Defense; Communications Redundancy
Cyber Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mindset; Trust and Confidence on the Internet; User Understanding of Personal Information Protection Online; Reporting Mechanisms; Media and Social Media
Cybersecurity Education, Training and Skills
Awareness Raising; Framework for Education; Framework for Professional Training
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Legal Frameworks; Criminal Justice System; Formal and Informal Cooperation Frameworks to Combat Cybercrime
Standards, Organizations, and Technologies
Adherence to Standards; Internet Infrastructure Resilience; Software Quality; Technical Security Controls; Cryptographic Controls; Cybersecurity Marketplace; Responsible Disclosure
In 2015, the US Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) introduced the maturity-model-based Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (CAT)  for banking institutions to evaluate bank’s risks and cybersecurity readiness by measuring levels of risk and corresponding controls. Five maturity levels are used: Baseline, Evolving, Intermediate, Advanced, and Innovative, based on five domains characterizing the institution’s behaviors, practices, and processes that support cybersecurity preparedness. The five domains consist of a total of 15 “assessment factors” with 497 “declarative statements” used to assess the maturity level achieved per domain. The five domains are:
For each domain, the assessment determines a maturity level on the following scale:
CAT FFIEC is meant to be completed periodically, but also after significant technological or operational changes. It is a self-assessment, which could be validated by an auditor. After disputes on the “voluntary assessment,” the tool has evolved to map better to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (revision in progress since 2019). Auditors also increasingly require that companies complete an assessment to demonstrate CAT FFIEC compliance.
The self-assessment package was designed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in partnership with the CERT Division of SEI, Carnegie Mellon University, as a derivative of the CERT-RMM tailored to the needs of critical infrastructure owners and operators.
As in CERT-RMM, CRR considers that an organization deploys its assets (people, information, technology, facilities) to support specific operational missions or critical services. Then the assessment of capabilities in performing, planning, managing, measuring, and defining operational resilience practices and behaviors is performed in the following ten domains: Asset Management; Controls Management; Configuration and Change Management; Vulnerability Management; Incident Management; Service Continuity Management; Risk Management; External Dependency Management; Training and Awareness; Situational Awareness. The domains are derived from CERT-RMM and are similar to the ten domains of C2M2. The assessment is based on the CERT-RMM method and could be performed in two ways: self-assessment or in a facilitated session.
CMMC is the new Cybersecurity Maturity Model Assessment requirement for all Defense Industrial Base (DIB) members that are suppliers to the DoD. All DIB companies will be required to get third-party certification to meet one of five maturity levels required to submit proposals on government contracts. We include this model in the review as it contains the most detailed up-to-date requirements and assessment criteria not only for the organization’s resilience but for the entire ecosystem (such as national security and defense). The model specifies 17 capability domains with 43 capabilities and 171 practices across five maturity levels to measure technical capabilities: Performed, Documented, Managed, Reviewed, Optimizing (somewhat different from the levels in CMMI and CERT-RMM). The logic of the CMMC levels is different, as it provides a means of improving the alignment of maturity processes and cybersecurity practices with the sensitivity of the information to be protected and the range of threats. Accordingly, the levels are defined as:
Level 1: Safeguard Federal Contract Information (FCI)
Level 2: Serve as a transition step in the progression to protect CUI
Level 3: Protect Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)
Levels 4-5: Protect CUI and reduce the risk of Advanced Persistent Threats.
The domains correspond to the security-related areas in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and the related security requirements from NIST frameworks. The 17 domains are: Access Control; Asset Management; Audit and Accountability; Awareness and Training; Configuration Management; Identification and Authentication; Incident Response; Maintenance; Media Protection; Personnel Security; Physical Protection; Recovery; Risk Management; Security Assessment; Situational Awareness; System and Communications Protection; System and Information Integrity.
We briefly cover one more systematic and architectural view of the MITRE methodology for assessing cyber resiliency which is based on the Systems-of-Systems (SOS)  approach and allows to define and assess the cyber resilience metrics at different levels and scope, going up to national and transnational enterprises:
The proposed metrics can facilitate the development of technical indicators to assess the risks and dependability (thus the possible cascading effects, escalating impact) of systems and then prioritize improvement programs.
With the increasing interest and ambition of nations to accelerate improvement programs and promote their achievements internationally, another instrument of evaluation and ranking countries’ status is the international/global indexes. There are many indexes established already for decades in areas like information society development, digital readiness, internet connectivity, computer literacy, etc. ITU published in 2017 an “Index of cybersecurity indices”  with the most popular international cybersecurity indexes. We will comment on three of them with a focus on assessing countries.
Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI), ITU : An assessment framework based on the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) of ITU. The GCI measures the commitment of countries to cybersecurity at a global level. The assessment measures a country’s level of development or engagement through a question-based online survey structured along five pillars—Legal Measures, Technical Measures, Organizational Measures, Capacity Building, and Cooperation—using 25 indicators and additional sub-indicators, and then calculating an overall score. Since the first survey in 2013, GCI promotes cybersecurity initiatives through comparison. The third issue of GCI (in 2018), covering more than 193 countries and producing three regional reports, shows considerable improvements in cybersecurity worldwide, as more countries have cybersecurity strategies, national plans, response teams, and specific legislation. However, a significant gap between regions is still observed.
National Cybersecurity Index (NCSI) : Global index, measuring the preparedness of countries to prevent cyber threats and manage cyber incidents, crime, and crises on a large scale. The Estonian e-Governance Academy develops it in cooperation with the Estonian Foreign Ministry. The index emphasizes the public aspects of national cybersecurity implemented by the central government. The index has 12 main indicators with sub-indicators, divided into three groups: General Cyber Security, Baseline Cyber Security, Incident and Crisis Management. The indicators have been tied to information society and cybersecurity issues such as e-identity, digital signature, and the existence of a secure environment for e-services. NCSI provides publicly available evidence materials and a tool for national cybersecurity capacity building. The country ranking is compared to GCI (ITU), the ICT Development Index, and the Networked Readiness Index.
Cyber Readiness Index 2.0 (CRI 2.0) : Evaluates a nation state’s cyber maturity as well as its overall commitment to cyber issues, defines the meaning of being “cyber ready” while proposing actionable blueprints to follow. The index uses a set of seven indicators: national strategy, incident response, e-crime and law enforcement, information sharing, investment in R&D, diplomacy and trade, defense, and crisis response. One hundred twenty-five countries were studied, and the methodology is based on similar pillars as those of the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Agenda. Each country is assigned a score, while the addition of military capabilities goes beyond that covered by the ITU GCI. However, CRI 2.0 does not offer any ranking despite its scoring mechanism.
Although these and other known indexes (Kaspersky Cybersecurity Index, Cyber Maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region, etc.) are quite popular and easy to promote countries, their use as cyber maturity assessment indicators is doubtful. The areas and indicators look similar to those of the maturity models, but they lack the rigor and granularity of the maturity levels and the assessments. There are no levels, and improvement plans could not be prioritized and structured with clear stages and targets. A higher rank in the index could be a success indicator, but it is unlikely to be set as a target. The question-based scores depend largely on the engagement and motivation of local bodies to provide evidence.
The focus on cybersecurity maturity is already incorporated, and maturity assessments are recommended in most of the updated manuals and guidelines for the development of national cybersecurity strategies. In ENISA’s National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) Good Practice Guide (updated in 2016)  , there are two references to maturity and assessments during the lifecycle of strategy development and implementation. To establish baseline security measures, several complex aspects should be considered: different levels of maturity among the stakeholders, differences in terms of the operational capacity of each organization, and the different standards existing in each critical sector. Among the actions recommended is to “Create maturity self-assessment tools and encourage the stakeholder to use them.” According to Recommendation 9: “Enhance capabilities of the public and private sector,” after baseline requirements have been defined, existing capabilities need to be evaluated to identify gaps and deviations. To develop improvement plans and assess results, governments are advised to “actively support capacity building by publishing national standards, designing cyber security capability maturity models, promote and encourage the exchange of knowledge…..”
Nevertheless, a quick review of the national cybersecurity strategies (listed on ENISA’s website) shows that the word “maturity” is barely mentioned, and “maturity levels” or models are not referred to. This observation might be incomplete, as the issue might be addressed in plans and roadmaps. Some of the mentions of cyber maturity and maturity models are:
A maturity-based approach, encouraged mainly by the experience in implementing the CERT-RMM, was selected in the development of the National Cybersecurity Strategy in Bulgaria, targeting “Cyber Resilient Bulgaria in 2020.”  Cyber resilience was defined as a target state upon implementing the strategy. According to the strategy, “the achievement of cyber resilience at national level necessitates coordinated activities regarding the security and reliability of all cyberspace components and assets: information, technology, people and facilities, of the design and deployment of communication channels and services, their interdependency and interoperability.”
The strategy has an “actionable architecture” and defines nine domains (areas) with several goals per domain and sets of measures (practices) with capabilities’ indicators. For the description of ‘maturity,’ a three-layered definition of security in cyberspace is used, based on two well-established aspects:
These two aspects helped to structure goals and measures at three levels and introduce them as a generalized ‘label’ to express the kind of maturity levels not only of the organizations, but also of the state, ecosystems, community and nation. These ‘nested’ levels are briefly outlined as follows:
Furthermore, the strategy implementation phases are defined as achieving the “maturity levels” and a transition from cybersecurity to cyber resilience for the entire country, namely:
Phase 1 – Initiation (“Cyber secure institutions”): Common agreement on the priorities of the National Cybersecurity Strategy and the Roadmap. Adopt a coordinated approach and establish a common national cybersecurity system framework. Define the main structures and core capacity, development processes, and principles in coordination with key stakeholders. Catch up with NATO and the EU and ensure baseline cybersecurity. Focus on the required basic level of information security and build upon it to achieve cybersecurity at the level of the individual organizations. Define “cyber crisis” in the National Cybersecurity Coordination Network. Conduct sector-specific and cross-sector exercises involving entities such as state bodies, businesses, and academia.
Phase 2 – Development (“From capacity to capabilities”): Focus on cyber-resilient organizations and cyber-secure society, develop a coordinated response to cyber crises at the national level. Continue the prevention activities, institutionalize a robust mechanism of interaction and collaboration in case of incidents and crises. Monitor the overall “cyber picture” (situational awareness). Build basic capabilities for operational and strategic analysis and assessment, operational and technical collaboration with NATO, EU, and other international networks.
Phase 3 – Maturity (“Cyber resilient society”): Effectively collaborate at the operational and strategic levels on a national and international scale. Based on the engagement and commitment of all stakeholders, develop advanced joint capabilities in public, private, and research sectors. Identify niches, and work for leading positions and specialization in the region, EU, and NATO.
Subsequently, the national Cybersecurity Act (2018) utilized the “capability levels” approach to define requirements for essential services and critical infrastructures. Target capability levels are defined as follows: ‘Baseline’ (corresponding to cyber hygiene from the NIS Directive), ‘Cybersecure’ (or ‘performed,’ as defined by the State Agency for National Security), and ‘resilient’ (defined by the Ministry Defense in accordance to civil resilience plans and engagements to NATO and EU collective defense).
As seen, hybrid threats (like disinformation) have been addressed already in “Level 2 – Cybersecurity,” but a more systematic coverage of the “hybrid influence,” especially in the context of increased specific interest in Eastern Europe, is ongoing for the current update of the National Resilience Strategy and a Roadmap, incorporating the new cyber/hybrid influence (also known as ‘cybrid’) to both areas – peoples’ minds and critical infrastructures.
The maturity levels approach was recommended for the incorporation of cybersecurity in the “EU Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP). In a study performed by ENISA and the Science and Technology Options Assessment Panel of the European Parliament, three aspects of a safer cyber domain in the context of CSDP are considered. In the area of Capacity Building, it is stated that to facilitate capacity building, one has to be able to measure it. The study recommends using cybersecurity capacity models that allow the development and monitoring of cyber capacities and their maturity. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (CMM of GCSCC) is mentioned.
Another study on EU Financial services discusses the “…degree of digital operational resilience and cybersecurity maturity” that needs to be considered.
A novel maturity assessment framework, Cybersecurity Maturity Assessment Framework (CMAF), was recently proposed and implemented as a pilot in Greece, dedicated to assessing the compliance with the requirements of the NIS Directive. Two main applications of CMAF are foreseen: for self-assessment from operators of essential services and digital service providers (identified according to the NIS Directive as adopted by the Member States) or as an auditing tool from the competent national authorities for cybersecurity.
ENISA also provided a CSIRT Maturity Self-assessment Tool  to assist the capacity and capabilities development of national and sectoral CERTs.
In addition to the highly demanding maturity models introduced for defense acquisitions and military supply chain (like the US DoD CMMC, presented above), NATO uses the maturity levels approach to plan and assess the nations’ cyber defense capabilities development according to the ongoing Cyber Defense Pledge.
To assess the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of a sector, community, country, or region, a unified approach to define goals and measurement indicators is needed. Capability maturity models provide such a mechanism since they implement a similar architecture and regardless of possible differences in scope and definitions of domains, they produce comparable scoring of achievements and facilitate the aggregation of target states. As shown, most of the popular models could naturally map, which allows organizations to choose the most suitable for their profile and business goals. At the national level, assessments and plans could still be effectively developed, as maturity and capability levels have identical meaning. However, this challenges the ‘maturity’ of the maturity models. Since ‘cybersecurity’ covers mainly the ‘protection’ side, resilience must be introduced to complete the protect-sustain cycle. Besides, new areas like cyber-empowered hybrid threats (named ‘cybrid’) should be introduced, as none of the models studied cover yet these aspects, and “people’s minds are not a sector that we know how to protect.” Same for new disrupting technologies like AI, Quantum, 5G – the ‘innovation’ capability at higher maturity levels is not sufficient, and new domains and indicators will certainly be needed. Maturity models are helpful to align ambition and programs at a higher level (like EU Member States, US States, or regions). They are also recommended to attract and involve the SMEs in the “roadmap to maturity.”
The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent official views of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, participating organizations, or the Consortium’s editors.
George Sharkov is an Adviser to the Minister of Defense and served as a National Cybersecurity Coordinator in the period 2014-2017. He led the development of the National Cybersecurity Strategy of Bulgaria, adopted in 2016. He holds a PhD in Artificial Intelligence and specialization in applied informatics, thermography, genetics, intelligent financial and security systems. Since 2003, he is the CEO of the European Software Institute – Center Eastern Europe, Head of the Cyber Resilience Lab (CyResLab), and since 2014 leads the Cybersecurity Lab at Sofia Tech Park. E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org